Re: CVE-2023-52823: kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely

2024-05-24 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 04:13:53PM +0200, Jiri Bohac wrote: > On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 02:38:04PM +0200, Jiri Bohac wrote: > > On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 12:15:47PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > > Nice, but then why was this commit worded this way? Now we check twice? > > > Double safe?

Re: CVE-2023-52823: kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely

2024-05-24 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 02:38:04PM +0200, Jiri Bohac wrote: > On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 12:15:47PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > Nice, but then why was this commit worded this way? Now we check twice? > > Double safe? Should it be reverted? > > double safe's good; turning it into a CVE not

Re: CVE-2023-52823: kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely

2024-05-24 Thread Jiri Bohac
On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 02:38:04PM +0200, Jiri Bohac wrote: > On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 12:15:47PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > Nice, but then why was this commit worded this way? Now we check twice? > > Double safe? Should it be reverted? > > double safe's good; turning it into a CVE not

Re: CVE-2023-52823: kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely

2024-05-24 Thread Jiri Bohac
On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 12:15:47PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > Nice, but then why was this commit worded this way? Now we check twice? > Double safe? Should it be reverted? double safe's good; turning it into a CVE not so much :( CVE-2023-52822, CVE-2023-52824 and CVE-2023-52820,

Re: CVE-2023-52823: kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely

2024-05-24 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 12:02:10PM +0200, Jiri Bohac wrote: > On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 05:31:59PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely > > > > Currently, there is no overflow-check with memdup_user(). > > This is false. > Therefore, I'd like to dispute this

Re: CVE-2023-52823: kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely

2024-05-24 Thread Jiri Bohac
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 05:31:59PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely > > Currently, there is no overflow-check with memdup_user(). This is false. Therefore, I'd like to dispute this CVE. The overflow check is in the kexec_load_check() function called

Re: [PATCH makedumpfile] Make sbindir configurable

2024-05-24 Thread 山崎 真光
On 2024/04/24 11:20, Coiby Xu wrote: > Fedora is going unify bin and sbin and /usr/sbin directory will become a > symlink to bin [1]. So make sbindir configurable to support this case. > > [1] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Unify_bin_and_sbin > > Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu > --- >

Re: [PATCH v3 4/7] crash_dump: reuse saved dm crypt keys for CPU/memory hot-plugging

2024-05-24 Thread Coiby Xu
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 11:48:49AM +0800, Baoquan He wrote: On 04/25/24 at 06:04pm, Coiby Xu wrote: When there is CPU/memory hot-plugging, the kdump kernel image and initrd will be reloaded. The user space can write the "reuse" command to /sys/kernel/crash_dm_crypt_key so the stored keys can be

Re: [PATCH v3 1/7] kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly

2024-05-24 Thread Coiby Xu
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 11:13:43AM +0800, Baoquan He wrote: On 05/21/24 at 09:58am, Coiby Xu wrote: On Mon, May 20, 2024 at 02:16:43PM +0800, Baoquan He wrote: > On 04/25/24 at 06:04pm, Coiby Xu wrote: > > Currently, kexec_buf is placed in order which means for the same > > machine, the info in