Large rallies against the regime all over Syria and in honor of those held in jail and prisons today, Friday.
Tense moments in Hama province. This video reportedly shows gunfire (perhaps over the heads?) of an anti-government protest earlier today: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=DouT02n7Gzs Meanwhile, in the Baba Amr district of Homs, perhaps the hardest hit neighborhood of the uprising, a large anti-government protest was held today: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=_qz-gfB-qcE http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4065/the-idiots-guide-to-fighting-dictatorship-in-syria *The Idiot's Guide to Fighting Dictatorship In Syria While Opposing Military Intervention* 0<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4065/the-idiots-guide-to-fighting-dictatorship-in-syria#comments> Jan 20 2012 by Bassam Haddad <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/contributors/545> [image: Listen to this page using ReadSpeaker]<http://app.readspeaker.com/cgi-bin/rsent?customerid=5919&lang=en_us&readid=rscontent&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jadaliyya.com%2Fpages%2Findex%2F4065%2Fthe-idiots-guide-to-fighting-dictatorship-in-syria> [image: [Image from unknown archive]] [Image from unknown archive] *[Writing this in Beirut is apt, where there's a deep polarization between those who would die for the Syrian regime and those who just want it to die at any cost. Those who do not support either position "as is," are dubbed cowards and opportunists by both sides and the pro-Saudi camp. Outside the Arab context, pro-Israel commentators don't like the nuanced position herein because it puts Israel and the United States in a bad light. Good company. The author does NOT assume this is the best rendition of a nuanced position. Just one of them.]* After almost five decades, when the time came to publicly oppose authoritarian rule in Syria, one would have thought that it was the rational and decent thing to do. And it is. More than that, it is incumbent on anyone who cares about Syrians (let us leave Syria alone for a moment) to struggle for the establishment of a political system that is free(r) of all forms of oppression. So, what is the problem?* * *Why Fighting Dictatorship Is Intuitive* It is easy, rational, and just to adopt unequivocal opposition to the decades-long history of the Syrian regimes authoritarian rule. It is equally easy, rational, and just to severely condemn and oppose the regimes ten-month crushing of independent protesters. Regime supporters and some in the anti-imperialist camp retort that some of these protesters are agents of external forces or armed gangs. While there may be a grain of truth in this argument, it is empty. It is, in fact an insult to the intelligence of any Syria observer. It overlooks the regimes brutality in the last ten months of uprising. It baldly erases the decades of oppression, detention, imprisonment, silencing, excommunication, and torture that the regime has dealt to the mere hint of opposition. That regime which turns fifty next year. Indeed, it is only Saddam Husseins relentless authoritarianism in Iraq that has surpassed the legacy of the Syrian regimes repression. This is not a secret. It is not a controversial description. It is true despite Syrias relative stability until March 2011. Its institutions were poor but sufficiently functional. Its cities were relatively safe. And after the late 1980s, its urban centers boasted an increasingly bustling and dynamic life. The regime peddled these characteristics as a model of social peace. The threat of heavy reprisal along with the formation and state cooptation of an exceptionally corrupt business class<http://www.sup.org/book.cgi?id=18447>were among the painful threads that held this brittle social peace together. Important too in this regard was the fact that the Syrian welfare state was able to provide the minimum needs for most Syrian citizens until the 1990s, though the countryside was largely neglected. Ultimately, It is precisely the relationship between the state and top business echelons after the mid-1980s that gradually exacerbated Syrias social and regional polarization. After the 2000 succession of Bashar Asad and eventually his team of liberlizers, the Syrian Ba`th (out of all places) introduced what they called the Social Market Economy in 2005 to respond to various calls not emanating from the Syrian majority. Within the still constitutionally socialist republic, the new announcement was intended as a near-formal blow to the remaining vestiges of a state-centered economy. A resulting series of camouflaged neoliberal policies and bad fortune exacerbated existing structural disparities and social discontent among the less privileged. The increasing withdrawal of state subsidies and welfare, the gradual introduction of weak market institutions to replace those corrupt but functioning institutions of the state, combined with continued notorious mismanagement of the economy, became a recipe for social unrest. The scant rainfall during the past decade caused massive migration and loss of jobs in the country side, *adding* fuel and, if I am say, location, to the fire of social protest potential after 2010. All it took was a spark. Bouazizi provided it. Syrias social peace was exposed and decimated. But it didnt all start in March 2011. Beneath the serene and comforting streets of Damascus and Aleppo lie thousands of political prisoners. Stuffing Syrias jails and solitary confinement units, even prior to the uprising, were Islamists and atheists, liberals and communists, and everything in between. Prisoners came in all shades and indeed comported with the Syrian regimes official rhetoric. They included those who dedicated their lives to defend the Palestinian cause against the apartheid state of Israel. They also included those who built honorable records for opposing the United States duplicitous and brutal policies in the region, its support of dictatorship, and its launching of barbaric wars on false counts. The prisoners fault was not that they were conspirators. It was that they opposed the regime. Their imprisonment and torture highlighted the fact that anti-imperialism has never been nor will never be the regimes priority. Clearly, the Syrian National Council (SNC) will not be any better on this countin fact, it is already much worse when it comes to related matters of autonomy from external actors. The tragedy is that the rise of such a problematic body, the SNC, with *varying degrees* of local support is an undeniable testament to the regimes deep repression and bankruptcy. Some may argue that the regimes holstering of various legitimate regional causes, or *the* cause, as a subterfuge for its horrendous domestic repression created resentment even among the causes proponents. Many Syrians are fed up with this duplicity that has come at their expense. They may even appear uninterested in regional issues and calculations. Many in the pro-resistance camp read this deprioritization of anti-imperialism, or even the domestic call for external intervention, only as a betrayal. They fail to see the exasperation, desperation, vulnerability, and ultimately the motive force of self-preservation. It is none other than the regime that has given birth to this informing imperative of self-preservation. *Imperialism Is Not the Issue For the Syrian Regime or the Protesters at All Times* It is one thing for analysts living outside Syria to oppose and condemn foreign intervention (which this author does unequivocally). It is another to assume that all those calling for it in Syria under the current conditions are part of a conspiracy. Again, it is the Syrian regimes brutality since March 2011 and before that has created the conditions for the streets increasing support for foreign intervention to stop the killing. Certainly, some may have had ulterior motives, connections, or designs and supported intervention all along. But the majority of those calling for intervention have been brutalized into doing so. They are not thinking in terms of supporting or opposing imperialism at this time. Bear with me for a moment here. Let us imagine a wild scenario where the United States was going to intervene to stop the Israeli massacre of Palestinians in Gaza in January 2009. Would Gazans, under daily bombs and bullets, object on the grounds of the US record of imperialism? Or perhaps, Gazans would objected due to their suspicion of the United States potential designs for the post-intervention stage? Surely many outsiders will think so and *some* insiders may too. But most Gazans would not be entertaining ideology and geostrategic reflexivity as the skies rained death. Moreover, even if, in this wild scenario, Gazan acceptance of external intervention was *perhaps* short-sighted, it would be patently ridiculous to claim that all such Gazans were part of an imperialist conspiracy. Imperialism is not always the issue for everyone. To not recognize this is to lose the fight against imperialism. The resistance camp seems to want or expect hunted and gunned down individuals and families on Syrian streets to prioritize the regimes anti-imperialist *rhetoric* over the instinct of self-preservation and their fight for freedom from authoritarism. Again, the fact that *some*inside Syria are abusing this dynamic to call for the kind of external intervention that the regimes regional and international enemies have long dreamed of does not negate that fight. If die-hards among the pro-resistance camp feel indignant or distraught by these calls, they should recount the modern history of Syria. Indeed, it is the anti-imperialist, pro-resistance camp that has some accounting to do at this stage. Any type of anti-imperialism must necessarily include a rejection of authoritarianism. Supporting resistance to imperialism at the expense of an entire communitys most inalienable rights can only spell defeat. Let us therefore cease this silly and insulting game of accusing the detractors of the Syrian regime as necessarily pro-imperialist. Finally, as the regime strongmen, subjects, observers, and detractors know well, the regimes priority above all else has been and continues to be its own preservation. If they engage in or enable resistance to imperialism, which the Syrian regime has certainly done more than any other in the region of late, thats all the better. If not, well, staying alive is good enough, even if it required siding with the United States or reactionary Arab regimes at times. This is similar to the problematics of the United States self-image supporting democracy: if it can engage in promoting democracy, thats all the better. If not, promoting dictatorship to serve its interests (as is the case in the Arab world) will do just fine. This is because the objective was never to create democratic regimes, but compliant ones. Finally, it is of crucial importance to disentangle the sources of criticism of the Syrian regime. Does the critique proceed with the interests of Syrians in mind? Or does it proceed from the best interests of, say, the United States or Israels foreign policy establishments and their proponents? This is not to mention an entire coterie of actors like Saudi Arabia and their minions, various European countries, and what is left of the Lebanese March 14th movement. The call for the downfall of authoritarianism is as, stated above, rational and just. But we must be necessarily weary when it is the likes of Elliot Abrahams behind the call for democracy. *Why Foreign Intervention Is Loathed* Protecting and defending authoritarianism on the political grounds that it serves resistance has become desperately short sighted from a the very-same pro-resistance perspective. By the same token, to not understand the implications and consequences of foreign intervention in Syria at this moment is equally short sighted all around. This moment of regional turmoil and unsavory political alignments linking the worst in the foreign policies of east and west, dating several decades now (longer than the Syrian regimes record of oppressing its own citizens, really), is cause for serious caution. In other words, Syria is being used by various powers, including the United States and Saudi Arabia and their chorus, as an occasion to accomplish their own objectives in the regionreactionary ones, to be sure, in terms of the interests of most people in the region as the decades behind us attest, and as the current uprisings against the fruits of such objectives make clearer even to some skeptics. That does not mean, that we should withdraw our opposition and halt the struggle against dictatorship in Syria. It only serves to remind us how *not* to do it. One must start with the simple and undramatic assertion that the Syrian situation is more than just the Syrian situation. This should not come, however, at the expense of Syrian lives. Since the mid-twentieth century, when mainly European designs for dominating and influencing the countries or politics of the region through schemas such as the Baghdad Pact, Syria was an important regional prize, but mostly in a passive manner. After Hafez Asad took power in what is called the Corrective Movement in 1970-1971, Syria became a more fortified regional actor that not only determined its own internal politics, but also those of other countries at times. Notably, Syria became a leading member in what was called the rejectionist front. That front sought to confront Israel without succumbing to bi-lateral peace plans that did not aim at a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestine-Israel conflict. Save for a brief stint of confrontation between Syria and Israel in 1982when Israel downed several Syrian jet-fighters in a pathetic air confrontationthe story goes that the Syrian-Israeli border was the safest place on earth, despite the occupation of the Golan Heights. However, by proxy, and mostly via non-state actors such as Hizballah and Hamas, Syria became the last and only state confronting Israel. Regionally, the Syrian regime acquired a reputation of bravado. This was not because it actively fought Israels outlaw behavior and racism. It was because all the other Arab states were, more or less, wimps, to use a sophisticated word (though some say they were rational, well leave at that for now). In 1993, Syrias stance as lone confronter state was further fortified. This was due on the one hand to Iraqs military irrelevance and defeat. On the other hand peace with Israel proliferated on multiple fronts: the Oslo accords the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, and deeper flirtations between various Arab countries and Israel, notably Qatar and Morocco. When Qaddafi paid off the UK and the US for being a bad boy and promptly joined the community of lawful nations. It was none other than the great intellect of George W. Bush that deemed Qaddafi as a model of sorts. By the mid 2000s, the Syrian regime was the only remaining Arab country that would not pay lip service to the United States. It did more than that. The Syrian regime continued to support resistance to the Israeli occupation by supporting Hizballah as well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad (both of which had offices in Damascus). It opposed the brutal and arrogant invasion of Iraq in a manner that no Arab country did. It continued to be the only well-endowed secular *and *explicitly, if only rhetorically, anti-imperialist state in the region. But for the United States, Israel, some European countries, Saudi Arabia and its minions in Lebanon and the Gulf, it is the Syria-Hizballah-Iran axis that constitutes the most formidable challenge. Taking out Syria as it stands would weaken Hizballah and isolate Iran, the big prize. With Syria out of the way, Hizballah would be starved of its safe arms transport corridor and less able to meet a strike against Iran with reprisal. An Iran-strike would also confront Turkey with a dilemma. Quite aside, from its two-faced posturing on the Syrian authoritarianism at the same time that it oppresses Kurdish resistance, Turkey would have to balance two conflicting desires. On the one hand, the Turkish administration hopes to nourish its vision of regional hegemony through the consent and admiration of the Arab street. But it is that very street that rejects the United States-Saudi Arabia alliance that Turkey is implicitly supporting in its drive to isolate the Syrian regime. In any case, precluding Turkey, the actors that are amassed to benefit from the fall of the Syrian regime are in the final analysis no less problematic than the Syrian regime. In sum, these actors are certainly more violent, discriminatory, and anti-democratic, in reality and in terms of their collective or individual long-term vision for the region. In unity, theres strength! Whether one supports the Syrian regime or not, the fall of the Syrian regime is more than the fall of the Syrian regime. That does not mean that it should not be opposed or overthrown by domestic means. I have argued elsewhere (1<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2527/for-syria-what-is-left-(part-1)>, 2<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3352/religion-morality-syria-resistance_for-syria-what->) that Syrias past or potential regional role should not be an excuse for supporting its sustenance. Conversely, supporting the demise of the Syrian regime by any means, including external military intervention, is extremely reckless if the objective is to save Syrian lives or set the stage for a post-regime path of self-determination. Any external military intervention supported by the above array of the awkward and brutal will devastate Syria because of a host of intended and unintended consequences. It will exponentially increase the death toll of Syrians in absolute and relative terms without achieving any discernable conclusive outcome. Moreover, the external factor will reignite another local and regional struggle rather than simply end domestic authoritarian rule and pave the way for democratic development. One can be moved by the urgency of saving Syrian lives today, but if this is the ultimate purpose, and if Syrians self-determination is the desired outcome, one can easily see the perils of military intervention that will make the current killing look like a picnic. Ideological considerations aside, the magnitude of the complexity and mayhem can be discerned simply by anticipating a conflict that will involve Iran, Hizballah, and an intense chunk of the Syrian population. Internal and regional opposition to external military intervention in Syria will swell the more an attack is imminent. Unless the regime brutality reaches even higher proportions prior to the intervention (apologies for the coldness of the calculation here), it will be counter-productive to say the least. As for the hoax of no-fly-zones that is considered the ask by many, as opposed to full scale military intervention, I am reminded of how some young(er) boys used to promise their girlfriends they would not go all the way. The no-fly-zones is equally unrealistic and much less pleasurable in the end. I cant say more here, and I cant believe Im keeping this text in the post. Thus, both positions are doable, if not necessary, simultaneously: opposing the regime as well as external military intervention. The problem arises with the question of agency. *The Residual Problem With This Article* Not to be outdone by this article, it is crucial to point to a flaw, or lack, within it, and to introduce a anti-climactic caveat. First, I must admit that the tenor of the position elaborated in the lines above lacks a clear agency (e.g., institution/party/movement) that might convert it to a real and actionable path. The Syrian National Council is certainly not it. But that has never been the object of debate. Hence, this article is a very modest and hopelessly insufficient attempt at engendering a discussion about locating or catalyzing such a collective. Some strands of the opposition, including the head of the National Coordinating Committees, support a nuanced position<http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=latest%2Fdata%2F2012-01-20-08-58-35.htm>, but are usually fought fiercely. According to independent organizers and protesters on the ground in Syria, there is room for the growth and effectiveness of a truly democratist opposition that is not always in line with the SNC. True, both parties may be benefitting from each other for their own purposes today, but there is growing concern among many activists on the ground about where the SNC is headed and how it is run, now and in the longer term. This tension, which is also evident between the SNC and other smaller opposition groups outside Syria, has not become explicit yet. Perhaps the most bright ray of light are the reports that the larger part of the Syrian opposition inside Syria does not take its cues from anyone outside Syria, and for good reason, despite some appearances to the contrary. It may only be this indigenous force that can solve the problem of leadership. The anti-climactic caveat is that no one outside the SNC and part of the domestic opposition is calling for external intervention in a inexorable manner. That is not for lack of want or desire. Besides the arguments suggested above from a general standpoint, the lack of readiness for external intervention is manifold and not always intuitive. Largely, its because of the low pay-offs, some deterrence, and a bit of cynicism, among the anti-Syrian (regime, geostrategic importance, and people) camp. First, Syria is not Iraq or Libya. It does not have ample natural resources to be used as mortgage for future reimbursement for the noble deed (the Wests got to stop liberating people!). Second, unrest in Syria may potentially spill over the new champions of democracy in and around the Arabian Peninsula, not to mention Lebanon and the thorny derivatives of further instability in that godforsaken country. Third, the current Syrian regime protected its borders with Israel (actually, itself, considering the occupied Golan) for decades. Not a bad thing for Israels decades long violation of international law, underwritten by the foe it robbed. Fourth, Syria has a lot of friends, big and small, that will not stand still, and some, like Russia, have a fleet docked near Syria's northern shores. Finally, as the venerable Kissinger used to say in the 1980s (Im paraphrasing), let the Iranians and Iraqis kill each other into impotence, for it facilitates things for the United States thereafter. Thus, some would like the Syrians to continue killing each other for a while longer before an intervention is advanced. They would be happy to see Syria weakening even further its institutions and infrastructure while exacerbating social/political divisions and undercutting possibilities of collective action for a long time to come. Syrias long-term trajectory after the Ba`th had fallen is an unknown quantity regarding the question of resistance, anti-imperialism, and the struggle for restoring the Golan. So, from their perspective, why not wait for Syria and Syrians to disempower themselves further instead of having a swift conclusion now? If one, or a government, supports the safety of the Apartheid state of Israel, what else would be better than a *protracted* killing field in Syria? So, for the moment, external military intervention is not seriously on the table yet. But the discursive conflicts on this question continue. Hence, the idiots guide.* * *[A version of this article was published on al-Jazeera English website]* [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- LAAMN: Los Angeles Alternative Media Network --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: <mailto:laamn-unsubscr...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subscribe: <mailto:laamn-subscr...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Digest: <mailto:laamn-dig...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Help: <mailto:laamn-ow...@egroups.com?subject=laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Post: <mailto:la...@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive1: <http://www.egroups.com/messages/laamn> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Archive2: <http://www.mail-archive.com/laamn@egroups.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo! 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