[image: Logo Venezuela Analysis] Workers’ Control, Challenges and the
Revolutionary Government: An Interview with Elio Sayago, President of CVG
Alcasa

Jan 3rd 2012, by Lucha de Clases
[image: Elio Sayago, Worker-President of CVG Alcasa (Aporrea)]

Elio Sayago, Worker-President of CVG Alcasa (Aporrea)

On 15 May 2010, Elio Sayago, a revolutionary activist with a long history
of struggle, was named worker-president of CVG Alcasa by [Venezuelan
President Hugo] Chavez, with the explicit order to implement Worker Control
and the Socialist Guyana Plan. As the comrade relates in this interview,
his management has been the victim of a series of bureaucratic traps; from
the violent seizure of the company’s front gates, to manoeuvres aimed at
unduly removing him from his post.

*LC: Elio, What is the current situation within the process of change that
is being carried out in the Guayana [CVG] companies? *

Sayago: Well, we are going to address four elements that I want to
highlight in this interview, which are: Operative, Organisational,
Political, and Financial. It is important to analyse Alcasa from a position
that we define as a revolutionary advance. For us, the president of the
republic [Hugo Chavez] is launching the advance of the revolution in the
economic sphere here (Guayana), when the president says in Guayana: “I play
on the side of the workers”.

First of all, you are not going to find a Maracaibo Socialist Plan, a
Merida Socialist Plan, or a Caracas Socialist Plan, because the socialist
aspect of the economic sphere is Guayana. It’s a challenge for us, and
involves carrying out a revolutionary offensive to consolidate the
Bolivarian Revolution.

We cannot deny that in these ten years, the natural fact of assuming
government has involved dismantling the structures of the adecos y
copeyanos [*translator: referring to Democratic Action (AD) and Christian
Democrats (Copei) the two ruling parties of Venezuela’s Fourth Republic
period, 1958-1998*]. This allowed for an autonomy which we have advanced in
both our political and territorial sovereignty. Today, as a country we have
relations with whomever we please, furthermore we are promoting a
multi-polar world with regards to sovereignty, (including) OPEC relations
in the field of energy.

The role that Venezuela plays on the world stage and the repercussions that
this has are undeniable; especially for those who are weakest. Latin
American relations have been extraordinary, the (bilateral) missions for
example, even within the field of finance. When the president (Chávez) came
to power, banking was totally controlled by the private sector. Today,
state banks hold the majority of the national banking system. We can give
concrete examples of the advances made by the revolution in the
manufacturing sector, for instance, the recovered companies which were
nationalised and which are now productive.

But when the president launches the cry for Socialist Plan Guyana and says
“I play on the side of the workers”, this involves a deepening of the
search to intervene in the mode of production within the economic sphere,
aiming to develop productive forces and the transformation of the social
relations of production. This is a challenge which is uniquely for us (in
Guayana), with what we made reference to at the start; that there isn’t a
Socialist Plan Maracaibo. It is through Socialist Plan Guyana that we can
bring together the construction of iron, steel and aluminium companies
under workers’ control, which involves creating just one company.

At the moment the aluminium sector consists of eight companies from the
point of extraction to the processors; Alucasa, Alunasa, Cabelum, Rialca.
Furthermore there are nationalised companies such as Alven, Alvarca, and
Alentuy. From these companies, it is necessary to construct just one: and
here a theoretical element comes into play, with regards to how this
company would be structured, how it would be ordered, how it can make use
of of spare parts, experience, primary material, input, knowledge, within
what has been up to now eight companies, eight businesses, eight
presidents, eight management boards. Multiply eight by twenty managers,
with their logistics and administration, each one culturally separated by
institutional individualism and the fact that historically they have been
separate businesses, each competing against the other.

This is a structural approach; to order the mode of production so that the
concept of the search for the workers of Bauxilium, Alcasa and Venalum is
strengthened, so they are not just thinking about their own companies, but
rather that they start to think about how their work, their efforts, the
relationship that we as human beings have with nature through aluminium and
iron, contribute to the search for the happiness of human beings; or of
that of the worker. We can give that relationship with nature to human
beings through the products which allow them to solve problems in society.

We would be talking about the search for a culture of work which aims to
provide satisfaction for human beings. Of course, this entails the
elimination of a certain culture: if the extraction worker has bauxite as
their production, they are always accustomed to extracting bauxite, and
with that you cannot make an arepa [popular Venezuelan bread].

That is how aluminium begins to be used from the point of view of making a
wheel, or aluminium for medicine, it is a worthwhile use. In creating just
one business out of the corporation, just one factory, we are looking to
construct the concept that, “my efforts must go towards this collective
value, and we all have to be working towards this”

Let’s leave behind that historic culture of being the producers of primary
material at the service of transnational companies; we want to develop our
productive forces, to convert them into agents of transformation so that
they can provide solutions for society. Of course, this is a revolutionary
process in which the state’s current productive capacity is small, but we
have to start off with that.

The fact that state production companies at the moment don’t have the
necessary aluminium to cover their installed capacity cannot be justified.
It is that path that we are pursuing right now with the 2012 Socialist Plan
Guyana, in order to consolidate the corporations within the process of
developing our productive forces. We would be starting with that aspect.

Of course, we are going to say that that development of productive forces,
for example in Alcasa’s plan, is to do with stabilising and developing
productive forces until the US $403 million that the president of the
Republic [Chavez] approved in 2010 materialises. The dollars which have
been in “BANDES” since 2010 due to the bureaucracy of CVG and MIBAM
[*translator:
Venezuelan Corporation of Guayana (CVG), the steering organisation of the
nationalised basic industries of the Guayana region, and the Ministry of
Basic Industries and Mining (MINAB), the government department which
oversees CVG, headed by minister Jose Khan*]. It has not been possible to
sign the commercial contract with the Chinese to properly implement the
development which Alcasa is designed for: to go from producing a historic
35,000 tonnes of laminates (for roofing), to 116,000 tonnes of laminates,
and, for the first time, with an orientation towards sustaining the Great
Housing Mission. (*translator: refers to the large-scale house building
program the Venezuelan government launched earlier this year*). We’re
thinking of constructing and developing a construction factory for housing,
where annually we’ll produce 40,000 tonnes of structural bases for housing.

For us, the situation is very simple in this sense: in what context are we
going to develop the productive force to create a concrete practise? From
stability, integrity, maintenance, from achieving the stabilisation of
production to the development of the 403 million dollars that the president
has already approved. We need to analyse bureaucracy from the point of the
social relations of production.

Firstly, as Alcasa is beginning this process within the sphere of
developing productive forces, it’s important within that framework and that
historic context; when the president launches the cry “I play on the side
of the workers” and that of workers’ control, that what we are looking for
is to bring to fruition and give structure to the protagonism of the people
in the construction of their own destiny.

As we are achieving that culture of mutual responsibility, and in the sense
of when we talk about the advance of the revolution, the president of the
Republic is really asking a question to the state functionary; “are you
ready to share power with the workers and the people?” And that’s how a
dynamic is created which has not existed for the past ten years of the
revolution, confrontation inside of our own government.

Why? Because during the first ten years we progressed by taking power
within those spheres that I already pointed out (international relations,
sovereignty etc), but it is now within the economic sphere that the
president is declaring Socialist Plan Guyana, with all of its geopolitical
and economic elements, which involve economic power for Guayana. It’s vital
that when we are talking about collective management under workers’
control, not everybody says “yes!”, because here in Guyana the
contradictions inside our own government are beginning to get worse.
Because there are bureaucratic networks and mafias that have managed to
take advantage in the past ten years by wearing little red caps, so that
they can get positions of power. Now they have these privileges and they
don’t want to lose them.

They are even potentially converting themselves into enemies of the
revolution, because the revolution means a real process of transformation.
As Jesus Christ said, ‘you are known for your acts’. So it’s not a matter
of what they may say, anyone call talk well, but a matter of what they do.
What is the result of their actions in Guayana?

This is what is being put to the test within our own government, who is
prepared to share power with the workers and organised communities, and who
is trying to continue with the same structure of ‘I command and the rest
obey’. It is important to understand this from a historic-political point
of view, because there is a theoretical debate surrounding what
contradiction exactly must be solved by the Bolivarian revolution.

>From a one-way point of view, we have to understand that Venezuela,
Guayana, the aluminium, steel and oil sectors, aren’t detached from the
global economic system. Beyond the purely economic, there is a global
crisis of the system which is threatening humanity. Therefore, when we talk
of the crisis of the prevailing model in Alcasa, in the iron sector, in the
oil sector, what we are talking about is inseparable from the global crisis
which is putting humanity in danger.

This is important because I would say right now, the fundamental
contradiction that we have to resolve within the Bolivarian revolution is
the contradiction between the nation and imperialism. We have to separate
them, as if we were not part of the same system. These are the internal
contradictions of the same global capitalist system in which we are
immersed.

It is this that allows elements of the bureaucracy, in the name of
confronting the United States, to say: “Look, you shouldn’t say anything to
me, because we are the revolutionaries confronting the United States”. “I
want to continue with that easy attitude of ‘I command and you obey,’ a
“we’re replacing you with me” (thus maintaining the same structures as
before). From the nationalist point of view, any Perez-Jimenista could say
that [*translator: in reference to Venezuelan nationalist-dictator Perez
Jimenez, Venezuela president 1952- 1958*]. Any bourgeois nationalist could
say that the Bolivarian revolution involves state capitalism, nationalism
from the point of view of the capitalist bourgeoisie.  .

Therefore that concept, deployed by those who aim to protect themselves -
that there’s no need to say anything [critical] - is an important
theoretical element for me. Precisely what we are doing in Guayana is that
we are in the historical human process of historical materialism, that
makes human beings relate between one another. Those relations between
ourselves and those relations with nature through water, air, iron, oil,
and aluminium, those relations with nature and with each other should allow
us the perpetuation and development of the species, individually and
socially.

Now, these relations which we have been having as human beings are the
societies which we have been constructing historically and through which we
relate to each other; from slavery and the nature of those relations, and
those relations of that society based in nature, the nature of those
relations within feudalism and also in capitalism. What relations are we
looking to construct within the globalised system within which we are
immersed?

So here is where the concept of mutual responsibility comes into play,
described perfectly by our commander (Chávez) when he talks about the
patriotic pole, when he talks about the mutual responsibility of popular
power within workers’ control; precisely because right in the middle of the
crisis of this system, humanity is defining itself – our structural
relations; it’s either I order and you obey, or we get involved in the
solution that is being demanded by humanity, and that is where the element
of workers’ control breaks with those differences that exist within the
government.

That’s why, when the president said “I play on the side of the workers” and
he approved the Socialist Guayana Plan, many bureaucrats within the
government said that the workers were unprepared. I say that it is they who
are prepared, with an ideology and a working diagram of the very system
that is in crisis, and they don’t have the humility or the openness to
allow themselves to learn how to construct the new social relations that
are being demanded by society.

Just as revolutions arose within slavery and feudalism, we are constructing
the revolution that is a point of reference for humanity on a global level,
and a revolution precisely within the arena of the development of
productive forces and the transformation of the social relations of
production, which is exactly what we are discussing and collectively
constructing.

*LC: What is the particular situation in Alcasa? *

Sayago: We knew that the previous administration at Alcasa had plans to
close it down, using the excuse that Alcasa was running at a loss for 26
years, which is true. They were planning to close it in order to make
agreements with transnational companies. Alcasa should function at its
installed capacity of more or less 396 cells [*translator: the units used
to separate aluminium from oxygen at extremely high temperatures is a
process known as “reduction”*], of these 396 cells they left us with 236,
250 of which were past their use-by date, code red, high risk.

They also lumbered us with the suppliers of input materials for the
production of aluminium, all of which are international. They left us in
debt, showing us three documents signed by the previous administration
pledging to pay the guys that had sent the material, but they hadn’t paid
them, plus, when those suppliers came to the country, they wouldn’t even
meet with them. Just imagine the situation!

With our cash flow restricted, paying the workers their fortnightly
salaries was delayed, generating conflicts all over the place. This is how
they justified the intervention by the transnational, with a view to
re-launching the factory. Well, this situation was overcome by the workers.
Right away we began discussions in the company’s common room, showing a
video, we explained: What is going on? What have we got? What are we going
to do? And from that, everyone knew what was going to be done and what
couldn’t be done, what we could pay and what we couldn’t pay.

This method allowed for a general trust to develop, as much with national
suppliers as with international. We were presented with the problem that
some international suppliers didn’t want to supply us with material. We had
to go to suppliers with whom we didn’t have a commercial relationship and,
as we didn’t have any debt with them, begin to buy material. The
others [*translator:
with whom Alcasa already had debt*], obviously said we had to pay back the
debt, and due to the fact they didn’t trust us, that we should pay
everything in advance.

We managed to broker an agreement with the small amount that we were
generating, which meant that the traditional suppliers began saying
“without giving these guys anything, they are moving six, eight, twelve
million dollars a month. Then they listened to a proposal that we made to
them; if you give us three years without charging any interest on our debt,
then within a year and a half we will pay that debt back and you will be
supplying us with material, and what little we are getting will be
permanently being given back to yourselves, which also acted as a guarantee
for them to generate trust.

If I need material in august, as the majority of the input material comes
from China, you should have it sent to me in July, but I have to deposit
[the money] to you in August; it was that part of the agreement which
allowed us to operate and continue paying off the debt.

Well, we started to work within that framework and it has yielded results.
We have suffered from a weakness in our cash flow to buy primary material
and start to put away labour benefits that naturally had been generated
over the last few years, where absolutely no one was paid anything, neither
savings, nor their food tickets, social security, or housing benefit,
absolutely nothing.

In order to do what we call putting the company books in order, we made a
proposal to put in order those books that had not even been maintained with
all those debts. Working in this fashion the suppliers, meeting every week
with the administration, made a repayment schedule, and little by little we
gained their trust and they gave us a permanent solution.

So we made plans. One of the first was in November and December, when
production was limited due to inoperative cells as has been previously
described. We began to recover and stabilise production, because in the
production of aluminium you have to insert and remove the cells which are
already past their use-by date, and so in this process you don’t increase
production but rather you maintain it, it is very slow to increase
production; it’s not like an oven that you turn on and off.

However the reduction workers have made an extraordinary effort. Our plans
were to stabilise [production] in December and January, and then in
February we started to incorporate cells. Unfortunately, given the context
of political conflicts, some confrontations against worker control were
generated from those sectors who disguised themselves as red
(Leftist/Chavista).

They saw that worker control was being materialised in Alcasa; and that
after twenty six years of running at a loss, the Alcasa plant was
re-emerging under workers’ control. Of course that was deadly for a
bureaucrat who is trying to refute history, because obviously we are going
to go over his head: that bureaucrat isn’t stupid and he is going to defend
the interests and privileges that he has obtained in this process.

And so began the conflict of the thirty four day strike, [*translator: a
strike in January – Febuary 2011 ostensibly over pay, by a sector regarded
by other union currents in Alcasa as a “fifth column” – opposition sectors
posing as Chavistas attempting to destabilise Alcasa’s experiment in worker
control*] you were witnesses at the gates, of how these political trade
union sectors behaved (were violent towards other workers)*; *as with a
follow worker dead in Ferrominero, those wounded by shots in Bauxilum, and
the Alcasa workers wounded by blows. Of course, this attack was combined
with strikes and the financial weakness of the company, which generated an
operative crisis. At the moment, it has not been possible for us to
stabilise Alcasa in order to start to re-launch it again.

Obviously it’s a permanent struggle, and against all adversity, we gained
the confidence of national clients. It’s important to highlight this
because Alcasa is the only company that isn’t complying with a contract of
future sale, which has resulted in the sinking of companies by Glencoe and
Noble. [*translator: “future sales” refers to contracts where parties agree
a price the producer will be paid for aluminium, but months in advance of
the aluminium being produced. This can mean with inflation and the rising
worth of aluminium that the transnational supply chain manager (Glencoe and
Noble) pays less in currency value to the producer (Alcasa) for aluminium
than originally agreed*]

You have a national and international legal discussion and those contracts
are classified as scams: conditions where the transnational puts down money
that is paid for with primary aluminium, but at a higher price than what
they were going to pay for the aluminium. What they were going to pay the
company is from a deal made three months earlier, and that hides what the
LMG was like. The transnational can hide the price it wants, but on top of
that, it is also only going to pay half of the premium, 18% of the loan
interest, and you pay them the cost of the transport to carry the material.

Evidently we discussed this contract politically in an assembly and with
the Board of Directors, and we at Alcasa decided that its application
wasn’t viable, and until now we haven’t complied with this contract. Alcasa
is the only company that has taken this decision. So in the field of
operations we managed to meet with national clients, and through an open
discussion with everyone, we succeeded in getting them to raise the payment
for premiums that historically weren’t charged as a premium. They used to
be charged at twenty dollars [per ton of aluminium].

We managed to get them to raise the premiums by one hundred, one hundred
and fifty dollars per ton. We also managed to get them to put up more than
30 million dollars for the incorporation of the cells, that is to say that
Alcasa have come up with solutions in the field of production, but we have
had a restricted cash flow.

Since December 2010, we have presented* *a proposal to the ministry (of
Mining and Basic Industries) to import aluminium, give it added value in
Alcasa’s production installations, and to sell it to clients who have been
asking us for 65,000 tonnes monthly since last year. This business of
importing and adding value was going to allow us to have monthly earnings
of at least 20 million BsF (US$4.65 million), that is for October this year
we would have managed to earn 200 million BsF (US$46.5 million) and in the
whole year 240 million BsF (US$55.8 million), that’s even with the
company’s financial weaknesses. Historically, Alcasa has generated policies
so that even when it is only running at half its production capacity, the
government has to permanently be paying the interest on social benefits
(for workers) and make up minimum earnings. *(Translator: social benefits
paid by the company to workers are put into a bank account for 5 days of
each month, which generates interest. The government covers the cost of the
interest when the company is not earning enough to meet it independently.
As a state company, when Alcasa is not meeting its own running costs, the
state is also obliged to make up the difference) *

We have 121 million BsF (US$28 million) to pay in social benefits and 90
million (US$21 million) to attain in minimum earnings *(to maintain
production)*. That is, we need 211 million BsF (US$49 million). If the deal
that we have been proposing since December 2010 were given the go ahead,
Alcasa would be in the conditions to pay its own social benefits to workers
and meet its minimum running costs for the first time ever, and up to now
they haven’t approved it.

Here is where we enter the political realm. As we have already
demonstrated, Alcasa has made concrete proposals in order to be able to
return to financial operation, so why have these proposals not been given
the go ahead? Because when we are going to transform the mode of
production, the dialectics of the transformation include; the means of
production, the productive forces and the social relations of production.
This transformation is expressed in three ways:

1) Power relations

2) Commercial relations

3) Relations relating to the very division of labour, or the fragmentation
of knowledge according to which industry acts and is managed.

In the political realm, there is the trade union sector linked to the state
with deputies and ex-ministers, which receive support even from the State
Department. Even though the President of the Republic named me for this
post (President of Alcasa) on Saturday 15th of May 2010, that very Monday,
that trade union sector released an official statement rejecting my
position as Company President.

Back and forth between those social relations of production, which are
about power, is obviously where we find the crux of the matter. The great
battle continues to follow the designated structure of ‘you command and the
others obey’. Workers’ control and mutual responsibility has to be
implemented.

In that sense, Alcasa has been consolidating work groups through operative
management, where the concept that we are pursuing is that knowledge is
linked to the reduction (of aluminium) through those who undertake the
work, those who control the variables of work, those who plan the work
combined with logistics, finance and environment; they make a work group in
which decisions are then taken according to that knowledge.

Mathematically, when you make a decision, you make a decision to do
something; and in doing that something, you are immersed within the action
of carrying that activity through, but you are also immersed in the
different variables that are involved in that activity, the planning of the
activity, the logistics of it, the observations and consequences of doing
it. Plan Simon Bolivar was conceived from this concept. [*translator:
Venezuelan’s national economic and social plan, geared toward the socialist
development of the nation*]

In Socialist Plan Guayana, with the aim of achieving technical sovereignty
within the revolution, the best actions and decisions are made when you are
in a work group, with respect and cooperation. This action brings together
all the knowledge from carrying through all the different variables
involved in the planning stage. Therefore, a better decision will be taken.

So the work groups and administration support groups were conceived of from
within this framework, we support them so that their work can come to
fruition, so that in the area of reduction, lamination and melting, the
other workers are a support network. We also formed a Procedural
Coordination Body (CPP), which includes the operative administration, the
union, the hygiene and security committee, and the (company) presidency.

This is a holistic vision of the plant in order to be able to prioritise
when you are facing a shortage in something, but also to be able to define
what we are going to do in relation to the demands that exist within the
factory. This is what we are consolidating. We are even running an exercise
right now with work groups in the areas where workers should participate
and forming a relationship with the other workers on duty.

As a worker on duty in a specific area knows what is happening in
management, in the CPP, the work group should guarantee an organic
relationship in the maintenance area. For example, so that the CPP can
develop an approach towards maintenance, melting, lamination etc; we create
a production system at an intermediate level which obliges the production
sector to meet (with other sectors) in order to share spare parts,
supplies, experience, planning techniques and then the factory is just one
thing, just one process, although it might be separated into several
sub-processes.

That is how we go about creating a holistic culture within the process, as
we are organising and stabilising the productive forces and social
relations of production. When we talk about man, there needs to be a system
which plans for the transformation of man. That is where the management of
communication, of personnel, of structure, organisation and methods,
culture and sport, everything linked to being human should be, so that
there is a central plan to transform the human being, the worker, in three
fundamental aspects, which is the essential development of the human being
within the material realm, called quality of life.

In the intellectual realm is the quest to achieve technological sovereignty
and also control over what we are doing as a society, from what society we
came and where we are going. There is also a spiritual development; as
Jesus Christ said “treat your neighbour as you would have yourself
treated.” This isn’t theory, and to treat a neighbour as you would have
yourself be treated involves mutual responsibility and the taking of
collective decisions.

If you don’t undertake an exercise in participation, then it is a lie that
you are going to generate a different type of consciousness. The essence
and strength of capitalism is that the structures beneath which we work
oblige a worker to compete with another worker in order to bring food home
for his family, because there’s a little promotion that’s going to allow
him to have a little higher salary.

Of course, a worker isn’t going to say to others: “here is my knowledge so
that you can learn”, that’s a lie, but it (capitalism) is designed in such
a way as that you have to be individualist and compete with your colleagues
in order to take a bit more salary home, this is precisely when we don’t
work together collectively, make collective decisions, resolve our housing
situation collectively.

Of course Marx pointed it out, existence determines consciousness. An
existence based on individualistic behaviour, what type of consciousness is
that going to create? Some people complain and say the workers don’t have a
consciousness.  I say to them: you’re stupid. What type of consciousness is
capitalism going to generate? How are you going to ask capitalism to
generate a consciousness of solidarity for you if that’s a negation of
itself? And that’s precisely where it is; in practice, in doing something
concrete, in how we do it: that is where the secret of consciousness lies
and what conditions that consciousness.

That’s the structure that we have in the organisational realm and
furthermore in the assembly we discuss plans; for example financial deals
with the clients. All of that is discussed, approved and defined in the
assembly, because in the end it’s the workers who are going to produce, and
if we make commitments without consulting them, everything gets complicated
and doesn’t work, it doesn’t make sense.

We would be denying what we want to construct, which is that element of
mutual responsibility within the sphere of power in the social relations of
production, through which those who support the old system and those who
believe it is necessary to transform, but through action, come into
conflict. As such, that union and political sector began a confrontation
two days after my naming as company president in 2010, with the story of
the payment for mobile equipment that is contracted and cooperative.

Demanding things is normal, natural and necessary, nobody has denied the
workers their right to the benefits of their labour. But what is evident is
that, beyond that arena of making demands, they decided to strike when the
President of the Republic was giving us the factory. And there was a strike
against this revolutionary government, from the very same people who call
themselves revolutionary, it’s like saying to the people “Chávez is against
your interests, and that’s why I have to strike, so that they pay me my
dues”.

*LC: What was the intention of the strike? *

Sayago: The message which they themselves are giving is the excuse that the
Minister hadn’t approved some money [*translator: of mining and basic
industries*]. Those who were losing out were Alcasa, the workers, the city,
the country, the economy. There was a conflict in January and February with
the tale that those guys were triumphant in the conflict, so it was better
for them to ask for resources and then for the executive to give them BsF
136 million BsF (US $31.6 million) so that they could be seen as the
victors before the coming electoral process. [*translator: refers to the
Alcasa trade union elections held in August 2011, see below*].

That was the political excuse, because in reality they were trying to
generate a crisis through the strike, so that the workers’ control project
at Alcasa couldn’t get past all of those hold ups we’re talking about. And
that was the nature of that conflict that you witnessed, those 34 days were
hard, from a business point of view. Well, you saw the chancellor (Nicolas
Maduro) and the minister (of Minam, Jose Khan) putting an end to the strike
in Venalum (*translator: another nationalised aluminium production company
overseen by CVG*) but letting the one in Alcasa continue, that action was
public and notorious, as if the Alcasa strike was a revolutionary strike.

The strike in Venelum was counterrevolutionary, because it was a
[right-wing] opposition-union. A group in power were also shown to have
been complicit in it. But not only that, they also sent people from that
movement to China to represent the presidency of Alcasa and to negotiate
with the Chinese. They started inventing things and making agreements which
were out of touch with the concrete reality of Alcasa, unrelated to the
needs of Alcasa.

So when we began institutionally to have that relationship (with the
Chinese), obviously the constant confrontation meant that the presidency
went unrecognised for those 34 days. You could see a union from the company
appearing in the media with the Chinalco Company, a representative of the
Chinese state, who are the investors. So you have part of just any old
union accompanying the representatives of the Chinese state, when that
wasn’t their responsibility, you just can’t do that!

Well, that’s what happened. It was in the press and the media. As they
didn’t manage to achieve what they wanted through violence, they came up
with another strategy. By this time the workers were so tired of so much
violence that they recovered the presidency after 25 days. As soon as they
recovered the presidency, these guys invent another story about a disabled
woman, and they were denouncing me for physically hitting her. They went to
the press looking to reach those in power within the region, they went to
the courts, to the prosecution, but in the end they didn’t get any results
from the accusation.

The fact that they have power would mean making me a prisoner, but that
strategy was defeated. Then the chancellor and the minister take me to
Cuba, where they have the cheek to tell me that the president is going to
undertake a restructuration of the company in the name of the Republic, and
that I have to put him (the chancellor) in charge of this. My response was
to tell them that I would undertake an assessment (of Alcasa) and then
present it to the president so that he could then decide. So that strategy
didn’t work for them either.

So then they opted for administrative isolation. Since December we have
been asking for a contract in which we are proposing to national investors,
under the conditions that we have established with them, an investment of
over US$30 million, which they would give to us over a period of time so
that we can start reactivating the cells.

Three dead months. Whilst we bought the materials and everything necessary
for the incorporation of this, after upping production levels by an
additional 33% so that we could pay back the debt and pay for the
materials. But at what price? At the normal market price. So we, what we
are producing and selling, works out like a loan with no interest, with 3
months when natural and normal production was dead, because they refused to
approve the contract.

On the 6th of October, an evaluation was being conducted in Socialist Plan
Guayana, and I, as part of the Sub-Commission that had been named by the
President of the Republic, wasn’t allowed entry to a meeting of all the CVG
company presidents.

María Cristina Iglesia, Giordani and the chancellor were present at this
meeting. The Minister had the cheek to say to me that the other three would
not allow me to enter, and that if I went in, the other three would leave.
That’s what they said to the workers who were demanding that I attend,
because not allowing me to attend an evaluation of the Socialist Guayana
Plan, which is what we have been constructing, is not only ignoring the
president of the republic, but also the workers of Guayana.

Doing that is like saying “I’ll do what I like”. “He can enter if I feel
like it, or he can’t if I don’t”. This is part of that game of expressing
political differences - which is what emerges from the facts of the
discussion - over the historic contradictions which the Bolivarian
Revolution is living right now, and that can be summed up in the question
of making workers’ control and mutual responsibility a reality.

*LC: How is it that the people of the MUD won the union elections?*

[*Translator: MUD refers to the right-wing opposition political coalition
to Chavez, “Roundtable for Democratic Unity”*].

Sayago: We have to look at reality through what it is in essence, not from
how it seems. It appears that the representatives of the revolution lost,
which was the 21 Movement *(the same movement which seized the company’s
front gates)*, and that the union leader of the MUD won. But in essence, as
relations in a social process, what we saw was this; simply a response to
those days of the lockout, the abuses...it was a punishment vote. That’s
what the voting history of Alcasa is like. Throughout the 44 years of its
electoral history, there has never been such a wide margin of difference
between the first and second (candidates in the union elections).

In the history of the companies in Guayana, there has always been a
difference of 30-40 votes. In Alcasa’s case, there were over 400 votes
between the candidates. That is a measure of the level of the workers’
rejection. We also saw that the union sector at Venalum, which had also
pursued that path, was also defeated in the union elections.

*LC: To conclude, what are the challenges facing the struggle for workers’
control in Guyana? *

Sayago: It is a historical question for everybody. Are state functionaries
willing to share power with the workers and organised communities? Yes or
no? Power with no half measures. With regards to the conflict here, they
get annoyed because they’re playing ball with the transnational companies,
and we’re saying, it’s not a problem with staff, but a problem of political
ideology.

Those who unite to defend the old model, the transnational companies, the
opposition and those sectors inside the government, put the brakes on the
revolutionary process in order to maintain the “we’re replacing you with
me”, to maintain this structure of power.

The fundamental contradiction is how to relate to each other in order to
effect a real change in the midst of the prevailing system, which has
global characteristics, such as the imperial-state relationship. But the
fundamental contradiction is our relationships as human beings, which will
allow us to resolve the issue of the state, and stand against imperialism.
Right now, that is the only way in which the human being can attack the
disease which is enveloping the planet, which is a matter of individual
interests versus defending the interests of humanity. The development and
defence of nature itself, and precisely that historical process of
relationships between ourselves which relate to nature, evident in this
situation and in a concrete form through all these discussions that we are
having.

Alcasa has lived through all of these contradictions, and despite
operative-financial weaknesses, it is constructing workers’ control.

*Translated by Ewan Robertson and Rachael Boothroyd for Venezuelanalysis*
 ------------------------------
*Source URL (retrieved on 03/01/2012 - 7:35pm):*
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6720


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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