Hello,
I am exploring ideas for clients in cloud to be able to implement functions
where there could verify the services offered by the cloud provider like
metering services.
Idea is I am using the concept of write execute protection scheme. And also I
am using TamperEvident Log. I am making
Hello,
I am working on testbed executing some secure applications on untrusted
hypervisor (in my case kvm).
In order to verify the run time integrity of applications,I am using an idea
based on write xor execute protection protecting any of the page table
updates of hypervisoruser code/data
Hello,
I am exploring ideas for clients in cloud to be able to implement functions
where there could verify the services offered by the cloud provider like
metering services.
Idea is I am using the concept of write execute protection scheme. And also I
am using TamperEvident Log. I am making
Paolo Bonzini pbonzini at redhat.com writes
Hello,
I am exploring ideas to implement a service inside a virtual machine on
untrusted hypervisors under current cloud infrastructures.
Particularly, I am interested how one can verify the integrity of the
service in an environment where
is a key feature of SGX? That is, to
my understanding, what Shiva is looking for (though on current hardware,
which remains infeasible unfortunately).
Jan
I was going through the Write xor Execute memory protection scheme and
thought if this could be the solution.
I think if we lock down
Hello,
I am exploring ideas to implement a service inside a virtual machine on
untrusted hypervisors under current cloud infrastructures.
Particularly, I am interested how one can verify the integrity of the
service in an environment where hypervisor is not trusted. This is my setup.
1. I
Nakajima, Jun jun.nakajima at intel.com writes:
On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 2:25 PM, Shiva V shivaramakrishnan740 at
gmail.com wrote:
Hello,
I am exploring ideas to implement a service inside a virtual machine on
untrusted hypervisors under current cloud infrastructures.
Particularly, I am
Hello,
I am exploring on finding a way to ensure runtime integrity of
a executable in untrusted hypervisors.
In particular, this is my requirements:
1. I have a 2 virtual machines. (A, B).
2. VM-A is running some service (exe) inside it. For example any resource
accounting service intended
the image to the
NFS share if the guest vm prior didn't had this functionality?
And If I do the functionality now,Only NFS-shared partitions could be
intercepted.What about the other partition writes occurring at the
guest vm?
Looking forward to your reply.
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Shiva
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Yes,I am using QEMU as device virtualizer.
Is there any suggestion that you could give to achieve it?
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Shiva
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developing a
driver or adding redirection of I/O). But I have a time constraint here and
unlikely to achieve it by this way.
Looking forward to your help/comments.Thanks
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Shiva
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