On 08/22/2013 08:09 PM, Tom Ritter wrote:
>> https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/ Since these
>> key exchange parts are ephemeral, recording ciphertext traffic
>> doesn’t help a would-be adversary, since there is no durable key
>> for them to compromise in the future.
>
> I disa
> https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/
> Since these key exchange parts are ephemeral, recording ciphertext traffic
> doesn’t help a would-be adversary, since there is no durable key for them to
> compromise in the future.
I disagree. PFS traffic today protected with 1024-bit
On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:03 AM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
> TextSecure’s upcoming iOS client (and Android data channel client) uses
> a simple trick to provide asynchronous messaging while simultaneously
> providing forward secrecy.
I've seen people want PGP to do this before— have every encry
On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 9:03 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
> TextSecure’s upcoming iOS client (and Android data channel client) uses
> a simple trick to provide asynchronous messaging while simultaneously
> providing forward secrecy.
Not sure if I understand all iOS-related issues described, but
https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/
...
The TextSecure Protocol
TextSecure’s upcoming iOS client (and Android data channel client) uses
a simple trick to provide asynchronous messaging while simultaneously
providing forward secrecy.
At registration time, the TextSecure client
