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It is time for Arab liberal reformers and peaceful
Islamist movements to join forces to foster the change in this region that
neither of them has been able to bring about on its own . . . Rami
Khouri writes
When we ask why in the Arab world today real political change,
economic reform and less dominance of society by the security systems do
not happen in any sustained manner, the answer is usually because domestic
groups have not joined forces to foster change. The three main domestic
Arab forces for change in recent decades are the mainstream Islamist
parties (such as Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbullah); many small civil
society organizations and liberal activists; and, pockets of incumbent
officials and prominent businessmen and women.
By working separately they have had limited
impact. The obvious conclusion is that it is time for Arab liberal
reformers and peaceful Islamist movements to join forces to foster the
change in this region that neither of them has been able to bring about on
its own.
The mainstream Islamists are the only groups that
have been able to generate the mass numbers and popular credibility that
can translate into political power. That power is negated or blocked,
though, because the Islamists are feared, suspected, opposed, outlawed, or
thwarted by everyone else in the world, and I mean everyone else -- their
own governments and security services, their liberal activists fellow
citizens, their business elites, foreign governments, and non-politicized
fellow Muslims.
Consequently, the Arab Islamists have succumbed to
several options that reduce their domestic political impact. They accept
limits on their representation in parliament, often through voluntary
limits on the number of seats they contest. They go underground and
migrate abroad, limiting their roles in their own countries. A few give up
and adopt violence, and make trouble with bombs and assassinations, thus
marginalizing themselves among their people and foreign governments.
Islamists tend to focus their organizational prowess on grassroots service
activities, and also articulate the grievances of ordinary citizens and
discontented elites alike. Islamists are a force, but not a
power.
Arab liberals and reform-minded activists, on the
other hand, are mostly free to operate publicly as they wish, because
their views on democracy, human rights and pluralism tend to appeal to a
rather narrow audience. They represent no major populist threat to
established regimes. They are well funded mostly by foreign donors and
actively cooperate with colleagues abroad. But their impact is limited,
mainly because the mass audience is responding to the Islamists in the
first instance, or to tribal and ethnic leaders, rather than to a liberal
appeal. The rhetoric and institutions of Arab liberal reformers also have
been freely adopted and co-opted by the Arab security state, which speaks
routinely of reform, human rights and democracy at its own
pace.
The means to a breakthrough in the iron wall of
Arab autocracy and the harsh rule of the colonels could well be for
Islamists and liberal reformers to join forces. Their core values mesh
together very naturally: democracy, equality, rule of law, peaceful
political participation, majority rule, protection of minority rights,
pluralism, clean elections, pragmatism, accountability, anti-corruption,
and legitimacy. They differ somewhat on issues such as religious-secular
divides, relations with Israel, national vs. religious identity, working
with the United States and other Western powers, and some aspects of the
public role of women.
The agreements substantially outweigh the
disagreements, and can usher in a compelling common political meeting
ground that could challenge existing dictatorships and mobilize majorities
of citizens in the service of building more decent societies with
credible, responsive governance systems. An Islamist-liberal alliance
would require compromises by both sides from those who have already shown
themselves willing to make such compromises. Witness the evolution of
Hizbullah's governance politics since 1990, the flexibility of democracy
activists in Egypt since 2004, and the cooperation between Islamists and
secular liberals in the recent elections in Gaza, or in the Hizbullah-Aoun
accord in Lebanon. Incumbency achieved peacefully will require eventual
accommodation by Islamists and secular liberals alike (as Turkey
confirms). It makes sense to make the compromises early and start reaping
the rewards.
By joining forces around a common charter of
dignified nationalism, genuine democracy, social integrity, and
reciprocity in relations with other states -- all acceptable core values
to both camps -- an Islamist-secular liberal coalition would achieve
critical goals that the component groups have not been able to achieve
separately. Their initial gain would be to boost their collective
legitimacy at home and abroad -- the Islamists becoming less threatening,
and the secular liberals becoming more credible. Their combined clout and
respectability could then force the adoption of more representative
electoral laws, win majorities in parliaments, and influence or define
state policies. Politics is about making good deals. This one seems to be
as good as it gets.
Rami G. Khouri is editor-at-large of the
Beirut-based Daily Star, published throughout the Middle East with the
International Herald Tribune.
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