Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: NEW ISSUE: Simplify SSP decision tree

2007-12-12 Thread Damon
+1. Enough +1's on this one? Regards, Damon Sauer ___ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html

Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: NEW ISSUE: Simplify SSP decision tree

2007-12-11 Thread Jeff Macdonald
On Mon, Dec 10, 2007 at 11:30:15AM -0800, Michael Thomas wrote: Frank Ellermann wrote: Michael Thomas wrote: Part of the problem is that "softfail" and "hardfail" don't make much intuitive sense. For SPF (and Sender ID) a SOFTFAIL is what SSP has as t-flag, and an Authentication-Resu

Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: NEW ISSUE: Simplify SSP decision tree

2007-12-11 Thread Hector Santos
Jon Callas wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 For receivers accepting "hardfail", not exactly the ideal course, but receivers are free to shoot into their own foot. Aim higher. Well, FWIW, I don't think that t=testing is at all helpful either. What, for example, does p=str

Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: NEW ISSUE: Simplify SSP decision tree

2007-12-11 Thread Jon Callas
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Dec 10, 2007, at 11:30 AM, Michael Thomas wrote: > Frank Ellermann wrote: >> Michael Thomas wrote: >> >> >>> Part of the problem is that "softfail" and "hardfail" don't make >>> much intuitive sense. >>> >> >> For SPF (and Sender ID) a SOFTFAIL is

Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: NEW ISSUE: Simplify SSP decision tree

2007-12-10 Thread Arvel Hathcock
Well, FWIW, I don't think that t=testing is at all helpful either. +1 And it will help lower the 10 steps to something less which, if this is necessary at all, would be a good thing. Arvel ___ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mi

Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: NEW ISSUE: Simplify SSP decision tree

2007-12-10 Thread Dave Crocker
Michael Thomas wrote: Well, FWIW, I don't think that t=testing is at all helpful either. What, for example, does p=strict, t=testing mean? It seems like a silly-state to me and ripe for confusion. It's that sort of subjective state that we should both learn from SPF and avoid. +1. d/ --

Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: NEW ISSUE: Simplify SSP decision tree

2007-12-10 Thread Michael Thomas
Frank Ellermann wrote: Michael Thomas wrote: Part of the problem is that "softfail" and "hardfail" don't make much intuitive sense. For SPF (and Sender ID) a SOFTFAIL is what SSP has as t-flag, and an Authentication-Results: hardfail is just a FAIL (for SPF etc.). For receivers accep

[ietf-dkim] Re: NEW ISSUE: Simplify SSP decision tree

2007-12-10 Thread Frank Ellermann
Michael Thomas wrote: > Part of the problem is that "softfail" and "hardfail" don't make > much intuitive sense. For SPF (and Sender ID) a SOFTFAIL is what SSP has as t-flag, and an Authentication-Results: hardfail is just a FAIL (for SPF etc.). For receivers accepting "hardfail", not exactly th