Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-06 Thread Frank Ellermann
The IESG wrote: > as an Informational RFC The "bypass" construct apparently includes what's also known as "challenge response scheme". If that's the case it's net abuse, unless the challenge is guaranteed to be sent to the originator. The only relevant case where that's guaranteed I'm aware o

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-07 Thread Eliot Lear
Frank, I'd have to go further than what you wrote. I believe the document should explicitly discuss interactions with DKIM, as that document is in front of the IESG at this time for approval as a Proposed Standard. Many modifications to a message will invalidate a DKIM signature. It may be

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-08 Thread Ted Hardie
At 9:21 AM +0100 1/7/07, Eliot Lear wrote: >Frank, > >I'd have to go further than what you wrote. I believe the document should >explicitly discuss interactions with DKIM, as that document is in front of the >IESG at this time for approval as a Proposed Standard. Many modifications to >a messa

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-08 Thread Frank Ellermann
Ted Hardie wrote: > I don't think adding explicit interactions with DKIM is appropriate > for this document, If OPES sees the complete message (header + body) it could be used as signer (conceptually somewhere between MSA and mailout) or verifier (between MX and MDA, if it has DNS access). That'

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-10 Thread Eliot Lear
Hi Ted, I don't think adding explicit interactions with DKIM is appropriate for this document, which is a high-level informational document on the set of problems of adapting OPES (developed in a bidirectional model) to SMTP, which has very different usage. The reason I'm concerned is tha

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-10 Thread Ted Hardie
At 4:59 PM +0100 1/10/07, Eliot Lear wrote: > >The reason I'm concerned is that any form of OPES might invalidate a DKIM >signature. What can we say in a DKIM sense about OPES trace information? Do you mean, should a DKIM server sign OPES trace information? The DKIM base document says: 4. Se

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-10 Thread Dave Crocker
Ted Hardie wrote: At 4:59 PM +0100 1/10/07, Eliot Lear wrote: The reason I'm concerned is that any form of OPES might invalidate a DKIM signature. What can we say in a DKIM sense about OPES trace information? Do you mean, should a DKIM server sign OPES trace information? Maybe one of you

RE: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-11 Thread Stecher,Martin
> > I never got the OPES idea. Of course folks can do their A/V > and SIEVE and SIQ (I-D.irtf-asrg-iar-howe-siq-03) businesss > on a separate box, they can even outsource it, but they do > this already without OPES. > So what's the technical point of OPES wrt mail ? > OPES' technical point

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-11 Thread Dave Crocker
Stechter, Thanks for the followup. Stecher,Martin wrote: This will allow to create such a separate filter box that you mentioned but have it negotiate with different proxies and gateways what kind of protocol/data it can handle. Given what you say at the end of this sentence, I assume this i

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-11 Thread Tony Finch
On Thu, 11 Jan 2007, Dave Crocker wrote: > > As has been clear for some time, the OPES topic is both important and > difficult. That sort of combination always makes want to look for some > history of exerience with ways to solve the current problem. In the case > of OPES, I do not know of a quali

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-11 Thread Markus Hofmann
Tony Finch wrote: If the current document is intended as a case analysis for a particular application -- namely email -- to serve as *input* to the design of the OPES architecture and protocols, then I do not see how the current document achieves that. I believe it's intended to fit the existi

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-11 Thread Frank Ellermann
Markus Hofmann wrote: > The intend of publishing this document before dissolving the WG is to > have the discussion on how the IAB considerations apply to OPES/SMTP > written down, in case individual contributors might pick-up the > OPES/SMTP work later on (although we don't have indication this m

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-11 Thread Barry Leiba
Eliot Lear said... I'd have to go further than what you wrote. I believe the document should explicitly discuss interactions with DKIM, as that document is in front of the IESG at this time for approval as a Proposed Standard. Many modifications to a message will invalidate a DKIM signature.

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-13 Thread Douglas Otis
On Fri, 2007-01-12 at 00:42 -0500, Barry Leiba wrote: > Eliot Lear said... > > I'd have to go further than what you wrote. I believe the document > > should explicitly discuss interactions with DKIM, as that document is in > > front of the IESG at this time for approval as a Proposed Standard.

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-13 Thread Dave Crocker
Markus Hofmann wrote: The intend of publishing this document before dissolving the WG is to have the discussion on how the IAB considerations apply to OPES/SMTP written down, in case individual contributors might pick-up the OPES/SMTP work later on (although we don't have indication this migh

Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security (Integrity, privacy and security in OPES for SMTP) to Informational RFC

2007-01-13 Thread Markus Hofmann
Dave, Thank you. This is extremely helpful. I suggest that the document have something like your above text added to the Introduction. Agreed, good suggestion. We'll add some words in. Thanks, Markus ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https:/