This Spring will be the first Open Whisper Systems Spring Break Of Code,
a week-long expenses-paid retreat to Maui for folks who like software
development, security, and the beach. We’ve rented a large beachfront
house on the west coast of Maui for everyone to stay in, and will pay
for your airfar
On 12/22/2012 04:49 AM, Brian Conley wrote:
> That said, thus far, neither redphone nor those over listed rivals skype
> or Google hangouts quality of transmission.
Depends. RedPhone's audio quality is (in general) substantially better
on Android than Skype's has been. Skype's desktop audio qu
On 10/11/2012 11:24 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote:
>> Zimmerman stated that servers are located in Canada to avoid US
>> subpoenas (not a lawyer, not sure what's that worth in the end).
>
> His entire IP block is connected to servers in the United States. I
> am very skeptical of that claim. Furtherm
On 10/11/2012 09:15 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote:
> James, you can charge for a service and leave it as open source
> software. This has been done countless times over the years and has
> functioned successfully. I am not against Silent Circle costing money -
> I'm against it being closed source soft
On 08/13/2012 09:18 AM, Brian Conley wrote:
> I'd love your thoughts, you may also be interested in some of the issues
> I've noted with TextSecure and Truecrypt, and how they may provide
> lessons to all of us involved in developing better tools and training
> for activists, journalists, etc.
H
On 08/08/2012 06:37 AM, liberationt...@lewman.us wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 07, 2012 at 05:18:02PM -0700, e...@sundelof.com wrote 4.7K bytes
> in 111 lines about:
> :partial defenses using any technology tool. I may feel too strong about
> :tools being discussed as THE solution or THE bulletproof vest
On 08/06/2012 10:19 PM, fr...@journalistsecurity.net wrote:
> No doubt the functional security of tools is an indispensable, essential
> concern. Ignoring any vulnerabilities is dangerous, indeed. But the
> usability of the same tools and making them accessible to
> non-technologists is just as b
On 08/06/2012 06:59 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
> Except that with your harm mitigation, you push many potential users
> back to plaintext, where they are guaranteed to be owned. What
> percentage of potential cryptocat users would the plugin version have to
> stop from using the tool for you to a
On 08/06/2012 06:22 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote:
> Is not Riseup accessed over SSL webmail a comparable analogy to current
> Cryptocat? And yet activists without their own .mx trust Riseup, and no
> one says there's little to no difference between Facebook email and
> Riseup email.
I actually disagr
On 08/06/2012 05:28 PM, Jillian C. York wrote:
> A /safer /web-based tool than Facebook chat with a GIANT WARNING is far
> better than everyone continuing to hold their discussions in insecure fora.
I think this sentence is really the essence of the problem. Why do you
assume it's safer?
Crypt
I've noticed that this discussion has a tendency to be framed in terms
of the crypto primitives. The core problems, as I see them, are
actually somewhat unrelated to whether it's possible to efficiently
perform cryptographic operations in JavaScript or not. In my reading,
this blog post seems to
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