Re: [Ietf-krb-wg] AD review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-otp-preauth

2011-08-19 Thread Greg Hudson
On Fri, 2011-08-19 at 08:53 -0400, gareth.richa...@rsa.com wrote: > I had always thought the same way as Sam, that clients would be > required to implement all of the options since there appears to be no > other way for them to support different disconnected token types. The > specification was in

Re: [Ietf-krb-wg] Last Call: (OTP Pre-authentication) to Proposed Standard

2011-08-16 Thread Greg Hudson
I have a last-call comment about the KDC-generated nonce used in 4-pass mode. I would like the text in section 3.2 changed from: This nonce string MUST be as long as the longest key length of the symmetric key types that the KDC supports and MUST be chosen randomly. to:

Re: IETF logistics

2000-12-22 Thread Greg Hudson
>> I think we can succeed in using mail for clarification (like we're >> doing now). We all just have to be willing to look stupid now and >> then. > One picture often says more than a 1000 words. Pictures can be sent (by reference, one hopes) over mailing lists as well. But it's more than tha

Re: Acronims' ambiquity

2000-06-01 Thread Greg Hudson
> There are a lot of such acronims, and although in shown examples it > does not make much difference I met several very confusing. Is there > any document specifying the use and meaning of acronims? "The Tao of IETF" gives the meaning of some acronyms, but in general I imagine that it would be a

Re: NAT->IPv6

2000-04-26 Thread Greg Hudson
> But anybody clear understand that if your internal hosts do not have > a public address then all attacks may be only static - wait until > internal host open TCP to somewhere. This is a naive understanding. Source-routing would let me get packets through to an internal address unless your NAT

Re: draft-ietf-nat-protocol-complications-02.txt

2000-04-21 Thread Greg Hudson
> doesn't this require the NAT to use the same inside<->outside > address binding for the connection between the client and the KDC as > for the connection between the client and the application server? > e.g. it seems like the NAT could easily change address bindings > during the lifetime of a ti

Re: draft-ietf-nat-protocol-complications-02.txt

2000-04-21 Thread Greg Hudson
I'd like to make some clarifications about Kerberos and NAT. >> When AUTH is used with Kerberos 4 and Kerberos 5 there are issues >> related to the IP addresses which are embedded into the Kerberos >> tickets which specify the valid machines from which the tickets are >> valid. > Are you saying