On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 08:16:28PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
Il 10/04/2014 16:01, Marcelo Tosatti ha scritto:
On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 04:38:08PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
Il 07/04/2014 21:06, Wu, Feng ha scritto:
Even though the tests do not cover the CPL=3/implicit access case, the
logic
I would like to see this in 3.15.
-hpa
On April 13, 2014 2:57:38 PM PDT, Marcelo Tosatti mtosa...@redhat.com wrote:
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 08:16:28PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
Il 10/04/2014 16:01, Marcelo Tosatti ha scritto:
On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 04:38:08PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini
Il 10/04/2014 16:01, Marcelo Tosatti ha scritto:
On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 04:38:08PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
Il 07/04/2014 21:06, Wu, Feng ha scritto:
Even though the tests do not cover the CPL=3/implicit access case, the
logic to compute PFERR_RSVD_MASK dynamically is already covered by
Il 11/04/2014 20:16, Paolo Bonzini ha scritto:
Il 10/04/2014 16:01, Marcelo Tosatti ha scritto:
On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 04:38:08PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
Il 07/04/2014 21:06, Wu, Feng ha scritto:
Even though the tests do not cover the CPL=3/implicit access case,
the
logic to compute
On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 04:38:08PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
Il 07/04/2014 21:06, Wu, Feng ha scritto:
Even though the tests do not cover the CPL=3/implicit access case, the
logic to compute PFERR_RSVD_MASK dynamically is already covered by AC=1.
So I'm quite happy with the coverage.
On Tue, Apr 01, 2014 at 05:46:32PM +0800, Feng Wu wrote:
Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is a new security feature
disclosed by Intel, please refer to the following document:
http://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/319433-014.pdf
Every access to a linear address is either
Il 07/04/2014 21:06, Wu, Feng ha scritto:
Even though the tests do not cover the CPL=3/implicit access case, the
logic to compute PFERR_RSVD_MASK dynamically is already covered by AC=1.
So I'm quite happy with the coverage. Series is
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonz...@redhat.com]
-Original Message-
From: kvm-ow...@vger.kernel.org [mailto:kvm-ow...@vger.kernel.org] On
Behalf Of Paolo Bonzini
Sent: Friday, April 04, 2014 3:28 PM
To: Wu, Feng; g...@redhat.com; h...@zytor.com; kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] KVM: enable Intel SMAP for KVM
Il
Il 04/04/2014 04:22, Wu, Feng ha scritto:
Thank you for providing these test cases. I tested it in related hardware
(both 32- and 64-bits) with both ept=1 and ept=0, they all pass.
I also did some similar testing before posting the patch set. Since SMAP
has been already supported in Linux
Il 01/04/2014 11:46, Feng Wu ha scritto:
Feng Wu (4):
KVM: Remove SMAP bit from CR4_RESERVED_BITS.
KVM: Add SMAP support when setting CR4
KVM: Disable SMAP for guests in EPT realmode and EPT unpaging mode
KVM: expose SMAP feature to guest
Hi,
I prepared some testcases. You can find
-Original Message-
From: kvm-ow...@vger.kernel.org [mailto:kvm-ow...@vger.kernel.org] On
Behalf Of Paolo Bonzini
Sent: Friday, April 04, 2014 12:46 AM
To: Wu, Feng; g...@redhat.com; h...@zytor.com; kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] KVM: enable Intel SMAP for KVM
Il
Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is a new security feature
disclosed by Intel, please refer to the following document:
http://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/319433-014.pdf
Every access to a linear address is either a supervisor-mode access
or a user-mode access. All accesses
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