> [Part II of Blaut via H. Liu.] > > iv. Cultural Racism > > All of this notwithstanding, biological racism remained somewhat > respectable until the 1950s and 1960s, the classical era of national > liberation and civil rights struggles. Racist practice now needed a > new theory. At this time, mainstream scholarship was being assigned -- > quite literally: with funds and jobs provided -- the task of > formulating a theoretical structure which would rationalize continued > dominance of communities of color in the Third World and at home. Such > a theory would have to accept two anti-biological-racist propositions > which were axiomatic in Non-European communities: that Europeans are > not innately superior, and that economic development can bring > non-Europeans to the same level as Europeans. The problem was to show > that non-Europeans, though equal to Europeans in innate capacity, > cannot develop economically to the European level unless these > societies voluntarily accept the continued domination by European > countries and corporations, that is, neocolonialism. > > The outcome of this truly massive theory- building effort was the > theory of "modernization." This theory argued, in essence, that > non-Europeans are not racially, but rather culturally backward in > comparison to Europeans because of their history: their lesser > cultural evolution. And it is for this reason that they are poor. So > they must follow, under European guidance and "tutelage," the path > already trodden by Europeans as the only means of overcoming > backwardness. Non-Europeans were thereby defined as inferior in > attained level of achievement, not potential for achievement. This was > the real essence of cultural racism. > > One of the most interesting and important aspects of this > theory-building campaign was the deification of Max Weber by various > groups of social scientists, among them the Parsonian structural- > functionalists (see Peet 1991) and "traditional mind" theorists like > McClelland, most of whom were involved directly or indirectly in the > modernization-theory construction project. Weber himself, a > half-century before, had expressed the then-dominant European views > concerning non-Europeans, with some small improvements. Weber's > argument, though partially grounded in biological racism (see, e.g., > Weber 1958: 30; 1967: 387; 1981: 299, 379; 1951: 231-232), could > easily be detached from that grounding because most of what he wrote > about European superiority was axiomatic argumentation about the > uniqueness of the European mind -- its rationality, its spiritual > capacity -- and historical argumentation about the unique rise within > Europe, and Europe alone, of institutions and structures which were > the source of modernity. (See in particular Weber 1951; 1958; 1981.) > Neither rationality nor structure was (in general) connected backward > to race, as effect of a prime cause. Thus the Weberian argument could > be, and was, detached from race and presented as a theory of > modernization grounded in the uniqueness of European mentality and > culture, permanent qualities which throughout history gave Europeans a > continuously more rapid course toward modernity than non-Europeans.2 > Those who think that Weber became popular in the 1950s and 1960s > because of his well-known opposition to the Marxist theory of the rise > of capitalism are missing the bigger picture. Weber, and Weberianism, > became important at that time mainly because Weber provided > contemporary social scientists with a theory of modernization, > essentially an elegant and scholarly restatement of colonial-era ideas > about the uniqueness of European rationality and the uniqueness of > European culture history. Weber was to neocolonialism what Marx was to > socialism. In a manner of speaking, Weber was the godfather of > cultural racism. > > Cultural racism, as a theory, needs to prove the superiority of > Europeans, and needs to do so without recourse to the older arguments > from religion and from biology. How does it do this? By recourse to > history -- by constructing a characteristic theory of cultural (and > intellectual) history. The claim is simply made that nearly all of the > important cultural innovations which historically generate cultural > progress occurred first in Europe, then, later, diffused to the > non-European peoples (Blaut forthcoming 1992). Therefore, at each > moment in history Europeans are more advanced than non- Europeans in > overall cultural development (though not necessarily in each > particular culture trait), and they are more progressive than > non-Europeans. This is asserted as a great bundle of apparently > empirical facts about invention and innovation, not only of material > and technological traits but of political and social traits like the > state, the market, the family. The tellers of this tale saturate > history with European inventions, European progressiveness, European > progress. > > This massive bundle of purportedly empirical, factual statements was > woven together by means of a modern form of the 19th-century theory of > Eurocentric diffusionism (Blaut 1987a; 1987b). This theory evolved as > a justification and rationalization for classical colonialism. It > asserted, in essence, the following propositions about the world as a > whole and throughout all of history. (1) The world has a permanent > center, or core, and a permanent periphery. The center is Greater > Europe, that is, the continent of Europe plus, for ancient times, the > Bible Lands and, for modern times, the countries of European > settlement overseas. The core sector, Greater Europe, is naturally > inventive, innovative, progressive. (2) The periphery, the > non-European world, naturally remains traditional, culturally sluggish > or stagnant. (3) The basic reason why Europe is progressive, > innovative, etc., is some quality of mind or spirit, some > "rationality," peculiar to Europeans. (4) Progress occurs in the > periphery as a result of the diffusion, the outward spread, of new and > innovative traits from the core to the periphery. The diffusion > process itself is natural. It consists of the spread of European > ideas, European colonialism, European settlers, and European > commodities. Notice that the basic theory can be driven by religious, > biological, or cultural motors. In the modern, post-1945 form of the > theory, the motor was culture, or rather culture history. The theory > itself was softened in some ways, for instance conceding that some > progress takes place in non-Europe (in spite of cultural "blockages"), > but the structure remained basically the same. > > Modern diffusionism therefore depicts a world in which Europeans have > always been the most progressive people, and non-Europeans are > backward, and permanently the recipients of progressive ideas, things, > and people from Europe. It follows that progress for the periphery, > today as always in the past, must consist of the continued diffusion > of European "rationality" and institutions, European culture and > control. The periphery, today, includes the Third World, along with > Third World minorities embedded in the European-dominated countries > like the United States, in ghettos, reservations, prisons, > migrant-labor camps. > > The main proposition here is a kind of Eurocentric historical > tunnel-vision which can be called "tunnel history." Historical > causation occurs, basically, in Europe and its self-proclaimed culture > hearth, the ancient Near East. (Examples: the origin of agriculture, > cities, states, science, democracy, feudalism, private property, > discovery, capitalism, industry...) Non-Europe participates in > history mainly as recipient of diffusions from Europe. The most > important part of tunnel history concerns the world before 1492. (And > 1992 is a peculiarly appropriate year in which to point this out.) The > essential argument is this: Europe was advancing more rapidly than the > other civilizations of the world, and was more advanced than these > other civilizations, at the very beginning of the modern era, prior to > the rise of capitalism and modernization, and prior to the beginnings > of colonialism. Therefore, the superiority of Europeans as individuals > and of European culture has very, very old roots and, by inference, is > natural and fundamental. This proposition accomplishes everything > that biological racism accomplished and more; indeed, there is a > structural as well as functional parallelism between this doctrine and > biological racism. It argues, in essence, that a cultural, not > genetic, superiority appeared in the European cultural pool very long > ago and, just like genetic superiority, it has led ever since to a > greater rate of development for Europe and to a level of development > which, at each moment in history, is higher than that of non-European > cultures. Something occurred long ago in European culture which pushed > it into rapid progress. This something then continued to operate to > generate progress throughout all of later history. In effect: a > cultural gene, or cultural mutation. But cultural racism claims that a > vast number of these European cultural causes of progress, cultural > mutations, occurred, throughout history, one after another, each > adding further impetus to the progress of Europe, each pushing Europe > farther ahead of all other civilizations. > > > > v. A Few Examples > > Before I give a few illustrative examples of modern cultural-racist > theories, I have to offer two introductory comments to avoid > misunderstanding -- serious misunderstanding. First: Precisely for the > reason that we have, these days, so much racism yet so few racists, > cultural racism is not, in most cases, propagated by people whom we > would want to label "racists." The doctrine is theory, not > prejudice. Those scholars who advocate one or another form of it are > people who believe that they are dealing with facts, and with the > policy implications of these facts. Most of them reject prejudice and > are not prejudiced. They simply believe that there are straightforward > empirical reasons, grounded in cultural differences, which explain why > some groups and individuals are backward. > > Secondly, it is very important to distinguish between those statements > which merely assert that some culture traits survive for long periods > of time and those statements which assert that some ancient, or at any > rate tenacious, culture traits explain the superiority of this culture > and the inferiority of that one. Change is the normal condition in > human cultures. If there is lack of change, it is either because the > members of a culture do not want to discard some cherished traits or > have no choice because of impinging circumstances. No human group is > so stupid as to cherish misery, want, and death. Culture traits which > generate or worsen such things are discarded, and quite deliberately > so. (There are exceptions to this generalization, but they are very > rare, though much publicized, particularly in freshman textbooks.) > Cultural ecologists speak of a "culture core" consisting of those > traits and institutions which lie close to the realm of human > survival: matters of life and death (see in particular Steward > 1955). This part of culture is very plastic, very adaptive. People > resist change in other parts of their culture (such as religion). But > it is very questionable to infer that human groups will retain any > traits if doing so is destructive to their livelihood and > survival. Therefore, whenever you hear a statement like "this group is > unprogressive because of its religious values," or "that group is poor > because its members are tradition-minded and opposed to innovation," > you should be on the lookout for cultural racism. It is one thing to > respect culture, and to appreciate cultural differences, and quite > another thing to rank human groups on cultural criteria, and to claim > then that you have explained history. > > Now some examples. > > 1. Many historians, today as in the past, claim to find a uniqueness > in the culture of very early Europe, something which they connect with > the early Indo-Europeans (e.g., Lelekov 1985; Baechler 1988) or the > Germans (e.g., Macfarlane 1978; 1986; Crone 1989) or the Iron-Age > peasants (Mann 1986; 1988), and quite regularly attach to the ancient > Greeks as contradistinct from their non-Indo-European neighbors (see > the analysis of this matter in Bernal 1987). In Marx's Germany, the > conventional wisdom was that ancient Germans were uniquely > freedom-loving, innovative, individualistic, aggressive, and rational; > the modern form of the doctrine does not depart much from this > formulation except as it admits Celts and Greeks to membership; no > modern evidence adds support. Here, now, are some of the historical > theories built upon the doctrine. (i) Ancient Europeans were uniquely > inventive and technologically innovative, and thereafter remained so > (Jones 1981). (ii) Ancient Europeans acquired a unique love of > freedom, which matured then into a democratic state (Mann 1986; Hall, > 1985). (iii) Ancient Europeans, because of or in close association > with their individualism, adopted a unique family type which then > acted to favor progressiveness, innovativeness, and, incipiently, > capitalism (Jones 1981; Macfarlane 1986; Todd 1985). > > 2. Many theories begin Europe's uniqueness with Roman times, or > slightly earlier, often focusing on the Church, or the partly > pre-Christian "Judeo- Christian tradition," or the later Western > Church. Different theories find different causes for the emergence of > the new, and unique, and uniquely progressive culture. The effects > also are manifold. For instance: (i) Lynn White, Jr,. argues that the > Judeo-Christian teleology explains Western technological inventiveness > and innovativeness (see Blaut forthcoming 1992); (ii) Anderson (1974) > sees something uniquely scientific and intellectual in the cultural > heirs to the Greeks and Romans; (iii) Werner (1988) believes that > European s became uniquely progressive because Christianity alone gave > prominence to the individual. > > 3. A great many present-day historians believe that Europeans long ago > acquired an ability to resist the Malthusian disasters which > supposedly blocked development in every other culture, some of the > arguments starting with the ancient Iron Age folk, some with an > amalgam of Germanic and Christian elements, some with medieval > Northwest-Europeans (see Mann 1986; Macfarlane 1986; Jones 1981; Stone > 1977; Crone 1989 and many others). This then becomes a general theory > explaining what some call the "European miracle," by arguing that the > (mythically unique) European family, nuclear, late-marrying, > companionate, led to population control (Hall [1985: 131] speaks of > "the relative continence of the European family"); led also to a > capitalist mentality (Macfarlane 1986; Laslett 1988); even led > unmarried European men to go forth and conquer the world because of > their sexual frustration (Stone 1977: 54). > > > 4. Paralleling all of these arguments is a set of arguments to the > effect that non-Europeans, long ago, acquired cultural qualities which > blocked development, or -- this is perhaps the more common formulation > -- such qualities are "traditional," and therefore have always been > present in non-European cultures. Todd (1985: 192) thinks that > Africans and African-Americans do not progress because the African > family has always lacked the father-figure. Many other scholars point > either to specific old traits in specific cultures as causes of > non-change, or else depict a world-wide zone of "traditional cultures" > -- including almost all non-European cultures -- which "traditionally" > lacked rationality, or achievement motivation, or sexual continence, > or some other quality necessary to forward historical motion. It must > be added that this argument is also used very routinely to explain the > poverty of minority people in countries like the United States. When, > for instance, lack of progress among Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in > this country is attributed to the "traditional culture," its supposed > "fatalistic attitudes," "docility," etc., etc., this is still cultural > racism even though the source of the cultural argument is not ancient > but rather a kind of undated "traditional society." > > Cultural racism is rooted most fundamentally in historical mythology > about the priority of Europe and thus the supposedly more mature, > evolved, rational character of Europeans, today, at home and > abroad. By way of closing this short paper I will simply note that, > even if all of the roots are torn out, the vine will not wither: it > will grow other roots, a new theory of racism, unless racism is > attacked, not as theory but as practice. > _______________________________________________ Leninist-International mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.wwpublish.com/mailman/listinfo/leninist-international
