Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-11 Thread Dave CROCKER
On 7/10/2011 7:51 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote: -Original Message- From: ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org [mailto:ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of Scott Kitterman Sent: Sunday, July 10, 2011 6:46 PM To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language

Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-11 Thread J.D. Falk
@mipassoc.org Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core I think we should make it clear that singleton header fields like From (and Subject and Date) can be added without breaking signatures unless one is careful as a signer and/or a verifier. This is related to a core

Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-10 Thread Hector Santos
Michael Deutschmann wrote: One additional thought on the whole double-From: argument -- if RFC language on the issue is justified at all, it really belongs in the ADSP RFC, not a core DKIM one. A double-From: doesn't even rise to the level of theoretical threat except when dealing with ADSP

Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-10 Thread Michael Deutschmann
On Sun, 10 Jul 2011, Hector Santos wrote: Now of course, if ADSP was a standard and whitehouse.com had an exclusive signing policy, receivers would of rejected the junk distributed by Dave's list server as an ADSP violation. But ADSP is a pipe dream. The attack only matters if the user

Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-10 Thread McDowell, Brett
-1 --- Sent from my mobile phone On Jul 10, 2011, at 3:58 AM, Michael Deutschmann mich...@talamasca.ocis.net wrote: On Sun, 10 Jul 2011, Hector Santos wrote: Now of course, if ADSP was a standard and whitehouse.com had an exclusive signing policy, receivers would of rejected the junk

Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-10 Thread Hector Santos
Well, you have a point: DKIM has failed to address legacy spoofing problems. The hope was this would be one of the highest and immediate benefits when an domain raised the bar by what was expected in his mail and supportive receivers saw deviations from the domain's published policy

Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-10 Thread Michael Deutschmann
On Sun, 10 Jul 2011, Hector Santos wrote: Well, you have a point: DKIM has failed to address legacy spoofing problems. That's not quite the point I intended to make. I consider it faintly possible that a situation could arise where a lazy validation module embedded in an MTA always

Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-10 Thread Scott Kitterman
On Saturday, July 09, 2011 07:19:17 PM Michael Deutschmann wrote: One additional thought on the whole double-From: argument -- if RFC language on the issue is justified at all, it really belongs in the ADSP RFC, not a core DKIM one. A double-From: doesn't even rise to the level of

Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-10 Thread Murray S. Kucherawy
-Original Message- From: ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org [mailto:ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of Michael Deutschmann Sent: Sunday, July 10, 2011 12:53 AM To: DKIM List Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core The attack only matters

Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-10 Thread Murray S. Kucherawy
-Original Message- From: ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org [mailto:ietf-dkim-boun...@mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of Scott Kitterman Sent: Sunday, July 10, 2011 6:46 PM To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core I think we should

[ietf-dkim] Doublefrom language should be in ADSP, not core

2011-07-09 Thread Michael Deutschmann
One additional thought on the whole double-From: argument -- if RFC language on the issue is justified at all, it really belongs in the ADSP RFC, not a core DKIM one. A double-From: doesn't even rise to the level of theoretical threat except when dealing with ADSP (or a successor). If we, for