Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-15 Thread brian . joh
Hi, In my company, we're pitching a Kerberos-based solution to authenticate tens of thousands of Linux users to Active Directory. To increase the likelihood of approval by the higher-ups, we really need to eliminate all perceived security holes. Although preauthentication helps some, Kerber

Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-15 Thread brian . joh
Hi, In my company, we're pitching a Kerberos-based solution to authenticate tens of thousands of Linux users to Active Directory. To increase the likelihood of approval by the higher-ups, we really need to eliminate all perceived security holes. Although preauthentication helps some, Kerber

Re: Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-15 Thread Andreas Hasenack
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 02:04:19PM +, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > AS-REQ. I saw some discussion about this from a few years ago in the > archives, but nothing recently. Is there a solution to this issue > yet? If not, what progress has been made, and what direction is being If I remember cor

Re: Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-15 Thread Jeffrey Altman
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >> If I remember correctly, the advice given back then was: >> - use hardware authentication >> - use SRP (a patent discussion followed) >> - implement a strong password policy > > > We have thousands of users to manage, so we're looking for > a solution which is pretty m

Re: Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-16 Thread brian . joh
Tunneling sounds like the best option. We have over 500 Windows 2000 and Windows 2003 domain controllers (KDCs in Active Directory), that we don't want to have to modify or install new software on. These domain controllers (KDCs) do have SSL properly configured, so I suppose, we could tunnel the

Re: Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-16 Thread peter huang
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Tunneling sounds like the best option. > > We have over 500 Windows 2000 and Windows 2003 domain > controllers (KDCs in Active Directory), that we don't want to have > to modify or install new software on. These domain controllers > (KDCs) do have SSL properly configure

Re: Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-16 Thread Jeffrey Altman
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Tunneling sounds like the best option. > > We have over 500 Windows 2000 and Windows 2003 domain > controllers (KDCs in Active Directory), that we don't want to have > to modify or install new software on. These domain controllers > (KDCs) do have SSL properly configur

Re: Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-16 Thread brian . joh
We're not using kinit. We're basically writing our own progams built on the Kerberos libraries. However, I've looked at the source code to kinit when I was learning how to use the MIT libraries, and it would not be hard to modify. Kerberos mailing

Re: Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-17 Thread Douglas E. Engert
There is PKINIT also. We did a "sslk5" in 1999 to use SSL authenticaiton to a KDC, then return an unencrypted ticket protected by SSL to the client. In this case the user was using X509 certificates for authenticaiton and no password. It was last updated for krb5-1.2.2 and OpenSSL-0.9.6. It can b

Re: Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-06-21 Thread davido
Brian, the earlier suggestion to use IPsec to your servers sounds like an elegant approach, but sounds like you may have rather too many client machines to make this practical. As a much simpler alternative, and one that is SSL based (and hence X.509 cert public key encryption based for easy depl

Re: Offline password attacks on AS-REQ

2005-07-06 Thread Matthew N. Andrews
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Brian, the earlier suggestion to use IPsec to your servers sounds like an elegant approach, but sounds like you may have rather too many client machines to make this practical. As a much simpler alternative, and one that is SSL based (and hence X.509 cert public key encr