-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Christian Huitema wrote:
| So, what about a text such as:
|
| Several IETF documents mention site local addresses [RFC2772, RFC2894,
| RFC3082, RFC3111, RFC3142, RFC3177]. These mentions should be removed if
| and when these documents are updated. In
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
| An unadministered PI scheme that generated unique prefixes would
satisfy the
| first 2 requirements. However, allowing such addresses to be globally
| routeable has two drawbacks:
| - affects global routing tables, possibly badly
| - raises
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
|
| RFC2894, router renumbering (an example contains FEC0)
| RFC3111, SLP (an example contains FEC0)
| RFC3142, TRT (an example contains FEC0)
|
|
| If it's only used in an example, then I don't think an update is
| required. If these documents
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
|
| Don't take me wrong, I am not an air-headed academic who fails to
| understand the importance of beeing able to sell the solutions to
| people who are willing to pay for them.
Just to be very clear on this: I don't believe I have seen anyone
in the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
snip
|
| This is based on the assumption that leaking RFC 1918 routing
| information or packets with RFC 1918 source or destination addresses is
| actually harmful in and of itself. This is a broken assumption. If
Tell that
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Eugene M. Kim wrote:
snip
|
| With all due respect, it seems that it would be beneficial for both
| camps (for and against SL) to hear, even now, the real concerns directly
| from the operation people and to let them participate in the decision
|
