On Jul 14, 2007, at 7:23 PM, Dave Crocker wrote:
Michael Thomas wrote:
Dave Crocker wrote:
I think a simple and appropriate model, here, is that the
receive-side should be given information that permits it to
detect external attacks -- that is, misbehaviors by actors
external to the o
Michael Thomas wrote:
Dave Crocker wrote:
I think a simple and appropriate model, here, is that the
receive-side should be given information that permits it to detect
external attacks -- that is, misbehaviors by actors external to the
origin-side.
...
In which case, the bob and jane @
On Jul 8, 2007, at 4:46 PM, Steve Atkins wrote:
On Jul 8, 2007, at 4:37 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
Steve pointed out to me that a basic challenge, here, is that
DKIM does not define a signature as meaning that the signer is
asserting the truthfulness of any particular bit of information
On Jul 8, 2007, at 4:37 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
Steve pointed out to me that a basic challenge, here, is that
DKIM does not define a signature as meaning that the signer is
asserting the truthfulness of any particular bit of information in
the message. That's the inherent difference b
On Jul 8, 2007, at 11:42 AM, Dave Crocker wrote:
An offline discussion with Steve Atkins has been helpful in
highlighting a two distinctions in function and implementation
design that the group should consider. He pressed quite hard, for
some of what follows, but I won't claim that I'm sp
Dave Crocker wrote:
1. Internal vs. External
The difference between recruiting the recipient to enforce
origin-side policies concerning origin-side participants, versus
enabling the recipient to detect misbehaviors by actors external to
the origin-side.
I think a simple and appropri
An offline discussion with Steve Atkins has been helpful in highlighting a two
distinctions in function and implementation design that the group should
consider. He pressed quite hard, for some of what follows, but I won't claim
that I'm speaking on his behalf; I just want to make sure it's cle
