[IPsec] Rekeying of child sa, Question on TS handling according to RFC 5996

2014-08-20 Thread Pål Dammvik
One of the differences between RFC 5996 and 4306 is in the rekeying where it's stated in RFC 5996 section 2.8: "Note that, when rekeying, the new Child SA SHOULD NOT have different Traffic Selectors and algorithms than the old one." Additionally in section 1.3.3 (that also addresses rekeying)

Re: [IPsec] Garage door - let's pick a different example

2014-08-20 Thread Valery Smyslov
Hi Hannes, I agree that the example is a bit artificial and in real life one would not use IKE/IPsec to control garage door. At least now. But if IoT becomes ubiquitous then who knows, probably such setup will be default "off shelf" solution... Regards, Valery. P.S. What about mutual authentic

Re: [IPsec] Garage door - let's pick a different example

2014-08-20 Thread Valery Smyslov
No, that is not caused by the unauthenticated protocol, but caused by the same device to be used with two different doors. Even if the device would do full authentication and would verify that the door is in his list of doors which can be opened, attacker could still do the same thing. Only way t

Re: [IPsec] Garage door - let's pick a different example

2014-08-20 Thread Valery Smyslov
Hi Yaron, sorry for late reply - I was on vacation. I still think that the example is valid. The example describes the remote opener which opens the only door. If you want to open different doors using single opener then you might run into trouble you described. But this attack can be thwarted