http://boliviadiary.wordpress.com/2013/02/07/from-water-wars-to-water-scarcity-bolivias-cautionary-tale-revista/


FROM WATER WARS TO WATER SCARCITY: BOLIVIA’S CAUTIONARY TALE (REVISTA)

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02/07/2013 · Leave a
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*Emily Achtenberg,
ReVista<http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/publications/revistaonline/>:
Harvard Review of Latin America,
Link<http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/publications/revistaonline/winter-2013/water-wars-water-scarcity>
to
original article, Winter 2013*
**When Bolivian President Evo Morales arrived at the new Uyuni airport last
August and found no water running from the tap, he publicly reprimanded and
promptly dismissed his Minister of Water. As it happened, the pipes were
merely frozen. The incident underscores the critical—and highly
symbolic—role of water in the politics of this landlocked Andean nation.
WATER WARS

[image: (Feria Internacional del Agua, 10 yr anniversary Cochabamba Water
Wars, credit: Kris Krug,
cc)]<http://boliviadiary.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/feria-internacional-del-agua-10-yr-anniversary-cochabamba-water-wars-bolivia.jpg>In
April 2000, a popular struggle against water privatization in Cochabamba,
Bolivia’s third largest city, ignited a chain of events that profoundly
altered the nation’s political landscape. The Water War was precipitated
when SEMAPA, Cochabamba’s municipal water company, was sold to a
transnational consortium controlled by U.S.-based Bechtel, in exchange for
debt relief for the Bolivian government and new World Bank loans to expand
the water system.

A new law allowed Bechtel to administer water resources that SEMAPA did not
even control, including the communal water systems prevalent in the
ever-expanding southern periphery and in the countryside, which had never
been hooked into the grid. Local farmer-irrigators feared that “even the
rain” collected and distributed for centuries by their associations would
fall within Bechtel’s grasp.

These concerns, along with a 50 percent average increase in water rates for
SEMAPA customers, prompted the formation of a broad alliance of farmers,
factory workers, rural and urban water committees, neighborhood
organizations, students and middleclass professionals in opposition to
water privatization. They were joined by the militant federation of coca
growers from the Chapare, led by then labor leader Evo Morales, who lent
his considerable expertise in organizing civic strikes, road blockades, and
massive popular assemblies. Eventually, Bechtel was forced to abrogate its
contract, return SEMAPA to public control, and withdraw its legal claim
against the Bolivian government for $50 million in compensation.

This iconic struggle crystallized a growing demand for popular control of
Bolivia’s natural resources, leading to the Gas Wars of 2003 and 2005, the
overthrow of two neoliberal presidents, and the subsequent election of Evo
Morales and the MAS (Movement Towards Socialism) party as a “government of
the social movements.” A second water revolt—this time by neighborhood
organizations in the sprawling indigenous city of El Alto—ousted the French
multinational Suez company from the recently privatized La Paz-El Alto
water district. Bolivia’s new constitution, enacted in 2009, proclaims that
access to water is a human right and bans its privatization.

Outside Bolivia, the Water War helped to inspire a worldwide
anti-globalization movement and provided a model for water-justice
struggles throughout the Americas and beyond. The Bolivian government led
the successful drive for UN recognition of water and sanitation as a human
right in 2010, and is in the forefront of a new international campaign for
a UN declaration against water privatization.

On the domestic front, as water-justice advocates look to Bolivia for
successful alternative models to privatization, the implementation of these
hard-won water rights has proved to be a significant challenge.
*WATER RIGHTS*

The Morales government has sought to develop a new institutional framework
that positions the state as a direct protagonist in providing and
regulating water and sanitation services (see Susan Spronk,
“Post-Neoliberalism in Latin America? Urban Water Supply Management in
Bolivia Under Evo Morales,” unpublished draft prepared for the Latin
American Studies Association, May 26, 2012). The Water Ministry, created in
2006 to integrate the functions of water supply and sanitation, water
resource management, and environmental protection, is the first of its kind
in Latin America. It has a mandate to end water privatization, including
the creation of a public water company to replace the temporary utility
established for La Paz-El Alto after the exit of Suez.

[image: Human Right to
Water]<http://boliviadiary.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/human-right-to-water.jpg>The
Water Ministry has been plagued by frequent reorganizations and
institutional instability, with six changes in leadership since its
creation. Critics charge that it operates more like a loose federation of
sub-ministry fiefdoms than a coherent organization, and suffers from
overlapping jurisdictions with other cabinet ministries. Its functions also
sometimes conflict with those of the departmental and municipal
governments, which have significant water management responsibilities under
Bolivia’s decentralized administrative structure.

Almost six years after the final ouster of Suez, the Water Ministry is
still negotiating the design of the La Paz–El Alto public water company,
with divergent visions held by combative El Alto neighborhood groups, the
City of La Paz, and the Morales government. La Paz has periodically
threatened to withdraw and establish its own municipal water utility.

While the Water Ministry has taken over the functions of the formerly
privatized water regulatory system, controlling and monitoring the
activities of Bolivia’s approximately 28,000 local water and sanitation
providers has proved to be a challenge. The sector encompasses a diverse
range of organizations, from sophisticated utilities like SAGUAPAC in Santa
Cruz—the largest urban water cooperative in the world—to thousands of
independent water committees in rural and peripheral areas, who manage
artisanal wells and antiquated distribution systems based on traditional
uses and customs.

These small providers are burdened with poorly constructed and deteriorated
systems, operating deficiencies, and community conflicts. An estimated 35
percent of their water is lost to leaks and clandestine hook-ups. While
only a fraction of independent providers are even registered with the
government, efforts to curb their traditional rights can become an
explosive political issue—as evidenced by the Cochabamba Water War.

In the absence of a comprehensive regulatory framework, tensions between
these traditional methods of water provision and the new system of formal
water rights are far from being resolved. Still, the Morales government has
made significant efforts to strengthen the capacity of independent water
providers through technical assistance and financing, recognizing their
role as a critical partner in the government’s water development agenda.

Twelve years after the Water War, the challenge of developing alternative
models to privatization is readily apparent in Cochabamba. While the
re-municipalized SEMAPA has more than tripled the size of its service area
since 2000, at least 40 percent of the city’s residents—mostly in the
southern hillside districts, which were the chief protagonists of the Water
War—still lack piped water and sanitation services (see Franz Chávez,
“Bolivia: Cochabamba Still Thirsty,” IPS Inter Press Service, March 22,
2011). Those remaining outside the grid are forced to pay 5 to 10 times
more than SEMAPA consumers for trucked-in water of dubious quality. Even on
the grid, water service is intermittent.

Although the reconstituted SEMAPA includes elected community
representatives on its board of directors, problems of mismanagement,
corruption, and inefficiency continue to plague the organization. In 2010,
the company was forced to lay off 150 workers to overcome a $3 million cash
deficit, due to alleged irregularities such as payroll padding, materials
thefts, and continued diversion of the system’s water.

Frustrated with both the private and public water management models,
residents of Cochabamba’s southern zones are increasingly relying on
traditional community-run water systems as an alternative. Many of these
neighborhoods have established autonomous and participatory water
distribution systems managed by elected water committees, cooperatives, or
community councils that are seeking to collaborate to varying degrees with
SEMAPA. The local water committees have affiliated through ASICA-Sur (the
Association of Community Water Systems of the South) to receive technical
assistance and, in some cases, direct EU financing for their systems. They
hope to buy water at bulk rates from SEMAPA while remaining under community
control.

[image: Cochabamba,
Bolivia]<http://boliviadiary.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/cochabamba-bolivia.jpg>
WATER SCARCITY

The model of decentralized social-public water management may prove to be
more viable than either the private or the state-centric model for
countries like Bolivia, with major geographic barriers to centralized
service provision, a weak state sector, and a strong culture of community
participation. Still, regardless of the management model, the major
challenge facing Bolivia’s water sector today is the need for significant
resources to upgrade and expand the existing infrastructure and develop new
water sources.

While the Morales government has made significant progress in this area, a
great deal remains to be accomplished. Recently, the government announced
that Bolivia will meet its overall Millennium Development Goal for access
to safe drinking water three years ahead of schedule, with 88 percent
overall coverage achieved in 2010. But potable water access rates in
Bolivia’s rural and peri-urban zones (71 percent) lag far behind those for
urban areas (96 percent), and are among the lowest in Latin America. And
only 27 percent of Bolivians have adequate sanitation facilities—the
second-worst record in the region, after Haiti.

Climate change and extreme weather events have added a new and urgent
dimension to Bolivia’s water challenges, both urban and rural (see “Climate
Change Is About Water,” the Democracy Center,
http://climatechange.democracyctr.org/). In recent years, droughts have
increasingly undermined the water systems and agricultural economies of
rural communities, while displacing their populations to precarious urban
zones where torrential rains and floods overwhelm existing water and
sanitation infrastructure. Retreating tropical glaciers are diminishing
freshwater resources not only for small highland communities, but for the
urban populations of El Alto and La Paz, who rely on glacial melt as a
major source of drinking water. Water levels in Lake Titicaca, which some
2.6 million people depend on, are reportedly at their lowest levels since
1949.

The national development plan calls for a $700 million investment between
2010 and 2015 to upgrade Bolivia’s water and sanitation infrastructure,
including climate change adaptations. Like its neoliberal predecessors, the
Morales government continues to rely on foreign donors (principally the
Inter-American Development Bank, the Venezuela-dominated
Latin American Development Bank, Spain, Italy, and Japan) for as much as 80
percent of this funding. Most of the balance is expected to come from the
departmental and municipal governments, whose revenues—derived principally
from hydrocarbon royalties—have increased substantially under Morales.
Water researcher Susan Spronk points out that only 1.5 percent of the
national budget (from direct Treasury revenues) is dedicated to water and
sanitation improvements, while 80 percent is allocated to mining,
hydrocarbons, hydroelectricity, and transportation infrastructure.

The reliance on foreign investment reinforces the concept of a “climate
debt” owed by industrialized countries to developing nations, which Morales
has justifiably promoted. Still, it keeps Bolivia’s rate of water and
sanitation infrastructure expansion dependent on external priorities,
introducing a level of risk and unpredictability that could be problematic
in the context of today’s worldwide financial crisis.

Critics argue that the Morales government’s budget priorities reflect its
continued commitment to a “neo-extractivist” development model, at the
expense of meeting popular needs through investment in sectors that are
considered “unproductive.” As well, the destructive impact of
government-supported mining operations on local water supplies has been a
growing source of tension with indigenous communities.

Once again, Bolivia is at the epicenter of a struggle over water—this time,
over water scarcity—with worldwide implications. Given the combative nature
of Bolivia’s social movements, popular and regional conflicts over water
shortages could be far more explosive than the Cochabamba Water War. Just
how this prospect might shape the next chapter of Bolivia’s water politics
remains to be seen.

—————————————————————————–

*Emily Achtenberg** is an urban planner and an independent researcher on
Latin American social movements and progressive governments. She writes a
biweekly blog for NACLA <https://nacla.org/blog/rebel-currents>, mostly on
current events in Bolivia.*


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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