Re: [IPsec] Reopening issue #12

2009-05-05 Thread Tero Kivinen
pasi.ero...@nokia.com writes: Tero Kivinen wrote: But now Bob cannot meet the requirement new SA MUST NOT be narrower than the old one, because it would violate his policy. This depends which happens first, algorithm selection or narrowing. In most cases the first thing happens

Re: [IPsec] Reopening issue #12

2009-05-05 Thread Tero Kivinen
pasi.ero...@nokia.com writes: I agree that rekeying is currently not very easy to understand. But e.g. early drafts of ikev2-clarifications (-00 and -01) included some text wondering about what exactly N(REKEY_SA) means (that is, what is different when you do/don't include REKEY_SA in

Re: [IPsec] Reopening issue #12

2009-05-05 Thread Michael Richardson
Dan McDonald described a worse case scenario. It had the advantage that communication that could continue did continue. It had the disadvantage that the traffic to port 2112 got delayed because we needed the packet contents to get the policy right. This is bad due to the delay. It required

Re: [IPsec] Reopening issue #12

2009-05-03 Thread Stephen Kent
At 2:18 PM +0300 4/29/09, Tero Kivinen wrote: ... In most case I would not expect Bob to create the old SA that way at all, as it would require it to combine two SPD rules together when accepting such entry. As the SPD entries are ordered list that would mean it was combining two entries which

Re: [IPsec] Reopening issue #12

2009-04-29 Thread Tero Kivinen
pasi.ero...@nokia.com writes: Tero Kivinen wrote: Paul Hoffman writes: It was pointed out that (a) this is a new MUST and Yes, but it can mostly be already deducted from the requirement that end node cannot violate its own policy, meaning it needs to delete Child SA which are not

Re: [IPsec] Reopening issue #12

2009-04-28 Thread Pasi.Eronen
Tero Kivinen wrote: Paul Hoffman writes: It was pointed out that (a) this is a new MUST and Yes, but it can mostly be already deducted from the requirement that end node cannot violate its own policy, meaning it needs to delete Child SA which are not following his policy. If that is

[IPsec] Reopening issue #12

2009-04-27 Thread Tero Kivinen
Paul Hoffman writes: It was pointed out that (a) this is a new MUST and Yes, but it can mostly be already deducted from the requirement that end node cannot violate its own policy, meaning it needs to delete Child SA which are not following his policy. If that is already done, there is no point

Re: [IPsec] Reopening issue #12

2009-04-26 Thread Jeff Sun
All, I'm not sure my opinion counts since Paul called for WG input. In any event, it seems to me that rekeying a CHILD_SA the way its currently done seems more like creating a new CHILD_SA, especially since the SA, TSi, TSr, and the optional N(TRANSPORT_MODE) Payloads are included. Rekeying a

[IPsec] Reopening issue #12

2009-04-24 Thread Paul Hoffman
Greetings again. During discussion with the other authors of IKEv2bis, we discovered some problems with the proposed resolution to issue #12 about traffic selectors when rekeying. The text I proposed to put in the document was this: - 2.9.2 Traffic Selectors in Rekeying Rekeying is used to