On 2006-09-11 13:09, Hector Santos wrote:
The acceptance criteria is completely external to DKIM -- Steve
labeled it as "B" in the portion you quoted above.
Why is this such a difficult concept?
Nothing at all, but reputation is out of scope. Or is it? Where is the
specification? Whose rep
- Original Message -
From: "J.D. Falk" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Yahoo! will use Yahoo!'s internal systems to make our own internal
> decisions about each message. AOL will, I'm sure, use AOL's.
> Everyone will make their own decision in their own way, just
> like today -- perhaps with a 3rd
On Sep 11, 2006, at 5:05 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
There are so many issues with this DKIM-BASE + LOCAL POLICY UNKNOWN
that I find it hard to see how it justifies the risk of signing.
What issues and risks do you refer to with respect to signing?
How does policy ameliorate these issues and r
- Original Message -
From: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Hector Santos" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "IETF-DKIM"
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 8:22 PM
Subject: Re: accept, deny, or other delivery decisions (was Re: [ietf-dkim]
SSP= FAIL
On 2006-09-11 17:05, Hector Santos wrote:
- Original Message -
From: "J.D. Falk" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Yahoo! will use Yahoo!'s internal systems to make our own internal
decisions about each message. AOL will, I'm sure, use AOL's.
Everyone will make their own decision in their own way,
On Sep 11, 2006, at 5:50 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
On Sep 11, 2006, at 5:05 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
There are so many issues with this DKIM-BASE + LOCAL POLICY
UNKNOWN that I find it hard to see how it justifies the risk of
signing.
What issues and risks do you refer to with respect to si
- Original Message -
From: "J.D. Falk" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> In what way?
> IP address is an input. Each URL in the message is an input.
> Virus scanning results on attachments are an input.
> Filtering hasn't been binary for years.
Not sure of the "binary" relationship, but these are
- Original Message -
From: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> - Inconsistent results.
>
> Either the signature is valid or it is not. This does not depend
> upon policy
> ...
> Can you be a bit more specific about what do you mean by
> inconsistent results?
I was referrering to the
On Sep 11, 2006, at 7:07 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
- Original Message -
From: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Inconsistent results.
Either the signature is valid or it is not. This does not depend
upon policy
...
Can you be a bit more specific about what do you mean by
inconsi
On Monday 11 September 2006 22:38, Steve Atkins wrote:
> On Sep 11, 2006, at 7:07 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
> > - Original Message -
> > From: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >
> >>> - Inconsistent results.
> >>
> >> Either the signature is valid or it is not. This does not depend
> >>
On Monday 11 September 2006 21:29, J.D. Falk wrote:
> On 2006-09-11 17:05, Hector Santos wrote:
> > - Original Message -
> > From: "J.D. Falk" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >
> >> Yahoo! will use Yahoo!'s internal systems to make our own internal
> >> decisions about each message. AOL will, I'm su
On Sep 11, 2006, at 8:08 PM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
On Monday 11 September 2006 22:38, Steve Atkins wrote:
On Sep 11, 2006, at 7:07 PM, Hector Santos wrote:
- Original Message -
From: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Inconsistent results.
Either the signature is valid or it is
On Mon, 11 Sep 2006 20:36:52 -0700 Steve Atkins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>So describing "inconsistent results" as a "risk of signing" seems
>something of a non-sequitur. Or possibly I'm misunderstanding,
>in which case I'm sure Hector will expand on the issue, with a
>clearer explanation of what
>On 2006-09-11 17:05, Hector Santos wrote:
> ...
>IP address is an input. Each URL in the message is an input. Virus
>scanning results on attachments are an input. Filtering hasn't been
>binary for years.
It still is where Hector lives.
R's,
John
On Mon, 2006-09-11 at 22:07 -0400, Hector Santos wrote:
> - Original Message -
> From: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> >> - Inconsistent results.
> >
> > Either the signature is valid or it is not. This does not depend
> > upon policy
> > ...
> > Can you be a bit more specific abou
On 2006-09-11 18:54, Hector Santos wrote:
If there a consistent ACCEPT, DENY and DELIVERY DECISIONS method
so that when XYZ.COM sends signed mail to users at YAHOO.COM and
AOL.COM, you don't get inconsistent results?
Could you rephrase the question?
Sorry, that should of started with "Is th
- Original Message -
From: "J.D. Falk" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> In short, what I wrote above with a domain achieving different DKIM-BASE
>> results depending on which DKIM-BASE only systems it sends its mail to.
>
> So, you're concerned that senders won't be able to know beforehand how
> th
On Wed, 2006-09-13 at 01:49 -0400, Hector Santos wrote:
> It is because of that inconsistent DKIM reception handling unknowns
> between different systems, we risk encouraging DKIM bad actors to
> proliferate against the new creation of different potential targets.
>
> In summary, the concern is th
- Original Message -
From: "Douglas Otis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Hector Santos" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> It is because of that inconsistent DKIM reception handling unknowns
>> between different systems, we risk encouraging DKIM bad actors to
>> proliferate against the new creation of dif
On Tue, Sep 12, 2006 at 12:07:00AM -0400, Scott Kitterman wrote:
> Why do senders want to accept this risk?
Because they don't have a choice. At least ESPs don't. When Microsoft
said:
'If you do Sender-ID, you have a better chance of the message going
into the Inbox'.
'If you do Sender Score Cer
On Wed, 2006-09-13 at 08:48 -0400, Jeff Macdonald wrote:
>
> Even when a client has both of these, blocks/'missing mail'/'bulk
> folder placement' still happen.
>
> Currently system don't seem to take past reputation into
> consideration. For instance, a customer could have a great reputation
> fo
On Sep 13, 2006, at 4:35 AM, Hector Santos wrote:
It is because of that inconsistent DKIM reception handling
unknowns between different systems, we risk encouraging DKIM bad
actors to proliferate against the new creation of different
potential targets.
In summary, the concern is that the
On 2006-09-12 22:49, Hector Santos wrote:
Anyway, I don't think you interpreted the concern incorrectly.
Certainly possible. I hope we see a wider variety of real-world
implementations soon so that we can figure out what's actually going to
happen, rather than just guessing (whether those g
23 matches
Mail list logo
