I really like this idea.
What worries me is the different cases to be examined/solved depending on the
source device: host (applications) or router (protocols).
And this draft takes into account mostly the first.
--
Tassos
Ronald Bonica wrote on 20/06/2013 18:55:
Folks,
Please review this
Fernando,
There was a message asking Fernando to wait because of a
yet-to-be-written draft. :-) In my opinion the dependency would
be non-normative. There doesn't seem to be much room for argument
there.
the action is on the chairs to initiate the WGLC, and subsequently to
review the
This BOF touches on technology of interest to each of the
working groups on the To list.
I apologies to those that have already seen this through
circulation to routing-discussion, but I know that not
everyone is subscribed there.
The list for discussion of this topic is sta...@ietf.org
-
Ole,
My apologies if my coments cam across the wrong way. PLease find my
comments in-line...
On 06/21/2013 10:23 AM, Ole Troan wrote:
This document has been suffering from unnecessary delays for almost a
year now.
this document was returned to the working group by the AD, after the IETF
Hi Tassos,
Thanks for reviewing the draft. Could you provide more detail on what is
missing?
Ron
-Original Message-
From: Tassos Chatzithomaoglou [mailto:ach...@forthnetgroup.gr]
Sent: Friday, June 21, 2013 4:03 AM
To: Ronald Bonica; ipv6@ietf.org
On 6/21/13 10:03 AM, Ray Hunter wrote:
I have also read this draft.
It mentions that DNSSEC will be impacted.
What's the alternative if DNSSEC can't send multiple UDP fragments?
so I'm pretty sure I don't want to expose myself to really big replies
because that pushed the opportunity to
I suppose I'm the contrarian, but this draft gives me some heartburn
surrounding the robustness principle. Yes, TCP MSS generally limits the use of
fragmentation for IPv6. We don't have a counterpart to MSS for UDP, and others
have noted that OSPF etc may have issues.
Thinking hypothetically,
I don't 100% agree. In the case that PMTUD is broken, there'd be
nothing to stop a current DNSSEC implementation from always assuming a
default path MTU of 1280, without awaiting confirmation from PMTUD, and
fragmenting the UDP packet pre-emptively [assuming fragmentation was
not equally
On 22/06/2013 07:53, Ronald Bonica wrote:
I don't 100% agree. In the case that PMTUD is broken, there'd be
nothing to stop a current DNSSEC implementation from always assuming a
default path MTU of 1280, without awaiting confirmation from PMTUD, and
fragmenting the UDP packet pre-emptively
-Original Message-
From: Brian E Carpenter [mailto:brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 21, 2013 4:53 PM
To: Ronald Bonica
Cc: Ray Hunter; ipv6@ietf.org 6man-wg
Subject: Re: FW: New Version Notification for draft-bonica-6man-frag-
deprecate-00.txt
On 22/06/2013
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