Il 11/9/13 11:29 PM, Tony Arcieri ha scritto:
>
> Please, think to use that pile of standards and think to approach
> email
> security by improving those one.
>
>
> It would be irresponsible not to. There is a fine line to be walked
> between improving the user experience and building u
On Sat, Nov 9, 2013 at 12:37 AM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) <
li...@infosecurity.ch> wrote:
> We have a big pile of existing very good and very strong IETF RFC
> standards for email.
>
> We need to improve the way those are used.
>
> We have OpenPGP.
> We have MIME.
> We have S/MIME.
> We have TLS.
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Why should I continue to trust the very standards and systems that
were subverted, corrupted, or just plain sold me out for a profit?
Standards and organizations that enshrined & codified confusing,
weakened, and watered down systems and made privacy
Why is it better to limit our innovation to the existing standards when
creating the nonexistent secure messaging system? Sometimes we could
improve security of a system by adding layers to it, like HTTPS and ZRTP;
sometimes hacking on a legacy protocol isn't good enough and we create new
things. A
On Sat, Nov 09, 2013 09:37:27 AM +0100, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> All initiatiatives are trying to setup some new technological
> infrastructure, some new communication or encryption protocol.
>
> We MUST USE THE INTERNET STANDARDS, with modifications here and there,
> improving them, in
Hi,
everytime there is a debate and discussion on email security i always
stand-up when i hear that most of the proposed approach are to "reinvent
the wheel".
All initiatiatives are trying to setup some new technological
infrastructure, some new communication or encryption protocol.
We MUST USE
