this is to prevent modifications that would render it as a malware. I haven't
signed the code yet so I am just protecting myself from such liabilities.
On Jun 28, 2013, at 12:51 AM, John Sullivan jo...@fsf.org wrote:
I like the idea, so I was checking it out. I was confused by this
I had similar confusion when I first started poking around - couldn't
find a proper LICENSE file and then the ToUs including things that
read an awful lot like Facebook instead of a distrubuted
privacy-centric system.
Including:
---
a. You will not provide any false personal information on
those are all to protect our organization (CU Boulder) from any liability. also
the contents that can be shared on this social network can be pretty much
anything and since we can't control or monitor any of the contents being shared
we had to have a strict terms of use agreement just to be
*nod* Yeah, that's was the hint I got.. but the bits about relay
servers, registration, etc. Lets set those aside.
How do you ~intend~ for this to behave in the wild? Every single
client w/ a Jetty stack? And - given that footprint - why not start
within a framework like I2P? (I'm not
Thank you - I read your comments on Diaspora, Tor, I2P, etc. and
through section 4.2.2 (Adversary Model) of your thesis. I find it
curious that some of the issues you're critical of in those systems
you've actually implemented into your own design (e.g. you do have a
central server/trust
In your resources section - you're not drawing a direct comparison but
do note model shortcomings. No worries there.. I'm trying to
understand what your design is in the context of your opening email to
the list:
military grade encryption and no authority can have any control over
it. one design
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57591391-38/surveillance-partnership-between-nsa-and-telcos-points-to-at-t-verizon/
Surveillance 'partnership' between NSA and telcos points to ATT, Verizon
Newly disclosed classified document suggests firms allowed spy agency to
access e-mail and phone call
On 27 June 2013 05:07, Rich Kulawiec r...@gsp.org wrote:
[ Okay, so I have a long-winded response to this. It's possible that
eventually I'll wander somewhere near a point. ;-) ]
...
...
My suggestion (and this is based on many other kinds of operations
since I've never run a Tor exit node)
On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 2:07 PM, Markus Beckedahl
mar...@netzpolitik.org wrote:
hi,
Privacy activists just held a protest at the well-known Berlin Wall crossing
point Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin. As President Barack Obama prepares to
arrive in the german capital, the protest critizised
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On 2013.06.28 03.37, Alireza Mahdian wrote:
First of all anonymity is not a goal here.
I'm going to come down on you kind of hard here, but it's not aimed at
you, it's aimed at everyone building systems like this.
A month ago, you could plausibly
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On 2013.06.28 04.21, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 04:56:24PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
I agree - no smartphones is sound advice. No phones is even
better. But the problem is, nobody follows that advice. So we
have to be
From: Eleanor Saitta e...@dymaxion.org
To: liberationtech liberationt...@mailman.stanford.edu
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 12:24 PM
Subject: Re: [liberationtech] a privacy preserving and resilient social network
[...]
Congratulations! Your job is now to
On Friday, June 28, 2013 12:28 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
On 2013.06.28 04.21, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 04:56:24PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
I agree - no smartphones is sound advice. No phones is
even better. But the problem is, nobody follows that advice. So
we have to
I want to commend Alirezza.
It's very important for us to welcome all those who design and conduct
research on liberation technologies, I commend him for trying to
build something of importance to all of us and dealing with the
inevitable issues that result from doing so.
One of the great
Tom Ritter:
On 27 June 2013 05:07, Rich Kulawiec r...@gsp.org wrote:
[ Okay, so I have a long-winded response to this. It's possible that
eventually I'll wander somewhere near a point. ;-) ]
...
...
My suggestion (and this is based on many other kinds of operations
since I've never
So I'm setting up a new Jabber service at www.patts.us.
I want to make it as secure and safe as possible for people to use it
and I'd like some advice. Here's what I've done so far:
1. Turned off all logging on the server (httpd, xmpp, etc)
2. Doesn't require ANY user info to register
3. Doesn't
Il 6/29/13 1:02 AM, Anthony Papillion ha scritto:
So I'm setting up a new Jabber service at www.patts.us.
I want to make it as secure and safe as possible for people to use it
and I'd like some advice. Here's what I've done so far:
1. Turned off all logging on the server (httpd, xmpp, etc)
2.
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[apologies for top-posting]
There are different kinds of linkability that matter. Linkability
from an external adversary and my ability to identify myself to a
friend are unrelated. If we posit a Facebook where I only connect via
Tor, only post
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On 2013.06.28 13.14, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
Just curious, Eleanor-- once you implement your bullet-proof
privacy- preserving network, how do you plan to make the user
experience at all tolerable without automated mirroring like what
this
Encryption meaningfully prevented a wiretap
for the first time ever in *2012* (or so we're told, for
non-intelligence domestic US wiretaps), and has only ever worked five
times.
What are you referring to? Do you have a pointer to more information?
I am very curious.
--
Matt Johnson
On Fri,
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On 2013.06.29 01.18, Matt Johnson wrote:
Encryption meaningfully prevented a wiretap for the first time
ever in *2012* (or so we're told, for non-intelligence domestic US
wiretaps), and has only ever worked five times.
What are you referring
Well that is good news, thanks for the pointer!
Now all we need is for the court to report what cipher and which
encryption tools were used...
--
Matt Johnson
On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 10:21 PM, Eleanor Saitta e...@dymaxion.org wrote:
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On
I really hope all your other facts are not based on this link you sent. as Matt
rightfully put it we don't know the kind of cipher that was used it could have
been a very primitive one. you are making a very bold statement based on a
very incomplete data. it is as if you are claiming that if
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