Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Hector Santos
- Original Message - From: "SM" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Stephen Farrell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Jeff Macdonald" > >And can't the threats document (& later, whatever relevant spec) not > >just say "don't do that" and thus avoid the problem? > > The DKIM draft mentions: > >"Under no cir

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread SM
Hi, At 14:25 17-11-2005, Stephen Farrell wrote: And can't the threats document (& later, whatever relevant spec) not just say "don't do that" and thus avoid the problem? The DKIM draft mentions: "Under no circumstances should an unsigned header field be displayed in any context that might

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Hector Santos
- Original Message - From: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Hector Santos" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > On Nov 17, 2005, at 1:12 PM, Hector Santos wrote: > > > Doug, > > > > It will be helpful to be distinctive and to distinguish which > > policies in > > DKIM/SSP you are concern about:

RE: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Bill.Oxley
Doug, If the hash validates to the signing domain and first sender, why is it nescessary that the two domains be the same? thanks, Bill -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Douglas Otis Sent: Thu 11/17/2005 6:43 PM To: Stephen Farrell Cc: IETF-DKIM Subject: Re: [ietf

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Douglas Otis
On Nov 17, 2005, at 1:12 PM, Hector Santos wrote: Doug, It will be helpful to be distinctive and to distinguish which policies in DKIM/SSP you are concern about: All but Never and None. : ) Please don't misunderstand, DKIM offers a tremendous advantage, but reliance upon a domain being

RE: [ietf-dkim] DKIM Charter Comments

2005-11-17 Thread Jim Schaad
Stephen, > -Original Message- > From: Stephen Farrell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2005 2:36 AM > To: Jim Schaad > Cc: 'Barry Leiba'; 'IETF DKIM WG' > Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] DKIM Charter Comments > > > Hi Jim, > > Jim Schaad wrote: > > I have the followin

RE: [ietf-dkim] DKIM Charter Comments

2005-11-17 Thread Jim Schaad
Dave, > -Original Message- > From: Dave Crocker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2005 10:08 PM > To: Jim Schaad > Cc: 'IETF DKIM WG' > Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] DKIM Charter Comments > > > > > 4. It is not clear to me that you can separate the > development of

Re: [ietf-dkim] DKIM charter

2005-11-17 Thread Arvel Hathcock
I propose striking the entire paragraph. And I propose ignoring that proposal. Can we move on now? -- Arvel ___ ietf-dkim mailing list http://dkim.org

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Douglas Otis
On Nov 17, 2005, at 2:27 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: Doug - quick and simple question: does all of this depend on there being >1 From address? First-party policy mandates (the only mode restricting use and somewhat protecting reputation) requires the _first_ email-address correspond to the

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Hector Santos
I'll be really interested in which POLICY causes this low likelihood, low impact problem? -- Hector - Original Message - From: "Stephen Farrell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: "IETF-DKIM" Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2005 5:27 PM Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim]

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Stephen Farrell
Doug - quick and simple question: does all of this depend on there being >1 From address? Douglas Otis wrote: DKIM should serve as an excellent mechanism for verifying the domain accountable for the MTA to MTA exchange at the transport level. However, once the email-address is bound in some

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Stephen Farrell
Jeff Macdonald wrote: On Thu, 2005-11-17 at 22:02 +0100, Eliot Lear wrote: Douglas Otis wrote: From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Mustang Sally <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Introducing similar visual confusion for list-servers the following will appear: From: IETF-DKIM No-Reply <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Doug

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Jeff Macdonald
On Thu, 2005-11-17 at 22:02 +0100, Eliot Lear wrote: > Douglas Otis wrote: > > From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Mustang Sally <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > Introducing similar visual confusion for list-servers the following will > > appear: > > > > From: IETF-DKIM No-Reply <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Douglas O

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Douglas Otis
On Nov 17, 2005, at 1:02 PM, Eliot Lear wrote: Douglas Otis wrote: From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Mustang Sally <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Introducing similar visual confusion for list-servers the following will appear: From: IETF-DKIM No-Reply <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Douglas Otis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Hector Santos
Doug, It will be helpful to be distinctive and to distinguish which policies in DKIM/SSP you are concern about: NONE (no policy declared) o=? WEAK (signature optional, no third party) o=~ NEUTRAL (signature optional, 3rd party allowed) o=- STRONG (signature required, 3rd

Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Eliot Lear
Douglas Otis wrote: From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Mustang Sally <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Introducing similar visual confusion for list-servers the following will appear: From: IETF-DKIM No-Reply <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Douglas Otis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Yes, this is valid 2822. I wonder what it brea

[ietf-dkim] SSP security relies upon the visual domain appearance

2005-11-17 Thread Douglas Otis
DKIM should serve as an excellent mechanism for verifying the domain accountable for the MTA to MTA exchange at the transport level. However, once the email-address is bound in some manner to the transport, a set of significant problems arise. In the current SSP draft: 2.9 Verifier Accept

[ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM DNS record types

2005-11-17 Thread Frank Ellermann
wayne wrote: >> The SSP part is short enough to be mirrored in SPF, either >> inline as "modifier", or as its own record using the same >> record type 99. > I think this would be A Bad Idea because neither of the DKIM > records have a required magic number at the beinning of the > record. Addin

[ietf-dkim] Re: Threat analysis kickoff

2005-11-17 Thread Frank Ellermann
Jim Fenton wrote: > In some cases (2821-zoo) it appears you agree Yes, in other words, if DKIM is all you have - either as "signer" or as "checker" - it must still make sense. > in others it appears that you are describing new threats Not really, I just like your idea to sort the threats by pro

Re: [ietf-dkim] DKIM Charter Comments

2005-11-17 Thread Stephen Farrell
Hi Jim, Jim Schaad wrote: I have the following comments on the draft charter: 1. The second paragraph has the sentence: The DKIM working group will also produce security requirements to guide their efforts, and will analyze the impact on senders and receivers who are not using DKIM, particul