Re: [Lightning-dev] Why do we need fee estimation in the protocol?

2018-05-14 Thread ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev
Good morning CJP, Rusty, and list, > > But why do we need consensus at all? There are two versions of each > > > > commitment transaction: one to be used for unilateral close by one peer > > > > (A), and one to be used by the other (B). Peer A has an interest in > > > > "commit transaction A",

Re: [Lightning-dev] Why do we need fee estimation in the protocol?

2018-05-14 Thread Rusty Russell
CJP writes: > Hi, > > Maybe this is a stupid question, and it is late so maybe I'm > overlooking something, but I don't want to lose a potentially good > idea, so here it goes: > > Right now, BOLT#3 imposes a certain algorithm for fee estimation. This > algorithm is likely to be sub-optimal: fee e

Re: [Lightning-dev] Mitigations for loop attacks

2018-05-14 Thread Rusty Russell
Jim Posen writes: > Thanks for the thoughtful responses. > >> You missed the vital detail: that you must prove channel closure if you >> can't unpeel the onion further. That *will* hit an unresponsive party >> with a penalty. > > Ah, that is a good point. I still find the proposal overall worryin

Re: [Lightning-dev] [bitcoin-dev] BIP sighash_noinput

2018-05-14 Thread Anthony Towns
On Thu, May 10, 2018 at 08:34:58AM +0930, Rusty Russell wrote: > > The big concern I have with _NOINPUT is that it has a huge failure > > case: if you use the same key for multiple inputs and sign one of them > > with _NOINPUT, you've spent all of them. The current proposal kind-of > > limits the p