Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/9/2017 1:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 3:38 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/8/2017 1:05 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates the PGD is encrypted. T

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Boris Ostrovsky
>> >> PV guests don't go through Linux x86 early boot code. They start at >> xen_start_kernel() (well, xen-head.S:startup_xen(), really) and merge >> with baremetal path at x86_64_start_reservations() (for 64-bit). >> > > Ok, I don't think anything needs to be done then. The sme_me_mask is set >

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/9/2017 1:43 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: On 06/09/2017 02:36 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/8/2017 5:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: What may be needed is making s

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 09/06/17 19:43, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: > On 06/09/2017 02:36 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: >>> basis, although (as far as I am aware) Xen as a whole would be able to >>> encompass itself and all of its PV guests inside one single SME >>> instance. >> Yes, that is correct. Thinking more about this, it

Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Andy Lutomirski
On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 3:38 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 6/8/2017 1:05 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> >> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Tom Lendacky >> wrote: >>> >>> The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates >>> the PGD is encrypted. The encryption bit should not

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Boris Ostrovsky
On 06/09/2017 02:36 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 6/8/2017 5:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: >>> On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: >>> What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not se

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3

2017-06-09 Thread Tom Lendacky
On 6/8/2017 5:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote: On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV guests. And that may be something that Xen will nee

Re: [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support

2017-06-09 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:14:16PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support > provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and > defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent > patches to mark pages a

[ANNOUNCE] kexec-tools 2.0.15-rc1

2017-06-09 Thread Simon Horman
Hi all, I am happy to announce the release of kexec-tools 2.0.15-rc1. This is an incremental feature pre-release. So long as no serious problems arise I intend to release kexec-tools 2.0.15 in a weeks time. Testing of 2.0.15-rc1 would be greatly appreciated. I do not have any outstanding change

Re: [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size

2017-06-09 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:14:04PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > When System Memory Encryption (SME) is enabled, the physical address > space is reduced. Adjust the x86_phys_bits value to reflect this > reduction. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > --- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 +++---

Re: [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature

2017-06-09 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:13:53PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the > Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME is identified by CPUID > 0x801f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of > MSR_K8_SYSCFG). Only show

Re: [PATCH] s390/crash: Fix KEXEC_NOTE_BYTES definition

2017-06-09 Thread Dave Young
On 06/09/17 at 10:29am, Dave Young wrote: > On 06/09/17 at 10:17am, Xunlei Pang wrote: > > S390 KEXEC_NOTE_BYTES is not used by note_buf_t as before, which > > is now defined as follows: > > typedef u32 note_buf_t[CRASH_CORE_NOTE_BYTES/4]; > > It was changed by the CONFIG_CRASH_CORE feature. >