Re: [PATCH] fs/proc/vmcore: a few cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump

2025-06-23 Thread Su Hui
On 2025/6/23 23:06, Dan Carpenter wrote: On Mon, Jun 23, 2025 at 06:47:05PM +0800, Su Hui wrote: There are three cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump(). Adjust data_size's type from 'size_t' to 'unsigned int' for the consistency of data->size. Return -ENOMEM directly rather than goto the label to

[PATCH] selftests/kexec: ignore selftest binary

2025-06-23 Thread Dylan Yudaken
Add a .gitignore for the test case build object. Signed-off-by: Dylan Yudaken --- Hi, I noticed this was causing some noise in my git checkout, but perhaps I was doing something odd that it has not been noticed before? Regards, Dylan tools/testing/selftests/kexec/.gitignore | 2 ++ 1 file ch

Re: [PATCH v14 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main header file

2025-06-23 Thread ross . philipson
On 6/23/25 4:44 AM, Camacho Romero, Michal wrote: Hello Ross, I'm BIOS Engineer from Intel, working on the TXT-related security modules development, including TBOOT project. I'm leaving you my thougths and objections on this patch: On 4/21/2025 6:26 PM, Ross Philipson wrote: Michal Camacho Ro

Re: [PATCH] kexec/zstd: fix static zstd build

2025-06-23 Thread Simon Horman
On Sun, Jun 22, 2025 at 06:12:53AM -0700, Nicholas Sielicki wrote: > 60ce9bdf introduced a local reimplementation of ZSTD_isFrame to this > tree, as the definition in libzstd is only available for static linking. > When a static build of libzstd is in-fact available to kexec-tools, this > was previ

Re: [PATCH] fs/proc/vmcore: a few cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump

2025-06-23 Thread Baoquan He
On 06/23/25 at 06:47pm, Su Hui wrote: > There are three cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump(). Adjust data_size's > type from 'size_t' to 'unsigned int' for the consistency of data->size. It's unclear to me why size_t is not suggested here. Isn't it assigned a 'sizeof() + data->size' in which size

Re: [PATCH] fs/proc/vmcore: a few cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump

2025-06-23 Thread Dan Carpenter
On Mon, Jun 23, 2025 at 10:36:45PM +0800, Baoquan He wrote: > On 06/23/25 at 06:47pm, Su Hui wrote: > > There are three cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump(). Adjust data_size's > > type from 'size_t' to 'unsigned int' for the consistency of data->size. > > It's unclear to me why size_t is not sug

Re: [PATCH] fs/proc/vmcore: a few cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump

2025-06-23 Thread Dan Carpenter
On Mon, Jun 23, 2025 at 06:47:05PM +0800, Su Hui wrote: > There are three cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump(). Adjust data_size's > type from 'size_t' to 'unsigned int' for the consistency of data->size. > Return -ENOMEM directly rather than goto the label to simplify the code. > Using scoped_gua

[PATCH] fs/proc/vmcore: a few cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump

2025-06-23 Thread Su Hui
There are three cleanups for vmcore_add_device_dump(). Adjust data_size's type from 'size_t' to 'unsigned int' for the consistency of data->size. Return -ENOMEM directly rather than goto the label to simplify the code. Using scoped_guard() to simplify the lock/unlock code. Signed-off-by: Su Hui -

Re: [PATCH v14 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main header file

2025-06-23 Thread Camacho Romero, Michal
Hello Ross, I'm BIOS Engineer from Intel, working on the TXT-related security modules development, including TBOOT project. I'm leaving you my thougths and objections on this patch: On 4/21/2025 6:26 PM, Ross Philipson wrote: Michal Camacho Romero: Replace all tabs with indentations (4 spaces)

Re: [PATCH] PM: Restrict swap use to later in the suspend sequence

2025-06-23 Thread Lucian Langa
On 13.06.2025 16:43, Mario Limonciello wrote: > From: Mario Limonciello > > Currently swap is restricted before drivers have had a chance to do their > prepare() PM callbacks. Restricting swap this early means that if a driver > needs to evict some content from memory into sawp in it's prepare ca

Re: [PATCH makedumpfile] Add confidential VM unaccepted free pages support on Linux 6.16 and later

2025-06-23 Thread Zhiquan Li
On 2025/6/9 13:02, Zhiquan Li wrote: > UEFI Specification version 2.9 introduces the concept of memory > acceptance: some Virtual Machine platforms, such as Intel TDX or AMD > SEV-SNP, requiring memory to be accepted before it can be used by the > guest. Accepting happens via a protocol specific