Re: [IPsec] Matching certificates in IKEv2

2013-09-17 Thread Valery Smyslov
So do you think it would be appropriate to mandate these matching rules in rfc5996bis, or should this be left to AD-VPN solutions. IOW, is such a standard rule needed for generic IKE/IPsec? It's definitely worth to mention these rules in RFC5996bis, or at least point to the RFC4945.

Re: [IPsec] Matching certificates in IKEv2

2013-09-17 Thread Tero Kivinen
Valery Smyslov writes: Yes, there is no obvious mapping between ID_KEY_ID and certificates and thus ID_KEY_ID is out of scope for RFC4945. As rfc5996 describes ID_KEY_ID as An opaque octet stream that may be used to pass vendor-specific information necessary to do certain proprietary types of

Re: [IPsec] Matching certificates in IKEv2

2013-09-17 Thread Valery Smyslov
And this not the only contradiction between RFC5996 and RFC4945 - the latter requires ID_IPV*_ADDR to match source IP address of IKE packet by default, while the former explicitely allows not to do it in any case. RFC4945 requires that implementations MUST be capable of verifying the