er'; 'Yoav Nir'; 'timo.te...@iki.fi'
Cc: 'ipsec@ietf.org'; Prashant Batra (prbatra);
'ipsec-tools-us...@lists.sourceforge.net'; 'ikev2-de...@lists.sourceforge.net';
'ipsec-tools-de...@lists.sourceforge.net'
Subject: RE: [IPsec] DH keys
> -Original Message-
> From: Naveen B N (nbn)
> Sent: Friday, August 26, 2011 1:37 AM
> To: Naveen B N (nbn); Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer); 'Yaron Sheffer'; 'Yoav
> Nir'
> Cc: 'ipsec@ietf.org'
> Subject: RE: [IPsec] DH keys calculation perf
er'; 'Yoav Nir'; 'timo.te...@iki.fi'
Cc: 'ipsec@ietf.org'; Prashant Batra (prbatra);
'ipsec-tools-us...@lists.sourceforge.net'; 'ikev2-de...@lists.sourceforge.net';
'ipsec-tools-de...@lists.sourceforge.net'
Subject: RE: [IPsec] DH keys
c-tools-
> us...@lists.sourceforge.net; ikev2-de...@lists.sourceforge.net; ipsec-
> tools-de...@lists.sourceforge.net
> Subject: RE: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance
>
> Hi Scott,
>
> Please find the queries and comments inline ..
>
> Scott>- Transporting keying material lack
on Sheffer; Yoav Nir
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; Prashant Batra (prbatra)
Subject: RE: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance
> -Original Message-
> From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Naveen B N (nbn)
> Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2011 6:48 AM
>
different
reasons); the IKEv2 designers decided to unify that.
>
> Thanks and Regards
> Naveen
>
> From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Prashant Batra (prbatra)
> Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2011 6:33 PM
> To: Yaron Sheffer; Yoav Nir
&g
-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Prashant Batra (prbatra)
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2011 6:33 PM
To: Yaron Sheffer; Yoav Nir
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance
Thanks Yoav and Yaron for the suggestions.
Even I was thinking and
Regarding Dan's suggestion (*) of using g^x, g^{x+1}, etc as successive DH
values, I would like to note the following.
This would lead to situations where two parties exchange successive keys of
the form g^{xy} and g^{(x+1)(y+1)}=g^{xy}*g^x*g^y*g.
In this case, if an attacker learns the key g^{xy}
>> Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance
>>
>>
>> On Jul 25, 2011, at 11:29 PM, Prashant Batra (prbatra) wrote:
>>
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> The DH exchange (Calculation of Public/Private key and t
> -Original Message-
> From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Yoav Nir
> Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2011 6:40 AM
> To: Prashant Batra (prbatra)
> Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance
>
>
Hello,
On Tue, July 26, 2011 6:03 am, Prashant Batra (prbatra) wrote:
> Thanks Yoav and Yaron for the suggestions.
>
> Even I was thinking and tried generating and storing the key pair well
> in the beginning,. This helped to some extent.
>
>
>
> The secret calculation is also very expensive
From: Yaron Sheffer [mailto:yaronf.i...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2011 4:47 PM
To: Yoav Nir
Cc: Prashant Batra (prbatra); ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance
You might want to review
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5996#section-2.12.
Also, session
You might want to review http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5996#section-2.12.
Also, session resumption (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5723)
reduces the computational costs of renewing an IKE SA when a client
needs to reconnect to a gateway a second time after some failure.
On Jul 25, 2011, at 11:29 PM, Prashant Batra (prbatra) wrote:
> Hello,
>
> The DH exchange (Calculation of Public/Private key and the Secret) in
> IKEV2 Initial exchange
> seems to be very expensive. This is slowing down the overall IKEv2
> tunnel establishment.
> Is there a way to optimize it?
Hi Prashant,
Back in the days we had some acceleration of DH in the hardware
http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/search/en/WO2005008999.
Other things you can do is put in more CPU or use a lower DH group.
Thanks,
Vishwas
On Mon, Jul 25, 2011 at 8:29 PM, Prashant Batra (prbatra) wrote:
> Hello,
>
Hello,
The DH exchange (Calculation of Public/Private key and the Secret) in
IKEV2 Initial exchange
seems to be very expensive. This is slowing down the overall IKEv2
tunnel establishment.
Is there a way to optimize it?
Regards,
Prashant
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