Security pointers about Kerberos5 realms open to a WAN

2006-11-01 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Hi kerberos folks-- Could anyone point me to information about the security concerns involved with opening a krb5 realm to the Internet (or any other untrusted WAN)? I've looked in several places, but could only find a couple of remarks on this list from last year:

Re: Security pointers about Kerberos5 realms open to a WAN

2006-11-01 Thread Tom Yu
Daniel == Daniel Kahn Gillmor [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Daniel Hi kerberos folks-- Daniel Could anyone point me to information about the security concerns Daniel involved with opening a krb5 realm to the Internet (or any other Daniel untrusted WAN)? Authentication over an untrusted network is

Re: Security pointers about Kerberos5 realms open to a WAN

2006-11-01 Thread Christopher D. Clausen
Daniel Kahn Gillmor [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think i understand the basic K5 protocol, but i don't have my head wrapped around the different possible attack vectors well enough to know if opening up a KDC to the internet is really asking for trouble (e.g. how much krb5 traffic needs to be

Re: Security pointers about Kerberos5 realms open to a WAN

2006-11-01 Thread Ken Raeburn
As Tom says, Kerberos was designed to be used on open networks. With the exception of the old DES-based types (a bad idea to use nowadays, but supported for backwards compatibility for places that haven't updated yet), the encryption schemes should be reasonably solid, and all of the data