Re: [RFC PATCH v5 0/5] vfio-pci: Add support for mmapping MSI-X table

2017-08-14 Thread Benjamin Herrenschmidt
On Mon, 2017-08-14 at 14:12 +0100, Robin Murphy wrote: > On the other hand, if the check is not so much to mitigate malicious > guests attacking the system as to prevent dumb guests breaking > themselves (e.g. if some or all of the MSI-X capability is actually > emulated), then allowing things to

Re: [RFC PATCH v5 0/5] vfio-pci: Add support for mmapping MSI-X table

2017-08-14 Thread Benjamin Herrenschmidt
On Tue, 2017-08-15 at 09:47 +0800, Jike Song wrote: > On 08/15/2017 09:33 AM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote: > > On Tue, 2017-08-15 at 09:16 +0800, Jike Song wrote: > > > > Taking a step back, though, why does vfio-pci perform this check in the > > > > first place? If a malicious guest already has

Re: [RFC PATCH v5 0/5] vfio-pci: Add support for mmapping MSI-X table

2017-08-14 Thread Jike Song
On 08/15/2017 09:33 AM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote: > On Tue, 2017-08-15 at 09:16 +0800, Jike Song wrote: >>> Taking a step back, though, why does vfio-pci perform this check in the >>> first place? If a malicious guest already has control of a device, any >>> kind of interrupt spoofing it could

Re: [RFC PATCH v5 0/5] vfio-pci: Add support for mmapping MSI-X table

2017-08-14 Thread Jike Song
On 08/14/2017 09:12 PM, Robin Murphy wrote: > On 14/08/17 10:45, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote: >> Folks, >> >> Is there anything to change besides those compiler errors and David's >> comment in 5/5? Or the while patchset is too bad? Thanks. > > While I now understand it's not the low-level thing I

Re: [PATCH v3] iommu/s390: Add support for iommu_device handling

2017-08-14 Thread Joerg Roedel
Hi Sebastian, On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 07:02:36PM +0200, Sebastian Ott wrote: > ..but I found the bug, actually 2 bugs: > > * That patch embedded a struct iommu_device within struct zpci_dev but > the iommu_device has a release function (via its class) - so when > the release function gets called

DMAR table missing, Intel IOMMU not available

2017-08-14 Thread Daniel Drake
Hi, We're working with a number of platforms based on Intel Apollo Lake and there are some clues suggesting that the IR-PCI-MSI irqchip functionality would be able to get us out of a tricky situation described at: ath9k hardware corrupts MSI Message Data, raises wrong interrupt

Re: [RFC PATCH v5 0/5] vfio-pci: Add support for mmapping MSI-X table

2017-08-14 Thread Robin Murphy
On 14/08/17 10:45, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote: > Folks, > > Is there anything to change besides those compiler errors and David's > comment in 5/5? Or the while patchset is too bad? Thanks. While I now understand it's not the low-level thing I first thought it was, so my reasoning has changed,

Re: [RFC PATCH v5 0/5] vfio-pci: Add support for mmapping MSI-X table

2017-08-14 Thread Alexey Kardashevskiy
Folks, Is there anything to change besides those compiler errors and David's comment in 5/5? Or the while patchset is too bad? Thanks. On 07/08/17 17:25, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote: > This is a followup for "[PATCH kernel v4 0/6] vfio-pci: Add support for > mmapping MSI-X table" >

Re: [RFC] virtio-iommu version 0.4

2017-08-14 Thread Jean-Philippe Brucker
On 14/08/17 09:27, Tian, Kevin wrote: >> * First, since the IOMMU is paravirtualized, the device can expose some >> properties of the physical topology to the guest, and let it allocate >> resources more efficiently. For example, when the virtio-iommu manages >> both physical and emulated

RE: [RFC] virtio-iommu version 0.4

2017-08-14 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Jean-Philippe Brucker [mailto:jean-philippe.bruc...@arm.com] > Sent: Saturday, August 5, 2017 2:19 AM > > This is the continuation of my proposal for virtio-iommu, the para- > virtualized IOMMU. Here is a summary of the changes since last time [1]: > > * The virtio-iommu document now

RE: Support SVM without PASID

2017-08-14 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Raj, Ashok > Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 12:25 AM > > On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:42:41AM +0100, Jean-Philippe Brucker wrote: > > Hi Kevin, > > > > > > Consider the situation where a userspace driver (no virtualization) is > > built in a client-server fashion: the server controls a

RE: Support SVM without PASID

2017-08-14 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: valmiki [mailto:valmiki...@gmail.com] > Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 8:11 PM > > On 8/7/2017 4:01 PM, Jean-Philippe Brucker wrote: > > On 05/08/17 06:14, valmiki wrote: > > [...] > >> Hi Jean, Thanks a lot, now i understood the flow. From vfio kernel > >> documentation we fill vaddr