On 12/07/17 23:07, Nadav Amit wrote:
> Edward Cree wrote:
>> In this specific case, there was a bug before: if (say) src and dst were
>> both unknown bytes (so range 0 to 255), it would compute the new min and max
>> to be 0, so it would think the result is known to be 0. But that's wrong,
>> bec
Edward Cree wrote:
> On 07/07/17 18:45, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> For me changes such as:
>>
>>> if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
>>> - dst_reg->min_value -= min_val;
>>> + dst_reg->min_value -= max_val;
>>
>> are purely cryptic. What happened her
On 07/07/17 18:45, Nadav Amit wrote:
> For me changes such as:
>
>> if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
>> -dst_reg->min_value -= min_val;
>> +dst_reg->min_value -= max_val;
>
> are purely cryptic. What happened here? Was there a bu
Nadav Amit wrote:
> Edward Cree wrote:
>
>> On 06/07/17 22:21, Nadav Amit wrote:
>>> I find it a bit surprising that such huge changes that can affect security
>>> and robustness are performed in one patch.
>> In the first version of the series, this was two patches, with "feed
>> pointer-to-un
Edward Cree wrote:
> On 06/07/17 22:21, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> I find it a bit surprising that such huge changes that can affect security
>> and robustness are performed in one patch.
> In the first version of the series, this was two patches, with "feed
> pointer-to-unknown-scalar casts into scala
On 06/07/17 22:21, Nadav Amit wrote:
> I find it a bit surprising that such huge changes that can affect security
> and robustness are performed in one patch.
In the first version of the series, this was two patches, with "feed
pointer-to-unknown-scalar casts into scalar ALU path" split out from t
Edward Cree via iovisor-dev wrote:
> Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits.
> Tightens some min/max value checks and fixes a couple of bugs therein.
> If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES,
> treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and
Edward Cree via iovisor-dev wrote:
> Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits.
> Tightens some min/max value checks and fixes a couple of bugs therein.
> If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES,
> treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and
Hi Edward,
[auto build test ERROR on net-next/master]
url:
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Edward-Cree/bpf-rewrite-value-tracking-in-verifier/20170629-012559
config: ia64-allmodconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: ia64-linux-gcc (GCC) 6.2.0
reproduce:
wget
https://raw.gith
On 06/28/2017 06:07 PM, Edward Cree wrote:
On 28/06/17 16:15, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
On 06/27/2017 02:56 PM, Edward Cree wrote:
Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits.
Tightens some min/max value checks and fixes a couple of bugs therein.
You mean the one in relation
On 28/06/17 18:09, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> Could you elaborate on this one? If I understand it correctly, then
> the scalar += pointer case would mean the following: given I have one
> of the allowed pointer types in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() then the
> prior scalar type inherits the ptr type/id.
On 06/27/2017 02:56 PM, Edward Cree wrote:
Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits.
Tightens some min/max value checks and fixes a couple of bugs therein.
If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES,
treat the pointer as an unknown scalar a
On 28/06/17 16:15, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 06/27/2017 02:56 PM, Edward Cree wrote:
>> Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits.
>> Tightens some min/max value checks and fixes a couple of bugs therein.
>
> You mean the one in relation to patch 1/12? Would be good to elab
On 06/27/2017 02:56 PM, Edward Cree wrote:
Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits.
Tightens some min/max value checks and fixes a couple of bugs therein.
You mean the one in relation to patch 1/12? Would be good to elaborate
here since otherwise this gets forgotten few
Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits.
Tightens some min/max value checks and fixes a couple of bugs therein.
If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES,
treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be
able to con
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