John Adams:
> ECHDE_RSA offers an excellent degree of protection against after the fact
> analysis if and only if the private key is disclosed (or captured.)
>
> If the the privkey is unavailable, NSA can always go after the session keys
> -- capture of communications is actually made easier in th
ECHDE_RSA offers an excellent degree of protection against after the fact
analysis if and only if the private key is disclosed (or captured.)
If the the privkey is unavailable, NSA can always go after the session keys
-- capture of communications is actually made easier in these cases when
sites u
Am I off in thinking that this is a good time to push more web
properties to use forwardly secret SSL key exchange (like Google does
with ECDHE_RSA)?
best, Joe
On Fri Jun 21 08:32:46 2013, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>
> http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/06/20/leaked-nsa-doc-says-it-can-col
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/06/20/leaked-nsa-doc-says-it-can-collect-and-keep-your-encrypted-data-as-long-as-it-takes-to-crack-it/
Leaked NSA Doc Says It Can Collect And Keep Your Encrypted Data As Long As It
Takes To Crack It
If you use privacy tools, according to the appare
