Russ Housley wrote:
We all know that there is not going to be a single name form that is
useful in all situations. We also know that you cannot put every useful
name form into the certificate. In fact, the appropriate value can
change within the normal lifetime of a certificate, so putting
"Stefan Santesson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Eric,
>
> In a general sense, name hints are IDs and IDs are not secrets and no
> security system should depend on them being secrets.
>
> However, there might be privacy concerns on where and when you want to
> send what ID info to whom. We may e.g
Call: 'TLS User Mapping Extension'
toProposedStandard
Eric:
> > I can see many situations where the information in this is not
> > sensitive. In fact, in the primary use case, the use mapping
> > information is not sensitive. An enterprise PKI is used in this
> >
Eric:
> I can see many situations where the information in this is not
> sensitive. In fact, in the primary use case, the use mapping
> information is not sensitive. An enterprise PKI is used in this
> situation, and the TLS extension is used to map the subject name in
> the certificate to the
Russ Housley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I can see many situations where the information in this is not
> sensitive. In fact, in the primary use case, the use mapping
> information is not sensitive. An enterprise PKI is used in this
> situation, and the TLS extension is used to map the subject
I can see many situations where the information in this is not
sensitive. In fact, in the primary use case, the use mapping
information is not sensitive. An enterprise PKI is used in this
situation, and the TLS extension is used to map the subject name in
the certificate to the host account n
"Stefan Santesson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Adding to Ari's arguments.
> There is one more argument why it would less functional to send the
> mapping data in the extension.
>
> The current draft under last call also includes a negotiation mechanism
> where the client and server can agree on w
tefan Santesson
Program Manager, Standards Liaison
Windows Security
-Original Message-
From: Ari Medvinsky [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: den 21 februari 2006 02:32
To: Eric Rescorla; ietf@ietf.org
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; iesg@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [TLS] Re: Last Call: 'TLS Us
