On Mon, 13 Nov 2006 21:06:58 -, Hallam-Baker, Phillip
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
LEMMA-1: The objective of policy is to allow a verifier to draw
conclusions from the absence of satisfactory authentication
PROOF:
AXIOM-1: The objective of policy is to influence the verifier
AXIO
On Mon, 13 Nov 2006 16:20:07 -, Dave Crocker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Charles Lindsey wrote:
Well that implies that every MUA worldwide needs to be upgraded before
this whitelist solution will work.
A whitelist is useful as soon as a single recipient (filter, user,
whatever) can appl
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Charles Lindsey
> Sent: Tuesday, November 14, 2006 7:58 AM
> To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
> Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Policy decision tree outcomes
>
> On Mon, 13 Nov 2006 21:06:58 -, Hallam-Baker, Phillip
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Folks,
OK. So I didn't understand how visible the effects of my experiment would be,
or how much impact it would have on folks' filters, ability to reply to bounce
messages, etc.
Those using the List-ID header field for filtering are notably affected.
Up until now, the domain name "dkim.org
Hi Phill,
Thanks for taking the time to respond like this. I th
Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
Before looking at the issue of whether downgrade attacks are important let us
look at the possible outcomes of a policy mechanism.
LEMMA-1: The objective of policy is to allow a verifier to draw con
Eric Allman wrote:
>
> --On November 8, 2006 12:05:07 AM +0200 Pekka Savola
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> ==> what is the expected verifier's behaviour if one or more of
>> these MUST/MUST NOTs doesn't hold? AFAICS, that hasn't been
>> specified, at least not very clearly. Should it be?
>
