Re: [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint

2020-05-09 Thread Baoquan He
On 05/09/20 at 09:10pm, Randy Dunlap wrote: > On 5/9/20 7:59 PM, Baoquan He wrote: > > Read admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst, but still do not get what 'G' means. > > I interpret 'G' as GPL (strictly it means that no proprietary module has > been loaded). But I don't see why TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODU

Re: [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint

2020-05-09 Thread Randy Dunlap
On 5/9/20 7:59 PM, Baoquan He wrote: > Read admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst, but still do not get what 'G' means. I interpret 'G' as GPL (strictly it means that no proprietary module has been loaded). But I don't see why TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE is the only taint flag that has a non-blank c_false

Re: [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint

2020-05-09 Thread Baoquan He
On 05/09/20 at 09:57am, Rafael Aquini wrote: > Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch > introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to > provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch > a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.

Re: [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint

2020-05-09 Thread Kees Cook
On Sat, May 09, 2020 at 09:57:37AM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote: > Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch > introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to > provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch > a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any

Re: [PATCH] kexec: Discard loaded image on memory hotplug

2020-05-09 Thread Eric W. Biederman
David Hildenbrand writes: > On 01.05.20 18:57, James Morse wrote: >> On x86, the kexec payload contains a copy of the current memory map. >> If memory is added or removed, this copy of the memory map becomes >> stale. Getting this wrong may prevent the next kernel from booting. >> The first kerne

Re: [PATCH v2] kernel: add panic_on_taint

2020-05-09 Thread Rafael Aquini
On Sat, May 09, 2020 at 03:48:54AM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote: > On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 08:47:19AM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote: > > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 10:25:58PM +, Luis Chamberlain wrote: > > > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:06:06PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote: > > > > On Thu, May 07, 2020

[PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint

2020-05-09 Thread Rafael Aquini
Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag. This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids