Hi, Christoph
在 2021年01月19日 23:29, Christoph Hellwig 写道:
>> +int iommu_do_deferred_attach(struct device *dev,
>> + struct iommu_domain *domain)
>
> I'd remove the "do_" from the name, it doesn't really add any value.
>
OK.
>> +{
>> +const struct iommu_ops *ops = doma
Hi, Christoph
Thanks for the comment.
在 2021年01月19日 23:26, Christoph Hellwig 写道:
> On Tue, Jan 19, 2021 at 07:16:15PM +0800, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>> +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__deferred_attach);
> Why the strange underscores? Wouldn't iommu_deferred_attach_enabled
The variable is defined wi
在 2021年01月15日 23:15, Robin Murphy 写道:
> On 2021-01-15 14:26, lijiang wrote:
>> Hi, Robin
>>
>> Thank you for the comment.
>>
>> 在 2021年01月13日 01:29, Robin Murphy 写道:
>>> On 2021-01-05 07:52, lijiang wrote:
>>>> 在 2021年01月05日 11:55, lijia
Hi, Robin
Thank you for the comment.
在 2021年01月13日 01:29, Robin Murphy 写道:
> On 2021-01-05 07:52, lijiang wrote:
>> 在 2021年01月05日 11:55, lijiang 写道:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> Also add Joerg to cc list.
>>>
>>
>> Also add more people to
在 2021年01月05日 11:55, lijiang 写道:
> Hi,
>
> Also add Joerg to cc list.
>
Also add more people to cc list, Jerry Snitselaar and Tom Lendacky.
Thanks.
> Thanks.
> Lianbo
> 在 2020年12月26日 13:39, Lianbo Jiang 写道:
>> Currently, because domain attach allows to be defer
Hi,
Also add Joerg to cc list.
Thanks.
Lianbo
在 2020年12月26日 13:39, Lianbo Jiang 写道:
> Currently, because domain attach allows to be deferred from iommu
> driver to device driver, and when iommu initializes, the devices
> on the bus will be scanned and the default groups will be allocated.
>
> Du
在 2019年07月19日 01:47, Lendacky, Thomas 写道:
> On 7/17/19 10:28 PM, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>> Secure Encrypted Virtualization is an x86-specific feature, so it shouldn't
>> appear in generic kernel code because it forces non-x86 architectures to
>> define the sev_active() function, which doesn't
在 2018年09月25日 20:04, Joerg Roedel 写道:
> On Fri, Sep 07, 2018 at 04:18:04PM +0800, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>> In kdump kernel, it will copy the device table of IOMMU from the old device
>> table, which is encrypted when SME is enabled in the first kernel. So we
>> have to remap the old device table with
Also cc maintainer and other reviewer. Thanks.
在 2018年09月26日 13:52, lijiang 写道:
> 在 2018年09月26日 03:10, Lendacky, Thomas 写道:
>> On 09/07/2018 03:18 AM, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>>> When SME is enabled on AMD machine, we also need to support kdump. Because
>>> the memory is en
在 2018年09月05日 14:46, Dave Young 写道:
> [snip]
>>
>> As previously mentioned, there are also many differences between kexec and
>> kdump. In general,
>> kexec needs to look at all of available physical memory, but kdump doesn't
>> need.
>>
>> For kexec, kexec-tools will read /sys/firmware/memmap an
在 2018年09月04日 09:51, Dave Young 写道:
> On 09/04/18 at 09:29am, Dave Young wrote:
>> On 09/04/18 at 08:44am, Dave Young wrote:
>>> On 09/03/18 at 10:06pm, lijiang wrote:
>>>> 在 2018年09月03日 10:45, Dave Young 写道:
>>>>> On 08/31/18 at 04:19pm, Lianbo Jian
在 2018年09月04日 08:44, Dave Young 写道:
> On 09/03/18 at 10:06pm, lijiang wrote:
>> 在 2018年09月03日 10:45, Dave Young 写道:
>>> On 08/31/18 at 04:19pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>>>> For kdump kernel, when SME is enabled, the acpi table and dmi table will
>>>> n
在 2018年09月03日 10:45, Dave Young 写道:
> On 08/31/18 at 04:19pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>> For kdump kernel, when SME is enabled, the acpi table and dmi table will need
>> to be remapped without the memory encryption mask. So we have to strengthen
>> the logic in early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(), which mak
在 2018年07月20日 18:08, Boris Petkov 写道:
> On July 20, 2018 12:55:04 PM GMT+03:00, lijiang wrote:>
>> Thanks for your advice, I will rewrite the log and send them again.
>
> Do not send them again - explain the problem properly first!
>
I have compared two solutions to handle
在 2018年07月20日 15:32, Borislav Petkov 写道:
> On Fri, Jul 20, 2018 at 01:23:04PM +0800, Dave Young wrote:
>>> Here, it doesn't need to dump MMIO space of the previous kernel, when the
>>> kdump kernel boot, the MMIO address will be remapped in decryption manners,
>>> but the MMIO address don't belong
在 2018年07月14日 01:08, Borislav Petkov 写道:
> On Mon, Jul 09, 2018 at 09:55:35PM +0800, lijiang wrote:
>> About this issue, i want to use an example to describe it.
>> /* drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c */
>> static u8 __iomem * __init iommu_map_mmio_space(u64 address, u64 end)
在 2018年07月09日 17:29, Borislav Petkov 写道:
> On Mon, Jul 09, 2018 at 02:28:11PM +0800, lijiang wrote:
>> Last week, I had tried many ways to do this work, but it looks
>> like that the ways of deducing address is not suitable to another
>> scenarios, such as mapping some devi
在 2018年07月03日 19:44, lijiang 写道:
> 在 2018年07月03日 19:14, Borislav Petkov 写道:
>> On Tue, Jul 03, 2018 at 06:58:14PM +0800, lijiang wrote:
>>> For kdump, the elf header finally use the crash kernel reserved memory, it
>>> is not an old memory.
>>
>> Lamme rep
在 2018年07月03日 19:14, Borislav Petkov 写道:
> On Tue, Jul 03, 2018 at 06:58:14PM +0800, lijiang wrote:
>> For kdump, the elf header finally use the crash kernel reserved memory, it
>> is not an old memory.
>
> Lamme repeat my suggestion:
>
> So beef up the logic in __ior
在 2018年07月03日 17:39, Borislav Petkov 写道:
> On Tue, Jul 03, 2018 at 10:17:19AM +0800, lijiang wrote:
>> for example, the elfcorehdr. In fact, the elfcorehdr and notes
>
> You mean this?
>
> ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read_notes(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
在 2018年07月03日 10:17, lijiang 写道:
> 在 2018年07月02日 18:14, Borislav Petkov 写道:
>> On Mon, Jul 02, 2018 at 03:26:35PM +0800, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>>> @@ -131,7 +132,8 @@ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr,
>>> unsigned long size,
>>> * call
在 2018年07月02日 18:14, Borislav Petkov 写道:
> On Mon, Jul 02, 2018 at 03:26:35PM +0800, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>> @@ -131,7 +132,8 @@ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr,
>> unsigned long size,
>> * caller shouldn't need to know that small detail.
>> */
>> static void __iomem *__io
在 2018年06月21日 18:23, Baoquan He 写道:
> On 06/21/18 at 01:06pm, lijiang wrote:
>> 在 2018年06月21日 09:53, Baoquan He 写道:
>>> On 06/16/18 at 04:27pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>>>> When SME is enabled in the first kernel, we will allocate pages
>>>> for kdump without
在 2018年06月21日 16:39, Baoquan He 写道:
> On 06/21/18 at 01:42pm, lijiang wrote:
>> 在 2018年06月21日 00:42, Tom Lendacky 写道:
>>> On 6/16/2018 3:27 AM, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>>>> In kdump mode, it will copy the device table of IOMMU from the old
>>>> device table,
在 2018年06月21日 00:00, Tom Lendacky 写道:
> On 6/16/2018 3:27 AM, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>> It is convenient to remap the old memory encrypted to the second
>> kernel by calling ioremap_encrypted().
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang
>> ---
>> Some changes:
>> 1. remove the sme_active() check in __ioremap
在 2018年06月21日 00:42, Tom Lendacky 写道:
> On 6/16/2018 3:27 AM, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>> In kdump mode, it will copy the device table of IOMMU from the old
>> device table, which is encrypted when SME is enabled in the first
>> kernel. So we must remap it in encrypted manner in order to be
>> automatic
在 2018年06月21日 09:53, Baoquan He 写道:
> On 06/16/18 at 04:27pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>> When SME is enabled in the first kernel, we will allocate pages
>> for kdump without encryption in order to be able to boot the
>> second kernel in the same manner as kexec, which helps to keep
>> the same code sty
在 2018年06月21日 09:21, Baoquan He 写道:
> On 06/16/18 at 04:27pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>> It is convenient to remap the old memory encrypted to the second kernel by
>> calling ioremap_encrypted().
>>
>> When sme enabled on AMD server, we also need to support kdump. Because
>> the memory is encrypted in
在 2018年06月19日 22:46, lijiang 写道:
> 在 2018年06月19日 11:16, Dave Young 写道:
>> On 06/16/18 at 04:27pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>>> In kdump mode, we need to dump the old memory into vmcore file,
>>> if SME is enabled in the first kernel, we must remap the old
>>> memor
在 2018年06月19日 11:16, Dave Young 写道:
> On 06/16/18 at 04:27pm, Lianbo Jiang wrote:
>> In kdump mode, we need to dump the old memory into vmcore file,
>> if SME is enabled in the first kernel, we must remap the old
>> memory in encrypted manner, which will be automatically decrypted
>> when we read f
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