>From: "Claudia K. White" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Subject: FARC promises to make drug war difficult [STOPNATO.ORG.UK] > >Rebels' Grip Tightens >Well-organized and flush with cash, FARC promises to make drug war difficult > > >http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/12/18/MN >52944.DTL > >Curillo, Columbia -- Ever since a year ago, when leftist guerrillas captured >this southern farm town in a hail of bullets and grenade explosions, >Washington's adversaries have run things just the way they want. > >The rebels have reorganized the local coca-growing business into a booming, >tightly run enterprise. Curillo's streets are clean, common crime has nearly >disappeared and justice is simple. Those who disobey the rebels have a choice: >Leave town or be killed. > >This is the growing empire of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, >known by its Spanish initials FARC. > >Demonized by government officials in Washington and Bogota, despised by much >of the Colombian public and treated as a pariah by many international >human-rights groups, the FARC has succeeded not only in becoming a major >military threat but in creating a vast network of grassroots power. > >As Colombia's drug war heats up, with peace talks collapsing and a huge new >U.S. military aid package kicking in, the FARC is moving toward the top of the >rogues' gallery for American foreign policymakers. > >The rebel army controls nearly one-third of Colombia's territory and is >growing fast, flush with hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue >from taxing the cocaine trade and running the world's largest kidnapping and >extortion racket. > >U.S. and Colombian government officials routinely call the rebels >"narcoguerrillas," and Gen. Barry McCaffrey, the White House drug policy >director, has called the FARC "the principal organizing entity of cocaine >production in the world." > >A new $1.3 billion U.S. aid program is intended to help the Colombian army >drive the FARC out of coca-producing regions, cut its revenues and weaken it >militarily. But the offensive, dubbed Plan Colombia, does not appear to take >into account the rebels' strong social networks in countless villages and poor >urban barrios throughout the nation. > >In Curillo, for example, which the FARC captured from the government in an >attack last December that killed dozens, the guerrillas' strength comes not >just from military muscle. In fact, the rebels are nowhere to be seen - >openly, > >at least. > >FARC undercover troops circulate through town, springing into action only when >needed. Their presence is more apparent out of town, where uniformed >guerrillas stop travelers to check identification and interrogate any >suspicious out-of-towner. > >"Nothing happens here that they don't touch," said one local farmer who asked >to remain unidentified. "Everything is under control. Everything is in order." > > >The rebels have expelled from FARC zones the middlemen who trade in coca paste >- the crack-like substance produced by coca farmers that is eventually >purchased by cocaine laboratories - and replaced them with local peasants who >are loyal to the rebels. The move gives the FARC near-complete power to set >coca prices, levy taxes and freeze out the rightist paramilitaries, who are >the rebels' drug-trade competitors and military archenemies. > >The guerrillas act as a sort of commercial police. "We set prices, levy taxes >and check the weights, making sure nobody gets cheated," said Jhon Jairo, > >a local FARC commander in El Luzon, a town south of Curillo. "And we make sure >that no buyers come from outside. We only allow locals we know." > >The rebel tax varies from region to region, averaging 500 pesos per kilo - >about 22 U.S. cents, or one-quarter of the price that middlemen pay farmers. > >Some Colombian and U.S. officials contend that the FARC has gone beyond the >middleman stage, becoming directly involved in the next two levels of the >business: the laboratories that process coca paste into cocaine and the export >of cocaine to the United States and Europe. > >However, many experts say the accusations are unfounded. "We have seen no >evidence yet that the FARC is directly involved in cocaine production and >export," said Klaus Nyholm, director of the U.N. Drug Control Program in >Colombia. > >The FARC leadership admits regulating and taxing the drug trade, but denies >any direct involvement in cultivation or trafficking. In interviews, top >commanders are defensive and jumpy when discussing the topic, which they know >gives them a bad image. They insist they are willing to help fight drug >trafficking, and cite FARC communiques earlier this year that called cocaine >"a scourge on humanity" and proposed a rebel-run coca eradication program. > >But there's a catch: The rebels say they will cooperate only if such drug- >consuming nations as the United States legalize narcotics consumption, much as >the Netherlands and Portugal have done, and concentrate resources on >substance- abuse programs and just-say-no public education. > >"We realize that cocaine is a bad thing and does lots of damage to the poor >people in the United States," said Commander Ivan Rios, a member of the FARC's >high command. "But we say that simply persecuting the poor peasants who grow >coca is not the answer. Instead of bombing and fumigating Colombia, the United >States must make its own sacrifices." > >For Rios and other commanders, the income from taxing the drug trade is simply >a means to the end of creating a "New Colombia," a forerunner to a >socialist-run revolutionary nation. > >While such Marxist concepts seem wildly out of place in 21st century urban >Colombia, there is no doubt that the FARC is a power to be reckoned with. > >"The FARC has been misinterpreted as just a bunch of criminal thugs," said >Alfredo Rangel, a well-known authority on military affairs and a national >security adviser to then-President Ernesto Samper in the mid 1990s. "In fact, >although it does engage in a lot of criminal activities, it is a coherent, >political-military organization with a clear ideology and a clear plan for >undermining the state." > >The FARC, which is estimated to have 18,000 fighters, has more than doubled in >size over the past decade despite nearly $1 billion in U.S. aid to the >government. Shaken by this failure, the United States has ratcheted up a >military effort unparallelled since President Ronald Reagan's crusade against >Central American Marxists in the 1980s. > >Under a new, two-year aid plan that was approved by Congress in June, >Washington is spending $1.3 billion and sending hundreds of Green Berets and >other military advisers to help get Colombian troops into fighting shape. > >Although many FARC critics say the rebels have been corrupted by the drug >trade and have lost their Marxist ideology, rebel documents and interviews >with commanders and low-ranking rebels indicate that this view is only partly >true. Both the FARC and the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN) espouse a >mix of Marxism and nationalism - reminiscent of 1980s Latin American leftists >such as Nicaragua's Sandinista government. The rebel agenda includes partial >nationalization of major industries, distribution of large farms to landless >peasants, increased social spending and a purge of the armed forces. > >"The FARC are ideological Marxists, but they are also very pragmatic," Rangel >said. "You won't hear any 1980s-style slogans of socialism or death.' " > >The rebels' pragmatism can be seen in their unusual justice system. They have >created a network of "complaint offices" - rural courts in which FARC >commanders try a vast gamut of rural cases, from chicken-stealing to drunken >brawls. > >The FARC courts have become popular, with many local residents saying the >rebel commanders give fast and fair results, unlike drawn-out trials in >government courts that often require multiple bribes to produce a ruling. > >"I like the (FARC) because I get a solution," said Myrna Ledesma, a resident >of the rebel-held town of San Vicente del Caguan, as she left a hearing at >which a commander brokered a compromise in a rent dispute with her landlord. > >But for many observers, "FARC justice" is an oxymoron. By nearly all accounts, >the FARC's human-rights record is poor. In San Vicente del Caguan, for >example, the rebels have killed at least 19 people since they were given >control of the area by the government as a venue for peace negotiations. >Rights groups generally blame the FARC and ELN for about 20 percent of the >several thousand extrajudicial killings in Colombia each year. The rightist >paramilitary groups are blamed for about three-quarters of the killings, and >the government's armed forces are blamed for the rest. > >An example of the rebels' dirty hands is their penchant for kidnapping. The >FARC and ELN routinely abduct wealthy Colombians as a means of enforcing what >they call a "peace tax." These huge, meticulously run extortion rackets net >both groups an estimated $100 million a year. > >"Of course I pay the guerrillas. Everybody does," said Gabriel Castaneda, >president of the Chamber of Commerce of Caqueta province, in the heart of the >drug war. "We have no choice; otherwise we'll be kidnapped or killed." > >The rebels' kidnapping racket has left them the losers in the battle for >Colombian hearts and minds - not just among the rich but also among millions >of average citizens. And, unlike their ideological cousins in Central America, >the FARC has drawn little support among intellectuals. > >"The guerrillas are very politically isolated, despite their growing military >strength and their niche among certain poor sectors of the population, " said >Fernando Cubides, a political scientist at the National University in Bogota. > >"There's growing sentiment among the public for a total military solution >against the rebels, a scorched-earth campaign to wipe them out." > >The FARC's isolation springs in part from its bitter experience with >compromise at the peace table. In the 1980s, the movement sponsored the >formation of a legal political party, the Patriotic Union. But the death >squads and the army carried out a brutal campaign to decapitate the new party, >assassinating about 4,000 of its top cadres. > >"The FARC lost its entire political leadership, its best and most flexible >thinkers," Cubides said. "Now it's left with the warriors, many of whom will >never believe in peace negotiations." > >As the peace talks crumble, FARC commanders make little attempt to disguise >their viewpoint that a military triumph is the only solution. > >Cmdr. Julian Conrado, a member of a FARC team responsible for talking with >civilian groups, alluded to the gradual breakdown in civil society that >Colombia has endured ever since the fratricidal 1948-58 period known simply as >La Violencia, when more than 200,000 people were killed in massacres by the >country's two rival parties, the Conservatives and Liberals. > >"In this country, it's easier to recruit people for the guerrillas than for a >student discussion group or a labor union," he said. "There's so much >violence, the regime is so corrupt, that many people see no other >alternative." > >Conrado, a gregarious man who also serves as lead singer in a rebel band that >plays vallenato - a folkloric music popular in Colombia - sees little but >bloodshed in the nation's future. > >"We're not warmongers, but this war is going to get a lot worse before there's >any resolution. Until this country feels a lot more pain, it won't change." > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >- > > >Law and Order, Rebel Style > >The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas have imposed a >parallel justice system in areas they control. Critics say it is arbitrary and >harsh, but no one denies that it is efficent. Examples of rebel rule include: > >- Middlemen: The rebels have expelled coca traders from FARC zones and >replaced them with loyal supporters. The move gives the rebels near-complete >power to set prices for coca paste, levy taxes and keep out the rightist >paramilitaries, who compete with the FARC for control of the cocaine business. > > >- Courts: The rebels have created a system of courts that metes out punishment >for crimes - most of which are the usual rural crimes of cattle theft, >property disputes and drunken feuds. Penalties include, in ascending order of >severity: verbal warnings; fines; work on local road-building crews; permanent >expulsion from the zone; death. > >- Morality: The rebels also work hard to stamp out domestic problems such as >wife-beating, drunkenness and even what is termed "malicious gossiping." >Late-night curfews are enforced, residents must participate in weekly street >cleanups and prostitutes get weekly health checkups. > >- Drug use: Despite the rebels' extensive involvement in the cocaine trade, > >they strictly prohibit local consumption of cocaine products or any other >illegal drugs. Punishment is usually fast and severe. > >- Municipal spending: The rebels use threats of violence to coerce elected >officials to obey rebel dictates on how to spend their budgets. Anti-poverty >programs, education and road-building get top priority. > >- Corruption: Any suspicion of graft by municipal officials prompts a public >trial - and, usually, punishment. > >- Roads: The FARC controls a large fleet of road construction equipment, which >it uses to repair and build farm-to-market roads. The FARC's obsession with >road-building comes from its top commander, Manuel Marulanda, who was a local >highways department boss in Tolima province in the 1950s, before he and a >handful of others founded the FARC. > >- Price controls: The rebels set prices for a wide variety of basic goods, >ranging from farm products such as coca paste to consumer items and locally >consumed food. > >E-mail Robert Collier at [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > 7 Printer-friendly version >7 Email this article to a friend >COLOMBIA QUAGMIRE > >Part II (12/18) >Well-organized rebels make drug war difficult. > >Paramilitary terrify nation. > > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >- >Part I (12/17) >U.S.-financed drug war aims to beat traffickers. > >Travelers take life in their hands. > >Coca money hard for farmers to resist > > > > > > > >12/17/2000 - Drug War in the Jungle. >12/17/2000 - Lure of Coca Money Hard for Farmers to Resist. > >09/27/2000 - OPEC'S VENEZUELA SUMMIT / Accord on OPEC Prices Sought at Caracas >Summit. > >06/29/2000 - Rebels say they battle U.S.-backed anti-drug offensive . > >>>more related articles... > > > > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >- > > > >Feedback > > >)2000 San Francisco Chronicle Page A1 >SectionsDatebookCommentarySportsNewsBusiness > > >xoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxox >Claudia White~Main Line News >Campaign International >http://www.angelfire.com/ut/Angel1 >Web Read & Subscription Info ;) >http://www.egroups.com/messages/MainLineNews >xoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxo >Pray for the Dine'h and traditional Hopi at Big Mountain, AZ, USA. >http://members.xoom.com/senaa/HomePage.html >xoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxox > > > > > >Angelfire for your free web-based e-mail. http://www.angelfire.com > > >______________________________________________________________________ >To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED] > _______________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. 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