Hi Valentin, Kees, Bernd and Random,
Thank you very much for all the info and advices. Now, things are
more clear to me.
Thank you all again for your time and guidance.
Regards,
Len
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On Sun, Sep 12, 2021 at 9:21 AM Len Baker wrote:
> It should be possible to perform taint tracking of addresses in the kernel
> to avoid flaws of the form:
>
> copy_from_user(object, src, ...);
> ...
> memcpy(object.address, something, ...);
>
> [end of extracted]
>
> My question is: Why is this s
On Mon, Sep 13, 2021 at 09:59:36AM +0200, Bernd Petrovitsch wrote:
> Hi all!
>
> On 12/09/2021 18:20, Len Baker wrote:
> [...]
> > [extracted from the KSPP]
> >
> > It should be possible to perform taint tracking of addresses in the kernel
> > to avoid flaws of the form:
> >
> > copy_from_user(o
Hi all!
On 12/09/2021 18:20, Len Baker wrote:
[...]
[extracted from the KSPP]
It should be possible to perform taint tracking of addresses in the kernel
to avoid flaws of the form:
copy_from_user(object, src, ...);
...
memcpy(object.address, something, ...);
[end of extracted]
My question is
On Sun, Sep 12, 2021 at 06:20:30PM +0200, Len Baker wrote:
> I am taking a look to the issues in the Kernel Self Protection Project [1]
> and this one [2] (perform taint-tracking of writes to kernel addresses
> that came from userspace) take my attention. Reading the explanation does
> not make it
On Sun, Sep 12, 2021 at 06:20:30PM +0200, Len Baker wrote:
> I am taking a look to the issues in the Kernel Self Protection Project [1]
> and this one [2] (perform taint-tracking of writes to kernel addresses
> that came from userspace) take my attention. Reading the explanation does
> not make it
Hi,
I am taking a look to the issues in the Kernel Self Protection Project [1]
and this one [2] (perform taint-tracking of writes to kernel addresses
that came from userspace) take my attention. Reading the explanation does
not make it clear to me where the flaw is.
[extracted from the KSPP]
It
