Re: [Ietf-dkim] What makes this posting different from the original posting?

2023-08-31 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hi Bron, On 01/09/2023 02:02, Bron Gondwana wrote: Fact: recipient spam filter has more information than sender spam filter I've no axe to grind here, but wondered - is there e.g. a peer-reviewed publication that conclusively demonstrates that? Not saying that that's necessary, but I wondere

Re: [Ietf-dkim] replay clues

2023-02-12 Thread Stephen Farrell
On 12/02/2023 17:28, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote: Have they not been getting consideration? I know I've been replying to many of his comments. I didn't mean to imply he was being ignored, sorry if it sounded that way. Cheers, S. OpenPGP_0xE4D8E9F997A833DD.asc Description: OpenPGP public key

Re: [Ietf-dkim] replay clues

2023-02-11 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, FWIW, as this discussion has a bit of a flavour of one person arguing with a bigger bunch of people, I'd like to say that Mike is asking good questions that deserve consideration. I don't have a position as to what may or may not be worth doing in this space, but I figure I'll find it eas

Re: [Ietf-dkim] Rechartering

2022-12-03 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, On 03/12/2022 06:38, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote: I've placed what I believe is the text that is closest to consensus in the datatracker: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-dkim/ Please provide comments or criticism soon. Once it appears to be stable relative to this audience,

Re: [Ietf-dkim] DKIM key rotation best practice

2020-08-10 Thread Stephen Farrell
n just publishing private keys when one is finished with 'em (plus a bit). S. > > ==Mike > >> On Aug 10, 2020, at 7:06 PM, Stephen Farrell >> wrote: >> >>  >> >>> On 10/08/2020 23:36, Brandon Long wrote: >>> Isn't publishing

Re: [Ietf-dkim] DKIM key rotation best practice

2020-08-10 Thread Stephen Farrell
On 10/08/2020 23:36, Brandon Long wrote: > Isn't publishing the private key the opposite of recovery? > > Ie, it's basically a mechanism for plausible deniability. > > "The key is public, anyone could have made that message." Yep. And for DKIM, it's a mechanism I'd myself like to see well-defi

Re: [Ietf-dkim] Thinking About DKIM and Surveillance

2019-10-02 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, Had a quick flick through the paper. Good work but not something that could yet be immediately used (which is entirely reasonable). Nonetheless it'd be good to see work done in this space. I do however disagree with some of the motivations for the smarter crypto: - The authors say: "The p

Re: [Ietf-dkim] Thinking About DKIM and Surveillance

2019-10-02 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, On 02/10/2019 22:01, Mark Delany wrote: > What might give it more strength is if many people adopted key swap > otherwise a solitary Snowden-like operative publishing a private key > in an essentially obscure location on the Internet is unlikely to > convince a judge that security thru obsc

Re: [Ietf-dkim] Thinking About DKIM and Surveillance

2019-10-02 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hiya, On 02/10/2019 20:29, Jon Callas wrote: > Thus, any discussion of it is good. I really liked it. Please read it. I will (but haven't yet:-). Personally I'd advocate for implementations that regularly cycle signing keys and publish previous private key values, also in the DNS perhaps, or co