Re: [IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP

2015-01-29 Thread Paul Wouters
On Thu, 29 Jan 2015, Valery Smyslov wrote: In conclusion, is the following text OK? ID_NULL is primarily intended to be used with the NULL Authentication, but it MAY also be used in other situations, when the content of Identification payload does not matter. For example, ID_NULL can be

Re: [IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP

2015-01-29 Thread Yaron Sheffer
Fine with me. Yaron On 01/29/2015 04:35 PM, Valery Smyslov wrote: Valery Smyslov writes: I don't see how this can be done without breaking existing implementations, and therefore I am unhappy with the new sentence in -03, "Another example is EAP authentication when the client identity

Re: [IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP

2015-01-29 Thread Valery Smyslov
Valery Smyslov writes: I don't see how this can be done without breaking existing implementations, and therefore I am unhappy with the new sentence in -03, "Another example is EAP authentication when the client identity in ID payload is not used." A responder that receives a new, unknown ID type

Re: [IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP

2015-01-29 Thread Yaron Sheffer
Valery Smyslov writes: I don't see how this can be done without breaking existing implementations, and therefore I am unhappy with the new sentence in -03, "Another example is EAP authentication when the client identity in ID payload is not used." A responder that receives a new, unknown ID type

Re: [IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP

2015-01-29 Thread Tero Kivinen
Valery Smyslov writes: > > I don't see how this can be done without breaking existing > > implementations, and therefore I am unhappy with the new sentence in > > -03, "Another example is EAP authentication when the client identity in > > ID payload is not used." A responder that receives a new,

Re: [IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP

2015-01-28 Thread Valery Smyslov
Hi Yaron, The text in RFC7296 specifically does not limit the uses of EAP identities more than that "SHOULD NOT" just because we wanted to leave things open so different implementations can do whatever is suitable for them. That's why I think that ID_NULL can be used as IDi in case of EAP - th

Re: [IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP

2015-01-28 Thread Yaron Sheffer
The text in RFC7296 specifically does not limit the uses of EAP identities more than that "SHOULD NOT" just because we wanted to leave things open so different implementations can do whatever is suitable for them. That's why I think that ID_NULL can be used as IDi in case of EAP - this usage d

Re: [IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP (was: My comments to the Null Authentication Method draft)

2015-01-27 Thread Valery Smyslov
It is fully legal for NAS to sent EAP Identity request and not use IKE Identity. Then, many modern EAP methods (like EAP-TLS) have their own means to exchange Identities within the method, and in this case the initial IKE Identity becomes almost useless. And for some EAP libraries getting rid of

[IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP (was: My comments to the Null Authentication Method draft)

2015-01-27 Thread Tero Kivinen
Valery Smyslov writes: > > Nope. The IKE ID payloads needs to be used, and the EAP identity > > reqeuest and respond SHOULD NOT be used (from RFC7296 section 3.16): > > > > Note that since IKE passes an indication of initiator identity in the > > first message in the IKE_AUTH exchange, the res

[IPsec] Initiator Identity in case of EAP (was: My comments to the Null Authentication Method draft)

2015-01-26 Thread Valery Smyslov
I changed a subject field. Valery Smyslov writes: Hi Tero, > On the other hand same section says that ID_NULL SHOULD only be used > with NULL authentication method. In which scenarios do you think > ID_NULL can be used when using normal authentication? I.e. which is > the exception for the SHO