Basil Dolmatov wrote:
>
> Martin Rex пиÑеÑ:
> >
> > Whether and how much the -1994 version is
> > deprecated is also a complete mystery.
>
> It is written in the text of GOST -2001
Which document are you refering to when you say "text of GOST -2001" ?
This document:
http://tools.ietf
On 12/02/2010 2:18 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
At 10:57 -0500 2/12/10, Stephen Kent wrote:
PS - I think Olafur meant "private algorithms" not personal algorithms.
See
http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml,
registrations for 253 and 254.
No I meant exaclty w
Hello All,
On Fri, 12 Feb 2010, IAB Chair wrote:
IAB statement on the RPKI.
= RPKI as a prerequisite for improving the security of the global
routing system.
To date, the Internet has operated without a secure means to certify
the allocation of Internet number resources, particularly
Edward Lewis wrote:
At 10:57 -0500 2/12/10, Stephen Kent wrote:
If we look at what the CP developed in the SIDR WG for the RPKI says, the
answer is the IESG (going forward, after an initial set of algs are
adopted
based on the SIDR WG process). In the IPSEC, TLS, and SMIME contexts,
the WGs
t
At 10:57 -0500 2/12/10, Stephen Kent wrote:
If we look at what the CP developed in the SIDR WG for the RPKI says, the
answer is the IESG (going forward, after an initial set of algs are adopted
based on the SIDR WG process). In the IPSEC, TLS, and SMIME contexts, the WGs
themselves have made the
On Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 12:29:00AM +0100, Alfred Hönes wrote:
> (3)
> I also concur with Andrew that having different requirement levels
> in a fundamental protocol that does not allow negotiation of
> crypto-algorithms also causes severe deployability concerns.
I want to be perfectly clear: I di
On Feb 12, 2010, at 7:57 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> Who gets to decide on what algorithms get first class status and based on
>> what criteria?
> If we look at what the CP developed in the SIDR WG for the RPKI says, the
> answer is the IESG
So, they're going to flip a coin or what?
"Who" is lar
(1)
There's a serious issue deeply buried in this draft,
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-06.
Let's start from a general PoV:
The signature algorithm used by this document targeted for PS is an
elliptical curve cryptography (ECC) algorithm.
Most international and national standards, including St
Basil Dolmatov wrote:
>
> Martin Rex пиÑеÑ:
>
> > Admittedly, I know very little about the cryptographic
> > details, but there are two GOST signature algorithms
> > (GOST R34.10-1994 and GOST R34.10-2001). The earlier
> > appears to bear some similarity with DH, the newer appears to bear
>
...
As a document shepeard I have made note that this is desired, but at
the same time this is a topic that was outside the scope of the working
group.
This is on the other hand a topic that belongs in the IETF review.
So my questions to the IETF (paraphrashing George Orwell)
"Are all crypto alg
On Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 03:12:30PM +0300, Basil Dolmatov wrote:
> ...have had much less _published_ cryptographic review... I would say. ;)
I am not a security expert, but I've never met one who thought that
unpublished cryptographic review was worth a dime. Moreover, for the
purposes of the IET
This is a call for comments on an individual draft regarding a
protocol-agnostic congestion management system. I and my co-authors would
like feedback on the latest revision of this draft at
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-livingood-woundy-congestion-mgmt-03.
If you have any comments, please sen
This is a call for comments on an individual draft regarding providing
near-real-time web notifications*. I and my co-authors would like feedback
on the latest revision of this draft at
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-livingood-web-notification-01.
If you have any comments, please send them to m
I agree with Steve and others saying that MAY is appropriate
for this.
S.
Stephen Kent wrote:
> I recommend that the document not be approved by the IESG in its current
> form. Section 6.1 states:
>
>> 6.1. Support for GOST signatures
>>
>>DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to su
Paul Hoffman пишет:
For example, there is already a published attack on the GOST hash function that does not exist in SHA-256 and SHA-512.
That "attack" lessens the complexity of building of the collision from
2**128 operations to 2**109 operations (infinitesimal part of overall
complexi
Martin Rex пишет:
Admittedly, I know very little about the cryptographic
details, but there are two GOST signature algorithms
(GOST R34.10-1994 and GOST R34.10-2001). The earlier
appears to bear some similarity with DH, the newer appears to bear
similarity with ECDH.
Whether and how much
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