On Tue, May 25, 2010 at 04:24:38PM -0500, Nicolas Williams wrote:
> A thought about PAKEs and ZKPPs...
I should also mention that the benefits of the SCRAM-with-cb
approach: a) simplicity (doesn't get much simpler!), b) this is
completely unencumbered to the best of my knowledge[*].
The one downs
A thought about PAKEs and ZKPPs...
In the SASL space we pursued a DIGEST-MD5-like mechanism. Yup, SCRAM is
vulnerable to off-line dictionary attacks by passive attackers. Except
that SCRAM is intended to be used with channel binding to TLS, with
confidentiality protection from the same TLS chann
With 5 more days to go, this is a quick reminder to review the problem
statement draft so we can move it along, and get to the juicy protocol
stuff.
This time around, we will take silence as agreement.
Thanks,
Yaron
On 05/16/2010 03:53 PM, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
This is to begin a 2 we
Following up on my previous mail, the IPR statement for HUSH is now
available as https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1324/.
Thanks,
Yaron
On 05/25/2010 12:19 PM, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
Per Paul's request, here is an evaluation of the HUSH proposal
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-i
Per Paul's request, here is an evaluation of the HUSH proposal
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-ipsecme-hush-00) according to
Dan's criteria draft. Comments and questions are more than welcome.
In summary, HUSH is an adaptation of Bellovin's and Merritt's Encrypted
Key Exchange (EKE)
