On 10/29/2023 1:51 PM, Jan Dušátko wrote:
In my opinion, the verifiability of the place and time of origin needs
to be addressed, which is one of the reasons to use DKIM:
While I think I understand the basis for thinking that DKIM is relevant
to that determination, it isn't. It's semantics
Jan Dušátko writes:
> In my opinion, the verifiability of the place and time of origin needs
> to be addressed, which is one of the reasons to use DKIM:
> - Ed25519 has a security equivalent of 125b, a little less than the
> currently required security equivalent 128b (more-less the same)
> - Ed4
Dne 27. 10. 2023 v 23:02 John Levine napsal(a):
It appears that Scott Kitterman said:
On October 27, 2023 2:56:30 PM UTC, "Murray S. Kucherawy"
wrote:
On Sun, Oct 1, 2023 at 1:50 AM Jan Dušátko
wrote:
I would like to ask to consider the possibility of defining a DKIM
signature using Ed
I do appreciate the discussion here, but the current issue we’re trying to
address is the problem statement.
laura
> On 29 Oct 2023, at 12:12, John R Levine wrote:
>
>> Future proofing? The history of encryption is riddled with examples of
>> overconfidence.
>
> Well, sure, and I would not
Future proofing? The history of encryption is riddled with examples of
overconfidence.
Well, sure, and I would not be opposed to revisiting this issue in a
decade.
As Scott noted, approximately nobody handles ed25519 yet, and nobody will
until there is some reason to believe that RSA signatu
