Re: [IPsec] Working Group LastCall:draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-02

2013-10-25 Thread Valery Smyslov
Hi Tero, Valery Smyslov writes: The problem, that the draft is not solving, is the situation, when one of the peers has more than one private key, each for different signature algorithm. This may happen if in deployed VPN there is a need to move from one signature alg to another (for any reason

Re: [IPsec] Working Group LastCall:draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-02

2013-10-25 Thread Johannes Merkle
Valery, >>> I suggest to change this as following. Instead of >>> adding IKE registry, listing hash algorithms, >>> add registry listing combinations of hash&signature >>> algorithms, as listed in Appendix A. >>> So, the registry would look like: >>> >>> RESERVED 0

Re: [IPsec] Working Group LastCall:draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-02

2013-10-25 Thread Valery Smyslov
Hi Johannes, Your proposal creates exactly the issue which the draft is trying to solve: The lack of flexibility by relying on IPsec code points for the signature algorithm (as opposed to using existing OIDs commonly used in certificates and CMS) and the coupling of signing algorithms and sign

Re: [IPsec] Working Group LastCall:draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth-02

2013-10-25 Thread Johannes Merkle
Hi Valery, > > As far as I remember, the main problem was that Auth Method field in AUTH > Payload > was only 8 bits and its codepoints coupled signature with particular hash. Well, this was the initial problem, but then Yoav had the great idea of generalizing the mechanism by using the OIDs in

[IPsec] More WG Last Call on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation

2013-10-25 Thread Paul Hoffman
Although there is a spirited, useful discussion going on between three or four participants, we could certainly use more reviewers for this WG document. Please send any comments to the list, and feel free to hop into the threads already running. Thanks! --Paul Hoffman __

Re: [IPsec] TSVDIR-ish review ofdraft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation-04

2013-10-25 Thread Yaron Sheffer
Hi Paul, Sorry for the late reply. You seem to assume that SPIs are random. This is not mandated by IKEv2 and in practice it is usually, but not always, the case. See http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec/current/msg06563.html Thanks, Yaron On 2013-10-22 18:35, Paul Wouters wro

Re: [IPsec] More WG Last Call on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation

2013-10-25 Thread Yoav Nir
Hi I think the draft is in good shape and is almost ready for publication. There is a bunch of grammatical issues with it, but I think the RFC editor is much better at fixing those than most of us. Section 2.5.1 recommends using 1280-byte max IP datagram size for IPv6 (based on RFC 2460), and

Re: [IPsec] TSVDIR-ish reviewofdraft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation-04

2013-10-25 Thread Joe Touch
On 10/24/2013 10:45 PM, Valery Smyslov wrote: ... You're using existing IKE messages *and* existing timeouts to determine when there is a problem. A separate timer would be useful, if only to allow you to decouple fragment retransmission from IKE transaction retries. No, the timeouts are diff

Re: [IPsec] More WG Last Call on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation

2013-10-25 Thread Yaron Sheffer
On 2013-10-25 23:05, Yoav Nir wrote: Hi [...] Section 2.5.1 recommends using 1280-byte max IP datagram size for IPv6 (based on RFC 2460), and 576 bytes (based on RFC 1122). The big difference between those two RFCs is not some technical difference between IPv6 and IPv4, but that the former w

Re: [IPsec] More WG Last Call on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation

2013-10-25 Thread Yoav Nir
On Oct 25, 2013, at 11:23 PM, Yaron Sheffer wrote: >> >> Section 2.5.1 recommends using 1280-byte max IP datagram size for >> IPv6 (based on RFC 2460), and 576 bytes (based on RFC 1122). The big >> difference between those two RFCs is not some technical difference >> between IPv6 and IPv4, but