Re: [IPsec] Fw: Preshared key authentication in IKEv2

2009-11-02 Thread Tero Kivinen
Paul Hoffman writes: At 9:58 AM +0300 10/30/09, Valery Smyslov wrote: Hi all, I'd like to reiterate my early message, which I haven't got answer to. My concerns are: 1. How padding pre-sahred key with string Key Pad for IKEv2 could help to avoid storing pre-shared key in IKE

Re: [IPsec] RFC4307 ENCR_NULL USGv6 profile Roadmap document

2009-11-02 Thread Tero Kivinen
pasi.ero...@nokia.com writes: I think you're correct that RFC 4307 has a bug: ENCR_NULL should be MUST NOT, instead of MAY (note that ENCR_NULL in 4305/4835 is MUST). Go ahead and submit an errata about this! Done. -- kivi...@iki.fi ___ IPsec

Re: [IPsec] Fw: Preshared key authentication in IKEv2

2009-11-02 Thread Valery Smyslov
Hi Paul and Tero, thank you for your answers. The PRF (or set of PRFs) is known by the receiving party. If the two parties always only use one PRF, it is known. The padding is not a universal solution for the reasons you give, but it works in the common case of peers who know each

Re: [IPsec] Fw: Preshared key authentication in IKEv2

2009-11-02 Thread Tero Kivinen
Valery Smyslov writes: Hi Paul and Tero, thank you for your answers. The PRF (or set of PRFs) is known by the receiving party. If the two parties always only use one PRF, it is known. The padding is not a universal solution for the reasons you give, but it works in the common