Now, how about us?  Amazing, how little comparison and pressure is yet 

being applied by the media to our own, enormous possibilities of nuclear

plant disasters.  It's heartening to begin getting news of popular concern,

but clearly, the Obama administration and congress will need a lot of
shoving 

to loosen ties to the nuclear industry and move away from this deadly
trajectory.  

-Ed 

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/asia/22nuclear.html?ref=world

 


Japan Extended Reactor's Life, Despite Warning


By HIROKO TABUCHI
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/t/hiroko_tabuchi
/index.html?inline=nyt-per> , NORIMITSU ONISHI
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/norimitsu_onis
hi/index.html?inline=nyt-per>  and KEN BELSON
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/ken_belson/ind
ex.html?inline=nyt-per> 


Published: March 21, 2011 


 


The regulatory committee reviewing extensions pointed to stress cracks in
the backup diesel-powered generators at Reactor No. 1 at the Daiichi plant,
according to a summary of its deliberations that was posted on the Web site
of Japan's nuclear regulatory agency after each meeting. The cracks made the
engines vulnerable to corrosion from seawater and rainwater. The generators
are thought to have been knocked out by the tsunami, shutting down the
reactor's vital cooling system. 

The Tokyo Electric Power Company, which runs the plant, has since struggled
to keep the reactor and spent fuel pool from overheating and emitting
radioactive materials. 

Several weeks after the extension was granted, the company admitted that it
had failed to inspect 33 pieces of equipment related to the cooling systems,
including water pumps and diesel generators, at the power station's six
reactors, according to findings published on the agency's Web site shortly
before the earthquake. 

Regulators said that "maintenance management was inadequate" and that the
"quality of inspection was insufficient." 

Less than two weeks later, the earthquake and tsunami set off the crisis at
the power station. 

The decision to extend the reactor's life, and the inspection failures at
all six reactors, highlight what critics describe as unhealthy ties between
power plant operators and the Japanese regulators that oversee them. Expert
panels like the one that recommended the extension are drawn mostly from
academia to backstop bureaucratic decision-making and rarely challenge the
agencies that hire them. 

Because public opposition to nuclear power makes it hard to build new power
plants, nuclear operators are lobbying to extend their reactors' use beyond
the 40-year statutory limit, despite uneven safety records and a history of
cover-ups. The government, eager to expand the use of
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/energy-environment/atomic-energ
y/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier> nuclear energy and reduce the reliance
on imported fossil fuels, has been largely sympathetic. Such extensions are
also part of a global trend in which aging plants have been granted longer
lives. 

Over the next decade in Japan, 13 more reactors - and the other 5 at the
Fukushima Daiichi plant - will also turn 40, raising the prospect of
gargantuan replacement costs. That is one reason critics contend that the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency's committee in charge of inspecting
aging nuclear power plants may play down its own findings. 

In approving the extension in early February, regulators told Tokyo Electric
to monitor potential damage from radiation to the reactor's pressure vessel,
which holds fuel rods; corrosion of the spray heads used to douse the
suppression chamber; corrosion of key bolts at the reactor; and conduction
problems in a gauge that measures the flow of water into the reactor,
according to a report published in early February. 

The committee, which convened six times to review findings gathered during
inspections of the No. 1 unit at the power station, found that Tokyo
Electric had met all required protections from earthquakes. Inspectors,
however, had spent just three days inspecting the No. 1 unit, a period that
industry experts say was far too brief because assessing the earthquake risk
to a nuclear plant is one of the most complex engineering problems in the
world. 

Despite these doubts, the committee recommended that Tokyo Electric be given
permission to run the No. 1 unit, which was built by General Electric and
began operating in 1971, for an additional decade. During the approval
process, the company claimed that the reactor was capable of running for 60
years. 

Mitsuhiko Tanaka, an engineer who worked on the design of the reactors at
the Fukushima Daiichi plant, said the reactors there were outdated,
particularly their small suppression chambers, which increased the risk that
pressure would build up within the reactor, a fault eliminated in newer
reactors. Since the tsunami, officials at Fukushima Daiichi have tried to
relieve rising pressure inside the reactors, several times resorting to
releasing radioactive steam into the atmosphere, a measure that in turn has
contributed to the contamination of food and water in the area.

"It was about time the reactor was replaced," Mr. Tanaka said. "The tsunami
would have caused great damage, regardless. But the pipes, the machinery,
the computers, the entire reactors - they are just old, and that did not
help." Somewhat younger reactors, Nos. 2, 3, and 4, also suffered extensive
damage. 

Regulators approved the 10-year extension even though aging reactors at
Tokyo Electric, as well as those at other power companies, had suffered a
series of problems as far back as a decade ago. Attempts to cover them up
and manipulate data, particularly by Tokyo Electric, the country's biggest
utility, underscored not only the problems of the nuclear industry but also
Japan's weakness in regulating it. The company has admitted wrongdoing. 

A Tokyo Electric spokesman, Naoki Tsunoda, said: "We are committed to
carrying out proper inspections in the future. We will study why this has
happened and endeavor to inform the public." 

In 2000, a whistle-blower at a separate company that was contracted to
inspect the reactors told regulators about cracks in the stainless steel
shrouds that cover reactor cores at Fukushima's Daiichi plant. But
regulators simply told the company to look into the issue, allowing the
reactors to keep operating. 

Nuclear regulators effectively sat on the information about the cracks in
the shrouds, said Eisaku Sato, the governor of Fukushima Prefecture at the
time and an opponent of nuclear power. He said the prefecture itself and the
communities hosting the nuclear plants did not learn about the cracks until
regulators publicized them in 2002, more than two years after the
whistle-blower reported the cracks. 

In 2003, regulators forced Tokyo Electric to suspend operations at its 10
reactors at two plants in Fukushima and 7 reactors in Niigata Prefecture
after whistle-blowers gave information to Fukushima Prefecture showing that
the company had falsified inspection records and hid flaws over 16 years to
save on repair costs. In the most serious incident, Tokyo Electric hid the
large cracks in the shrouds. 

"An organization that is inherently untrustworthy is charged with ensuring
the safety of Japan's nuclear plants," said Mr. Sato, governor from 1988 to
2006. "So the problem is not limited to Tokyo Electric, which has a long
history of cover-ups, but it's the whole system that is flawed. That's
frightening." 

Like many critics of Japan's nuclear industry, Mr. Sato attributed weak
oversight to a conflict of interest that he said essentially stripped the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency of its effectiveness. The agency, which
is supposed to act as a watchdog, is under the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry, which has a general policy of encouraging the development of
Japan's nuclear industry. 

The ministry and the agency, in turn, share cozy ties with Tokyo Electric
and other operators - some of which offer lucrative jobs to former ministry
officials in a practice known as "amakudari," or descent from heaven. 

"They're all birds of a feather," Mr. Sato, 71, said in an interview at his
home in Koriyama, in Fukushima Prefecture. 

The  <http://www.jnes.go.jp/english/index.html> Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization, which is supposed to provide a second layer of scrutiny, is
understaffed and largely an advisory group. Masatoshi Toyoda, a former vice
president at Tokyo Electric who, among other jobs, ran the company's nuclear
safety division, said the organization should be strengthened. The United
States had a similar setup until the 1970s, when Congress broke up the old
Atomic Energy Commission into the Department of Energy and the
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/nuclear
_regulatory_commission/index.html?inline=nyt-org> Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. 

"Like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the United States, they should
have full-time engineers who should check the safety of power plants," Mr.
Toyoda said. "I've been telling the government that the system should be
changed, but any changes to Japan's nuclear policy take a long time." 

Hidehiko Nishiyama, deputy director general of the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency, said that "there are no problems with the current safety
setup." He added that the extension of the life of Reactor No. 1 "was
approved on the understanding that any problems found would be fixed by
Tokyo Electric." 

But critics say the approval process for extending the lifespan of reactors
is fraught with problems. Limited amounts of information are disclosed
before approval is granted. The government reviews only reports submitted by
utilities, and does not conduct its own tests to determine whether those
reports are true, according to Chihiro Kamisawa, a nuclear safety researcher
at the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, Japan's most vocal nuclear
watchdog. 

"They are stretching the limit," Mr. Kamisawa said. 

Kantaro Suzuki and Noriko Takata contributed reporting.



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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