Re: CVE-2023-52823: kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely

2024-05-24 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 04:13:53PM +0200, Jiri Bohac wrote: > On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 02:38:04PM +0200, Jiri Bohac wrote: > > On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 12:15:47PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > > Nice, but then why was this commit worded this way? Now we check twice?

Re: CVE-2023-52823: kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely

2024-05-24 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 02:38:04PM +0200, Jiri Bohac wrote: > On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 12:15:47PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > Nice, but then why was this commit worded this way? Now we check twice? > > Double safe? Should it be reverted? > > double safe's good;

Re: CVE-2023-52823: kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely

2024-05-24 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 12:02:10PM +0200, Jiri Bohac wrote: > On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 05:31:59PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > kernel: kexec: copy user-array safely > > > > Currently, there is no overflow-check with memdup_user(). > > This is false. >

Re: [PATCH 08/11] sysctl: Add size to register_sysctl_init

2023-06-28 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 11:09:57AM +0200, Joel Granados wrote: > static int __init random_sysctls_init(void) > { > - register_sysctl_init("kernel/random", random_table); > + register_sysctl_init("kernel/random", random_table, > + ARRAY_SIZE(random_table)); As

Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] resource, crash: Make kexec_file_load support pmem

2023-04-27 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 06:18:34PM +0800, Li Zhijian wrote: > It does: > 1. Add pmem region into PT_LOADs of vmcore > 2. Mark pmem region's p_flags as PF_DEV I'm sorry, but I can not parse this changelog. Please take a look at the kernel documentation for how to write a good changelog message so

[PATCH 6.2 092/139] asymmetric_keys: log on fatal failures in PE/pkcs7

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 3584c1dbfffdabf8e3dc1dd25748bb38dd01cd43 ] These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when secureboot lockdown is in place. Without this change, even with a signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the

[PATCH 6.2 091/139] verify_pefile: relax wrapper length check

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ] The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table (Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required to

[PATCH 6.1 086/134] asymmetric_keys: log on fatal failures in PE/pkcs7

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 3584c1dbfffdabf8e3dc1dd25748bb38dd01cd43 ] These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when secureboot lockdown is in place. Without this change, even with a signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the

[PATCH 6.1 085/134] verify_pefile: relax wrapper length check

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ] The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table (Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required to

[PATCH 5.15 45/91] verify_pefile: relax wrapper length check

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ] The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table (Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required to

[PATCH 5.15 46/91] asymmetric_keys: log on fatal failures in PE/pkcs7

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 3584c1dbfffdabf8e3dc1dd25748bb38dd01cd43 ] These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when secureboot lockdown is in place. Without this change, even with a signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the

[PATCH 5.10 092/124] asymmetric_keys: log on fatal failures in PE/pkcs7

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 3584c1dbfffdabf8e3dc1dd25748bb38dd01cd43 ] These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when secureboot lockdown is in place. Without this change, even with a signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the

[PATCH 5.10 091/124] verify_pefile: relax wrapper length check

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ] The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table (Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required to

[PATCH 5.4 68/92] verify_pefile: relax wrapper length check

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ] The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table (Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required to

[PATCH 5.4 69/92] asymmetric_keys: log on fatal failures in PE/pkcs7

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 3584c1dbfffdabf8e3dc1dd25748bb38dd01cd43 ] These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when secureboot lockdown is in place. Without this change, even with a signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the

[PATCH 4.19 45/57] verify_pefile: relax wrapper length check

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ] The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table (Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required to

[PATCH 4.14 30/37] verify_pefile: relax wrapper length check

2023-04-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Robbie Harwood [ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ] The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table (Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required to

Re: [PATCH 5.15 0/6] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature + dependencies

2022-09-26 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Sat, Sep 24, 2022 at 01:55:23PM +0200, Michal Suchánek wrote: > On Sat, Sep 24, 2022 at 12:13:34PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > On Sat, Sep 24, 2022 at 11:45:21AM +0200, Michal Suchánek wrote: > > > On Sat, Sep 24, 2022 at 11:19:19AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: &

Re: [PATCH 5.15 0/6] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature + dependencies

2022-09-24 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Sat, Sep 24, 2022 at 11:45:21AM +0200, Michal Suchánek wrote: > On Sat, Sep 24, 2022 at 11:19:19AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 23, 2022 at 07:10:28PM +0200, Michal Suchanek wrote: > > > Hello, > > > > > > this is backport of commit 0d

Re: [PATCH 5.15 0/6] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature + dependencies

2022-09-24 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, Sep 23, 2022 at 07:10:28PM +0200, Michal Suchanek wrote: > Hello, > > this is backport of commit 0d519cadf751 > ("arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image > signature") > to table 5.15 tree including the preparatory patches. This feels to me like a new feature

[PATCH 5.15 02/45] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature

2022-09-21 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Coiby Xu [ Upstream commit 0d519cadf75184a24313568e7f489a7fc9b1be3b ] Currently, when loading a kernel image via the kexec_file_load() system call, arm64 can only use the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring to verify a signature whereas x86 can use three more keyrings i.e.

[PATCH 5.4 254/389] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification

2022-08-23 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
ernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" Acked-by: Baoquan He Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Acked-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 18 +- 1 file changed,

[PATCH 5.10 489/545] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification

2022-08-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Michal Suchanek [ Upstream commit 0828c4a39be57768b8788e8cbd0d84683ea757e5 ] commit e23a8020ce4e ("s390/kexec_file: Signature verification prototype") adds support for KEXEC_SIG verification with keys from platform keyring but the built-in keys and secondary keyring are not used. Add

[PATCH 5.15 14/14] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature

2022-08-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
chal Suchanek Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_im

[PATCH 5.19 7/7] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature

2022-08-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
chal Suchanek Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_im

[PATCH 5.15 13/14] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic

2022-08-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 20 +--- include/linux/kexec.h |7 +++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 17 + 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 19

[PATCH 5.18 5/6] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic

2022-08-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 20 +--- include/linux/kexec.h |7 +++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 17 + 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 19

[PATCH 5.18 6/6] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature

2022-08-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
chal Suchanek Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_im

[PATCH 5.19 6/7] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic

2022-08-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 20 +--- include/linux/kexec.h |7 +++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 17 + 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 19

[PATCH 5.19 1071/1157] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification

2022-08-15 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Michal Suchanek [ Upstream commit 0828c4a39be57768b8788e8cbd0d84683ea757e5 ] commit e23a8020ce4e ("s390/kexec_file: Signature verification prototype") adds support for KEXEC_SIG verification with keys from platform keyring but the built-in keys and secondary keyring are not used. Add

[PATCH 5.18 1004/1095] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification

2022-08-15 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Michal Suchanek [ Upstream commit 0828c4a39be57768b8788e8cbd0d84683ea757e5 ] commit e23a8020ce4e ("s390/kexec_file: Signature verification prototype") adds support for KEXEC_SIG verification with keys from platform keyring but the built-in keys and secondary keyring are not used. Add

[PATCH 5.15 719/779] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification

2022-08-15 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Michal Suchanek [ Upstream commit 0828c4a39be57768b8788e8cbd0d84683ea757e5 ] commit e23a8020ce4e ("s390/kexec_file: Signature verification prototype") adds support for KEXEC_SIG verification with keys from platform keyring but the built-in keys and secondary keyring are not used. Add

Re: [PATCH v2 03/13] firmware: google: Test spinlock on panic path to avoid lockups

2022-08-15 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Mon, Aug 08, 2022 at 12:37:46PM -0300, Guilherme G. Piccoli wrote: > Let me clarify / ask something: this series, for example, is composed as > a bunch of patches "centered" around the same idea, panic notifiers > improvements/fixes. But its patches belong to completely different > subsystems,

Re: [PATCH v2 03/13] firmware: google: Test spinlock on panic path to avoid lockups

2022-08-15 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Mon, Aug 08, 2022 at 12:14:30PM -0300, Guilherme G. Piccoli wrote: > On 08/08/2022 02:07, Evan Green wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 19, 2022 at 12:55 PM Guilherme G. Piccoli > > wrote: > >> > >> Currently the gsmi driver registers a panic notifier as well as > >> reboot and die notifiers. The

Re: kernel/kexec_file.o: failed: Cannot find symbol for section 10: .text.unlikely.

2021-09-06 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Mon, Sep 06, 2021 at 01:10:34PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote: > On Sun, 5 Sept 2021 at 20:28, Greg Kroah-Hartman > wrote: > > > > On Sun, Sep 05, 2021 at 07:28:35PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote: > > > Following build errors noticed while building stable rc Linu

Re: kernel/kexec_file.o: failed: Cannot find symbol for section 10: .text.unlikely.

2021-09-05 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Sun, Sep 05, 2021 at 07:28:35PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote: > Following build errors noticed while building stable rc Linux 5.13.14 > with gcc-11 for powerpc architecture. > > # to reproduce this build locally: > tuxmake --target-arch=powerpc --kconfig=defconfig --toolchain=gcc-11 >

[PATCH 5.4 044/388] x86/kdump: Always reserve the low 1M when the crashkernel option is specified

2020-09-29 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Lianbo Jiang [ Upstream commit 6f599d84231fd27e42f4ca2a786a6641e8cddf00 ] On x86, purgatory() copies the first 640K of memory to a backup region because the kernel needs those first 640K for the real mode trampoline during boot, among others. However, when SME is enabled, the kernel

Re: [PATCH v2 2/7] kernel/resource: move and rename IORESOURCE_MEM_DRIVER_MANAGED

2020-09-09 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
; Cc: Jason Gunthorpe > Cc: Kees Cook > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel > Cc: Pankaj Gupta > Cc: Baoquan He > Cc: Wei Yang > Cc: Eric Biederman > Cc: Thomas Gleixner > Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman > Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org > Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand > --- > in

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: move kernel_read_file* to its own include file

2020-07-01 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
> Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig > Signed-off-by: Scott Branden Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

[PATCH 5.7 176/376] net: qed*: Reduce RX and TX default ring count when running inside kdump kernel

2020-06-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Bhupesh Sharma [ Upstream commit 73e030977f7884dbe1be0018bab517e8d02760f8 ] Normally kdump kernel(s) run under severe memory constraint with the basic idea being to save the crashdump vmcore reliably when the primary kernel panics/hangs. Currently the qed* ethernet driver ends up

[PATCH 5.4 109/261] net: qed*: Reduce RX and TX default ring count when running inside kdump kernel

2020-06-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Bhupesh Sharma [ Upstream commit 73e030977f7884dbe1be0018bab517e8d02760f8 ] Normally kdump kernel(s) run under severe memory constraint with the basic idea being to save the crashdump vmcore reliably when the primary kernel panics/hangs. Currently the qed* ethernet driver ends up

[PATCH 4.19 156/267] net: qed*: Reduce RX and TX default ring count when running inside kdump kernel

2020-06-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Bhupesh Sharma [ Upstream commit 73e030977f7884dbe1be0018bab517e8d02760f8 ] Normally kdump kernel(s) run under severe memory constraint with the basic idea being to save the crashdump vmcore reliably when the primary kernel panics/hangs. Currently the qed* ethernet driver ends up

[PATCH 4.14 119/190] net: qed*: Reduce RX and TX default ring count when running inside kdump kernel

2020-06-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Bhupesh Sharma [ Upstream commit 73e030977f7884dbe1be0018bab517e8d02760f8 ] Normally kdump kernel(s) run under severe memory constraint with the basic idea being to save the crashdump vmcore reliably when the primary kernel panics/hangs. Currently the qed* ethernet driver ends up

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: move kernel_read_file* to its own include file

2020-06-17 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 08:17:10AM -0700, Scott Branden wrote: > Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h > include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere > and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface. > >

Re: [PATCH] fs: move kernel_read_file* to its own include file

2020-06-16 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 08:31:52PM -0700, Scott Branden wrote: > Move kernel_read_file* to it own kernel_read_file.h include file. That says what you did, but not _why_ you are doing it :( ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org

[PATCH 5.4 018/165] x86/efi: Update e820 with reserved EFI boot services data to fix kexec breakage

2020-01-11 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Dave Young [ Upstream commit af164898482817a1d487964b68f3c21bae7a1beb ] Michael Weiser reported that he got this error during a kexec rebooting: esrt: Unsupported ESRT version 2904149718861218184. The ESRT memory stays in EFI boot services data, and it was reserved in kernel via

[PATCH 4.19 10/84] x86/efi: Update e820 with reserved EFI boot services data to fix kexec breakage

2020-01-11 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Dave Young [ Upstream commit af164898482817a1d487964b68f3c21bae7a1beb ] Michael Weiser reported that he got this error during a kexec rebooting: esrt: Unsupported ESRT version 2904149718861218184. The ESRT memory stays in EFI boot services data, and it was reserved in kernel via

[PATCH 4.14 07/62] x86/efi: Update e820 with reserved EFI boot services data to fix kexec breakage

2020-01-11 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Dave Young [ Upstream commit af164898482817a1d487964b68f3c21bae7a1beb ] Michael Weiser reported that he got this error during a kexec rebooting: esrt: Unsupported ESRT version 2904149718861218184. The ESRT memory stays in EFI boot services data, and it was reserved in kernel via

[PATCH 4.4 057/137] x86/crash: Add a forward declaration of struct kimage

2020-01-02 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Lianbo Jiang [ Upstream commit 112eee5d06007dae561f14458bde7f2a4879ef4e ] Add a forward declaration of struct kimage to the crash.h header because future changes will invoke a crash-specific function from the realmode init path and the compiler will complain otherwise like this: In

[PATCH 4.9 071/171] x86/crash: Add a forward declaration of struct kimage

2020-01-02 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Lianbo Jiang [ Upstream commit 112eee5d06007dae561f14458bde7f2a4879ef4e ] Add a forward declaration of struct kimage to the crash.h header because future changes will invoke a crash-specific function from the realmode init path and the compiler will complain otherwise like this: In

[PATCH 5.4 302/434] x86/crash: Add a forward declaration of struct kimage

2019-12-29 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Lianbo Jiang [ Upstream commit 112eee5d06007dae561f14458bde7f2a4879ef4e ] Add a forward declaration of struct kimage to the crash.h header because future changes will invoke a crash-specific function from the realmode init path and the compiler will complain otherwise like this: In

[PATCH 4.19 159/219] x86/crash: Add a forward declaration of struct kimage

2019-12-29 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Lianbo Jiang [ Upstream commit 112eee5d06007dae561f14458bde7f2a4879ef4e ] Add a forward declaration of struct kimage to the crash.h header because future changes will invoke a crash-specific function from the realmode init path and the compiler will complain otherwise like this: In

[PATCH 4.14 118/161] x86/crash: Add a forward declaration of struct kimage

2019-12-29 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Lianbo Jiang [ Upstream commit 112eee5d06007dae561f14458bde7f2a4879ef4e ] Add a forward declaration of struct kimage to the crash.h header because future changes will invoke a crash-specific function from the realmode init path and the compiler will complain otherwise like this: In

[PATCH 4.19 187/220] x86/kexec: Correct KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END off-by-one error

2019-11-22 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
etkov CC: "H. Peter Anvin" CC: Andrew Morton CC: Brijesh Singh CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman CC: Ingo Molnar CC: Lianbo Jiang CC: Takashi Iwai CC: Thomas Gleixner CC: Tom Lendacky CC: Vivek Goyal CC: baiyao...@cmss.chinamobile.com CC: b...@redhat.com CC: dan.j.willi...@intel.com C

[PATCH 4.19 138/220] kexec: Allocate decrypted control pages for kdump if SME is enabled

2019-11-22 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Lianbo Jiang [ Upstream commit 9cf38d5559e813cccdba8b44c82cc46ba48d0896 ] When SME is enabled in the first kernel, it needs to allocate decrypted pages for kdump because when the kdump kernel boots, these pages need to be accessed decrypted in the initial boot stage, before SME is

[PATCH 4.14 079/122] kexec: Allocate decrypted control pages for kdump if SME is enabled

2019-11-22 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Lianbo Jiang [ Upstream commit 9cf38d5559e813cccdba8b44c82cc46ba48d0896 ] When SME is enabled in the first kernel, it needs to allocate decrypted pages for kdump because when the kdump kernel boots, these pages need to be accessed decrypted in the initial boot stage, before SME is

[PATCH 4.14 102/122] x86/kexec: Correct KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END off-by-one error

2019-11-22 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
etkov CC: "H. Peter Anvin" CC: Andrew Morton CC: Brijesh Singh CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman CC: Ingo Molnar CC: Lianbo Jiang CC: Takashi Iwai CC: Thomas Gleixner CC: Tom Lendacky CC: Vivek Goyal CC: baiyao...@cmss.chinamobile.com CC: b...@redhat.com CC: dan.j.willi...@intel.com C

[PATCH 4.9 211/222] x86/kexec: Correct KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END off-by-one error

2019-11-22 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
etkov CC: "H. Peter Anvin" CC: Andrew Morton CC: Brijesh Singh CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman CC: Ingo Molnar CC: Lianbo Jiang CC: Takashi Iwai CC: Thomas Gleixner CC: Tom Lendacky CC: Vivek Goyal CC: baiyao...@cmss.chinamobile.com CC: b...@redhat.com CC: dan.j.willi...@intel.com C

[PATCH 4.4 151/159] x86/kexec: Correct KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END off-by-one error

2019-11-22 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
etkov CC: "H. Peter Anvin" CC: Andrew Morton CC: Brijesh Singh CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman CC: Ingo Molnar CC: Lianbo Jiang CC: Takashi Iwai CC: Thomas Gleixner CC: Tom Lendacky CC: Vivek Goyal CC: baiyao...@cmss.chinamobile.com CC: b...@redhat.com CC: dan.j.willi...@intel.com C

[PATCH 4.19 163/190] resource: Fix find_next_iomem_res() iteration issue

2019-09-13 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
[ Upstream commit 010a93bf97c72f43aac664d0a685942f83d1a103 ] Previously find_next_iomem_res() used "*res" as both an input parameter for the range to search and the type of resource to search for, and an output parameter for the resource we found, which makes the interface confusing. The current

[PATCH 4.19 162/190] resource: Include resource end in walk_*() interfaces

2019-09-13 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
[ Upstream commit a98959fdbda1849a01b2150bb635ed559ec06700 ] find_next_iomem_res() finds an iomem resource that covers part of a range described by "start, end". All callers expect that range to be inclusive, i.e., both start and end are included, but find_next_iomem_res() doesn't handle the end

[PATCH 5.0 163/246] x86/kexec: Fill in acpi_rsdp_addr from the first kernel

2019-04-04 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. -- [ Upstream commit ccec81e4251f5a5421e02874e394338a897056ca ] When efi=noruntime or efi=oldmap is used on the kernel command line, EFI services won't be available in the second kernel, therefore the

[PATCH 4.4 098/230] x86/kexec: Dont setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabled

2019-03-22 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. -- [ Upstream commit 2aa958c99c7fd3162b089a1a56a34a0cdb778de1 ] Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable to

[PATCH 3.18 068/134] x86/kexec: Dont setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabled

2019-03-22 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. -- [ Upstream commit 2aa958c99c7fd3162b089a1a56a34a0cdb778de1 ] Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable

[PATCH 4.9 58/96] x86/kexec: Dont setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabled

2019-03-12 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. -- [ Upstream commit 2aa958c99c7fd3162b089a1a56a34a0cdb778de1 ] Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable to

[PATCH 4.14 079/135] x86/kexec: Dont setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabled

2019-03-12 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. -- [ Upstream commit 2aa958c99c7fd3162b089a1a56a34a0cdb778de1 ] Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable

[PATCH 4.19 052/149] x86/kexec: Dont setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabled

2019-03-12 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. -- [ Upstream commit 2aa958c99c7fd3162b089a1a56a34a0cdb778de1 ] Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable

[PATCH 4.20 060/171] x86/kexec: Dont setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabled

2019-03-12 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
4.20-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. -- [ Upstream commit 2aa958c99c7fd3162b089a1a56a34a0cdb778de1 ] Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable

[PATCH 4.18 49/53] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure in the SEV bit detection code

2018-10-18 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
ha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 19 --- 1 file changed, 19 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S @@ -25,20 +25,6 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit) push

[PATCH 4.9 42/63] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot

2018-09-07 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
ki Signed-off-by: David Howells Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyri...@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-mod...@vger.kernel.org Cc: sta...@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c |2 +- 1 file changed, 1 inser

[PATCH 4.14 17/89] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot

2018-09-07 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
ki Signed-off-by: David Howells Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyri...@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-mod...@vger.kernel.org Cc: sta...@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c |2 +- 1 file changed, 1 inser

[PATCH 4.18 025/145] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot

2018-09-07 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
ki Signed-off-by: David Howells Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyri...@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-mod...@vger.kernel.org Cc: sta...@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c |2 +- 1 file changed, 1 inser

[PATCH 4.14 074/138] x86/gart: Exclude GART aperture from vmcore

2018-04-10 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
arf.suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.le...@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c | 46 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_hvm.c|2 - 2 files changed, 46

[PATCH 4.15 098/168] x86/gart: Exclude GART aperture from vmcore

2018-04-10 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
arf.suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.le...@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c | 46 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_hvm.c|2 - 2 files changed, 46

[PATCH 4.9 022/241] x86/mce: Handle broadcasted MCE gracefully with kexec

2018-03-19 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.le...@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h|1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 18 -- arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c |5 +++-- 3 files chang

[PATCH 4.14 87/89] x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation in stop_this_cpu()

2018-01-22 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
<rui.zh...@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <ar...@linux.intel.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrov...@oracle.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.willi...@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180117234141.21184.44067.st...@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hart

[PATCH 4.7 23/31] arch/x86: Handle non enumerated CPU after physical hotplug

2016-10-14 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com> Cc: dyo...@redhat.com Cc: Eric Biederman <ebied...@xmission.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1475514432-27682-1-git-send-email-pra...@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:

[PATCH 4.8 26/37] arch/x86: Handle non enumerated CPU after physical hotplug

2016-10-14 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com> Cc: dyo...@redhat.com Cc: Eric Biederman <ebied...@xmission.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1475514432-27682-1-git-send-email-pra...@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:

[PATCH 4.1 045/202] x86/kexec: Fix kexec crash in syscall kexec_file_load()

2015-10-17 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
: Takashi Iwai <ti...@suse.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de> Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.ku...@linaro.org> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-ker...@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443531537-29436-1-git-sen

[PATCH 4.2 069/258] x86/kexec: Fix kexec crash in syscall kexec_file_load()

2015-10-17 Thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
: Takashi Iwai <ti...@suse.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de> Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.ku...@linaro.org> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-ker...@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443531537-29436-1-git-sen