http://www.thenation.com/article/164995/playing-fire-obamas-risky-oil-threat-china
 
Playing With Fire: Obama's China Syndrome 
 
 <http://www.thenation.com/authors/michael-t-klare> Michael T. Klare
The Nation:  in the December 12th, 2011 edition
 
This article originally appeared at  
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175476/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_a_new_cold_war_in_asia/>
 TomDispatch.com. To stay on top of important articles like these, sign up to 
receive the  <https://app.e2ma.net/app/view:Join/signupId:43308/acctId:25612> 
latest updates from TomDispatch.com. Click  
<http://tomdispatch.blogspot.com/2011/12/new-cold-war-in-asia.html> here to 
listen to the author discuss the American military build-up in the Pacific. 
 
When it comes to China policy, is the Obama administration leaping from the 
frying pan directly into the fire? In an attempt to turn the page on two 
disastrous wars in the Greater Middle East, it may have just launched a new 
cold war in Asia—once again, viewing oil as the key to global supremacy.
 
The new policy was signaled by President Obama himself on November 17 in an 
address  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>
 to the Australian Parliament in which he laid out an audacious—and extremely 
dangerous—geopolitical vision. Instead of focusing on the Greater Middle East, 
as has been the case for the last decade, the United States will now 
concentrate its power in Asia and the Pacific. “My guidance is clear,” he 
declared in Canberra. “As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate 
the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this 
region.” While administration officials insist that this new policy is not 
aimed specifically at China, the implication is clear enough: from now on, the 
primary focus of American military strategy will not be counterterrorism, but 
the containment of that economically booming land—at whatever risk or cost.

The Planet’s New Center of Gravity

The new emphasis on Asia and the containment of China is necessary, top 
officials insist, because the Asia-Pacific region now constitutes the “center 
of  <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176999.htm> gravity” of world 
economic activity. While the United States was bogged down in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the argument goes, China had the leeway to expand its influence in 
the region. For the first time since the end of World War II, Washington is no 
longer the dominant economic actor there. If the United States is to retain its 
title as the world’s paramount power, it must, this thinking goes, restore its 
primacy in the region and roll back Chinese influence. In the coming decades, 
no foreign policy task will, it is claimed, be more important than this.

In line with its new strategy, the administration has undertaken a number of 
moves intended to bolster American power in Asia, and so put China on the 
defensive. These include a decision to deploy 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203537304577028490161890480.html>
  an initial 250 US Marines—someday to be upped to 2,500—to an Australian air 
base in Darwin on that country’s north coast, and the adoption on November 18 
of “the Manila  <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177226.htm> 
Declaration,” a pledge of closer US military ties with the Philippines.

At the same time, the White House announced the sale  
<http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/194629-us-to-deliver-two-dozen-f-16s-to-indonesia>
 of 24 F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia and a visit by Hillary Clinton to 
isolated Burma, long a Chinese ally—the first there by a secretary of state in 
fifty-six years. Clinton has also spoken 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176999.htm>  of increased diplomatic 
and military ties with Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—all countries 
surrounding China or overlooking key trade routes that China relies on for 
importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods.

As portrayed by administration officials, such moves are intended to maximize 
America’s advantages in the diplomatic and military realm at a time when China 
dominates the economic realm regionally. In a recent  
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century> 
article in Foreign Policy magazine, Clinton revealingly suggested that an 
economically weakened United States can no longer hope to prevail in multiple 
regions simultaneously. It must choose its battlefields carefully and deploy 
its limited assets—most of them of a military nature—to maximum advantage. 
Given Asia’s strategic centrality to global power, this means concentrating 
resources there.

“Over the last 10 years,” she writes, “we have allocated immense resources to 
[Iraq and Afghanistan]. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and 
systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in 
the best position to sustain our leadership [and] secure our interests.… One of 
the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will 
therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment—diplomatic, 
economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Such thinking, with its distinctly military focus, appears dangerously 
provocative. The steps announced entail an increased military presence in 
waters bordering China and enhanced military ties with that country’s 
neighbors—moves certain to arouse  
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38715&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=b17a7a99a3ee2726f13bb6a96e842e90>
 alarm in Beijing and strengthen the hand of those in the ruling circle 
(especially in the Chinese military leadership) who favor a more activist, 
militarized response to US incursions. Whatever forms that takes, one thing is 
certain: the leadership of the globe’s number-two economic power is not going 
to let itself appear weak and indecisive in the face of an American buildup on 
the periphery of its country. This, in turn, means that we may be sowing the 
seeds of a new cold war in Asia in 2011.

The US military buildup and the potential for a powerful Chinese counter-thrust 
have already been the subject of discussion in the American and Asian press. 
But one crucial dimension of this incipient struggle has received no attention 
at all: the degree to which Washington’s sudden moves have been dictated by a 
fresh analysis of the global energy equation, revealing (as the Obama 
administration sees it) increased vulnerabilities for the Chinese side and new 
advantages for Washington.

The New Energy Equation

For decades, the United States has been heavily dependent on imported oil, much 
of it obtained from the Middle East and Africa, while China was largely 
self-sufficient in oil output. In 2001, the United States consumed 19.6 million 
barrels of oil per day, while producing only 9 million barrels itself. The 
dependency on foreign suppliers for that 10.6 million-barrel shortfall proved a 
source of enormous concern for Washington policymakers. They responded by 
forging ever closer, more militarized ties with Middle Eastern oil producers 
and going to war on occasion to ensure the safety of US supply lines.

In 2001, China, on the other hand, consumed only 5 million barrels per day and 
so, with a domestic output of 3.3 million barrels, needed to import only 1.7 
million barrels. Those cold, hard numbers made its leadership far less 
concerned about the reliability of the country’s major overseas providers—and 
so it did not need to duplicate the same sort of foreign policy entanglements 
that Washington had long been involved in.

Now, so the Obama administration has concluded, the tables are beginning to 
turn. As a result of China’s booming economy and the emergence of a sizeable 
and growing middle class (many of whom have already bought their first cars), 
the country’s oil consumption is exploding. Running at about 7.8 million 
barrels per day in 2008, it will, according to recent projections 
<http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/>  by the US Department of Energy, reach 13.6 
million barrels in 2020, and 16.9 million in 2035. Domestic oil production, on 
the other hand, is expected to grow from 4.0 million barrels per day in 2008 to 
5.3 million in 2035. Not surprisingly, then, Chinese imports are expected to 
skyrocket from 3.8 million barrels per day in 2008 to a projected 11.6 million 
in 2035—at which time they will exceed those of the United States.

The US, meanwhile, can look forward to an improved energy situation. Thanks to 
increased production in “tough  
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175249/Michael_Klare_the_oil_rush_to_hell> 
oil” areas of the United States, including the Arctic seas off Alaska, the deep 
waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and shale formations in Montana, North Dakota and 
Texas, future imports are expected to decline, even as energy consumption 
rises. In addition, more oil is likely to be available from the Western  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/world/americas/recent-discoveries-put-americas-back-in-oil-companies-sights.html>
 Hemisphere rather than the Middle East or Africa. Again, this will be thanks 
to the exploitation of yet more “tough oil” areas, including the Athabasca tar 
sands of Canada, Brazilian oil fields in the deep Atlantic, and increasingly 
pacified energy-rich regions of previously war-torn Colombia. According to the 
Department of Energy, combined production in the United States, Canada and 
Brazil is expected to climb by 10.6 million barrels per day between 2009 and 
2035—an enormous jump, considering that most areas of the world are expecting 
declining output.

Whose Sea Lanes Are These Anyway?

>From a geopolitical perspective, all this seems to confer a genuine advantage 
>on the United States, even as China becomes ever more vulnerable to the 
>vagaries of events in, or along, the sea lanes to distant lands. It means 
>Washington will be able to contemplate a gradual loosening of its military and 
>political ties to the Middle Eastern oil states that have dominated its 
>foreign policy for so long and have led to those costly, devastating wars.

Indeed, as President Obama said in Canberra, the US is now in a position to 
begin to refocus its military capabilities elsewhere. “After a decade in which 
we fought two wars that cost us dearly,” he declared, “the United States is 
turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region.”

For China, all this spells potential strategic impairment. Although some of 
China’s imported oil will travel overland through pipelines from Kazakhstan and 
Russia, the great majority of it will still come by tanker from the Middle 
East, Africa and Latin America over sea lanes policed by the US Navy. Indeed, 
almost every tanker bringing oil to China travels across the South China Sea, a 
body of water the Obama administration is now seeking  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/world/asia/united-states-pivots-eastward-to-reassure-allies-on-china.html>
 to place under effective naval control.

By securing naval dominance of the South China Sea and adjacent waters, the 
Obama administration evidently aims to acquire the twenty-first-century energy 
equivalent of twentieth-century nuclear blackmail. Push us too far, the policy 
implies, and we’ll bring your economy to its knees by blocking your flow of 
vital energy supplies. Of course, nothing like this will ever be said in 
public, but it is inconceivable that senior administration officials are not 
thinking along just these lines, and there is ample evidence that the Chinese 
are deeply worried about the risk—as indicated, for example, by their frantic 
efforts to build <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH>  staggeringly 
expensive pipelines across the entire expanse of Asia to the Caspian Sea basin.

As the underlying nature of the new Obama strategic blueprint becomes clearer, 
there can be no question that the Chinese leadership will, in response, take  
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38715&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=b17a7a99a3ee2726f13bb6a96e842e90>
 steps to ensure the safety of China’s energy lifelines. Some of these moves 
will undoubtedly be economic and diplomatic, including, for example, efforts to 
court regional players like Vietnam and Indonesia as well as major oil 
suppliers like Angola, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia. Make no mistake, however: 
others will be of a military nature. A significant buildup 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903918104576499423267407488.html>
  of the Chinese navy—still small and backward when compared to the fleets of 
the United States and its principal allies—would seem all but inevitable. 
Likewise, closer military ties between China and Russia, as well as with the 
Central Asian member states of the Shanghai  
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=SCO&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38710&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=f0066f1eb8a7a4e04f3e02adb21fe800>
 Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), 
are assured.

In addition, Washington could now be sparking the beginnings of a genuine cold 
war–style arms race in Asia, which neither country can, in the long run, 
afford. All of this is likely to lead to greater tension and a heightened risk 
of inadvertent escalation arising out of future incidents involving US, Chinese 
and allied vessels—like the one that occurred in March 2009 when a flotilla of 
Chinese naval vessels surrounded 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USNS%20Impeccable%20%28T-AGOS-23%29>  a US 
anti-submarine warfare surveillance ship, the Impeccable, and almost 
precipitated a shooting incident. As more warships circulate through these 
waters in an increasingly provocative fashion, the risk that such an incident 
will result in something far more explosive can only grow.

Nor will the potential risks and costs of such a military-first policy aimed at 
China be restricted to Asia. In the drive to promote greater US 
self-sufficiency in energy output, the Obama administration is giving its 
approval to production techniques—Arctic drilling, deep-offshore drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing—that are guaranteed to lead to further  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater%20Horizon%20oil%20spill> Deepwater 
Horizon-style environmental catastrophe at home. Greater reliance on Canadian 
tar sands, the “dirtiest 
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175468/bill_mckibben_puncturing_the_pipeline>
 ” of energies, will result in increased greenhouse gas emissions and a 
multitude of other environmental hazards, while deep Atlantic oil production 
off the Brazilian coast and elsewhere has its own  
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175264/michael_klare_the_coming_era_of_energy_disasters>
 set of grim dangers.

All of this ensures that, environmentally, militarily, and economically, we 
will find ourselves in a more, not less, perilous world. The desire to turn 
away from disastrous land wars in the Greater Middle East to deal with key 
issues now simmering in Asia is understandable, but choosing a strategy that 
puts such an emphasis on military dominance and provocation is bound to provoke 
a response in kind. It is hardly a prudent path to head down, nor will it, in 
the long run, advance America’s interests at a time when global economic 
cooperation is crucial. Sacrificing the environment to achieve greater energy 
independence makes no more sense.

A new cold war in Asia and a hemispheric energy policy that could endanger the 
planet: it’s a fatal brew that should be reconsidered before the slide toward 
confrontation and environmental disaster becomes irreversible. You don’t have 
to be a seer to know that this is not the definition of good statesmanship but 
of the march of folly.

 <http://www.thenation.com/authors/michael-t-klare> Michael T. Klare
December 6, 2011 
 
 


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