At 17:06 12-06-2009, Steve Atkins wrote:
>I've seen interop problems caused very recently by a deep
>misunderstanding of what g= is for and how it interacts with i=. "We
>tried DKIM and gmail / yahoo said our signatures were invalid" is
>hurting adoption by senders today, and I'm sure some of that
On Jun 12, 2009, at 6:34 AM,
wrote:
> Okay, I would like to keep what we have, removing pieces is not a
> good idea, people don't have to use the tags if they don't want to
Implementors have to, for DKIM verifiers at least. Also, even DKIM
signers have to either understand the semantics
Jim Fenton wrote:
> Can you clarify what IESG concern this is attempting to address?
Frankly, for that level of question, I suggest you direct it to our area
director. That will be far more efficient than my attempting to channel him
and
the rest of the IESG.
d/
--
Dave Crocker
Can you clarify what IESG concern this is attempting to address? I
looked at the IESG evaluation record for the draft
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/idtracker/ballot/3084/) and didn't see
anything that this change would address, except possibly Cullen's
comment that he asked three developers what c
Wietse Venema wrote:
> If it helps to avoid stepping on sensitive toes, you could drop
> the last sentence, but I can live with it.
I'm pretty sure that the toe compression problem is inseparable from breathing
and certainly is joined at the hip with posting any email at all.
What appeals to m
On Jun 12, 2009, at 4:47 AM, Charles Lindsey wrote:
> On Thu, 11 Jun 2009 15:34:19 +0100, Michael Thomas
> wrote:
>> J.D. Falk wrote:
>>> Michael Thomas wrote:
>>>
There is *NO* *REASON* to strip signatures. NONE.
In fact it is HARMFUL.
>>
>> Well for starters, RFC4871 section 3
On Jun 11, 2009, at 11:50 PM, Dave CROCKER wrote:
>
> Existing Introduction text:
>
>> This currently leaves signers and assessors with the potential
>> for having differing -- and therefore non-interoperable --
>> interpretations of how DKIM operates.
>>
>> This update resolves this confu
Okay, I would like to keep what we have, removing pieces is not a good idea,
people don't have to use the tags if they don't want to and we MAY have a need
for them in the future. The tags were discussed at length during the original
draft. Removing them after the fact doesn't help or hurt adopt
Dave CROCKER:
> Proposed text:
>
>This currently leaves signers and assessors with the potential for
> making different interpretations between the two identifiers and may
> lead to interoperability problems. A signer could intend one to be
> used for reputation,
Charles Lindsey wrote:
> In general +1 to all that, though I am not as passionate as Michael, and
> can accept that hopelessly broken signatures _might_ occasionally be
> removed.
>
> But by and large, I do not want to prevent Forensics.
Whats odd about all this is that it perpetuates the key dif
> Proposed text:
>
> This currently leaves signers and assessors with the potential for
> making different interpretations between the two identifiers and may
> lead to interoperability problems. A signer could intend one to be
> used for reputation, and have a non-rep
This text inappropriately makes a normative requirement on reputation
systems. Reputation
systems are explicitly outside of the scope of our charter. As well they
should be as there
has been no discussion about reputation systems may or may not find
useful, let alone
require, from DKIM.
On Thu, 11 Jun 2009 15:34:19 +0100, Michael Thomas wrote:
> J.D. Falk wrote:
>> Michael Thomas wrote:
>>
>>> There is *NO* *REASON* to strip signatures. NONE.
>>>
>>> In fact it is HARMFUL.
>>
> Well for starters, RFC4871 section 3.5:
>
> And from RFC2822 section 3.6:
>
> And then RFC4871 sect
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